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Abstract 
The topic of insider/director trading raises interesting questions and has 
generated much attention from researchers, market participants and regulators. 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the long-run director trading 
performance in the UK market. It examines relationship between aggregate 
director trading and indicators of the UK macroeconomy focus on the macro-
aspects in Chapter 4 and 5. The extant empirical literature on aggregate 
director trading can be categorized into two parts: the first is the relationship 
between director trading and the stock market; and the second is the link 
between stock returns and future aggregate economic activities. Having 
examined the macro-picture, it goes to examine a more micro-picture. Chapter 
6 examines long-run relationship between director trading and market reactions.  
This thesis is organized around three research studies which are presented in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 and which examine long-run director trading activities in the 
UK. Chapters 4 and 5 together investigate the evidence for director trading 
activities and the macroeconomy. There is little literature on aggregate director 
trading and the macro-economy: therefore Chapter 4 examines the relationship 
between aggregate director trading and future market excess returns. Empirical 
evidence is presented which demonstrates that the returns on stock market are 
significantly correlated to future economic growth. Chapter 5 then examines 
whether the forecasting ability can be improved by adding aggregate director 
trading as a measurement of business confidence into the forecasting model. 
Chapter 6 examines the long-run performance of market reaction to director 
roles.  
In order to examine the relationship between aggregate director trading and the 
macro-economy, the link between aggregate director trading and future market 
excess returns is investigated. This thesis considers the importance of the 
seasonality issue in UK director trading and employs a number of alternative 
seasonality adjustments to adjust the raw data on aggregate director trading. 
The positive correlation between aggregate director trading and future market 
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excess returns is confirmed and evidence is provided that indicates directors 
are contrarian: in aggregate they purchase (sell) their own-company stock prior 
to general stock market increases (decreases). In the long-run, the empirical 
work demonstrates that aggregate director trading has forecasting power in 
terms of predicting future stock market excess returns. Additional findings are 
that aggregate director trading in large firms has a positive significant predictive 
ability for identifying future excess returns of large firms and aggregate director 
trading of some industries has positive significant forecasting ability for future 
excess returns of these industries.  
Having confirmed the relationship between aggregate director trading and future 
market movement, this thesis turns to examine the link between aggregate 
director trading and future UK economic growth. It measures economic growth 
of future real economic activity by the change in gross domestic product (GDP) 
and it documents a strong correlation between past aggregate director trading 
and future real economic activity. The predictability of future economic growth 
increases with both the length of forecasting horizon and past net number of 
director trading. In a multivariate regression analysis this thesis finds that 
aggregate director trading retains predicting power with respect to future GDP 
growth even after including popular business cycle variables (dividend yield of 
FTSE All share, growth rate of industrial production and term spread) as 
explanatory variables. This finding suggests that aggregate director trading 
captures things related to changes in real activity but not captured by market 
factors (Fama-French 3 factors: SMB, HML and RMRF) and business cycle 
variables.  
After examining the relationship between aggregate director trading, market 
returns and changes in GDP, the last empirical Chapter of the thesis 
concentrates director trading on the micro-aspects of director trading and stock 
movement. It examines the stock market reaction to director trading with firm 
characteristics and the effects of director trading pattern. Using long-run 
calendar-time abnormal returns (CTAR) methodology with Fama-French 3-
factor model, evidence is presented that directors do have more valuable 
information allowing them to make significant abnormal returns than other 
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market participants, the performance of CFOs supports the information 
hierarchy hypothesis in 1- and 6-month post-purchase trading time, and the 
director trading with firm characteristics has a significant effect on stock 
abnormal returns. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
It has long been established that insiders/directors (corporate executives or 
company directors) are able to trade profitably in their own companies’ stock in 
the market, and that outsiders following these trading strategies can also earn 
significant and abnormal returns.  
The reasons that director trade are first, director are contrarian. They tend to 
buy stocks with poor past performance and cheap according to measures such 
as B/M (Seyhun, 1988, 1990, 1992; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Gregory et al., 
2013). Second, director trading could make profit. Directors have many reasons 
to sell shares, but the main reason to buy shares is to make money. That is why 
most of empirical works find director purchase is useful signal, while sales are 
not (Gregory et al., 1997; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Fidrmuc at al., 2006).  
Most of the previous literature has focused on the share price reaction of 
aggregate insider/director trading in terms of individual company effect, but this 
thesis focuses on aggregate director trading activities. The existing empirical 
literature uses two approaches to measure the effect of insiders/directors 
information on share prices. One strand of the literature argues that price 
reaction is via the long-run abnormal returns earned over the 6 to 12 months 
after a transaction. The existence of significant abnormal returns over this 
period is interpreted as proof of superior insiders/directors information (for 
example, Jaff, 1974; Seyhun, 1992; Gregory et al., 1994; Gregory et al., 1997; 
Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Gregory et al., 2012; Gregory et al., 2013). The 
second strand of the literature assumes that stock markets are (to some degree 
at least) informationally efficient and that share prices adjust rapidly to 
insiders/directors trades. These studies measure the abnormal return on the 
date of announcement of the insider/director trade (Jaffe, 1974; Friederich et al., 
2002; Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Gregory et al., 2012). In other words, these 
empirical works are based on event studies.  
Economic theory suggests that stock prices reflect expectations about future 
corporate earnings. Corporate profits are an important part of gross domestic 
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product (GDP) and also are likely to be correlated with its components, 
including consumption and investment. The forward-looking nature of stock 
prices would imply that stock prices should be valuable as leading indicators of 
economic activity.  
Previous studies conducted in the US (Moore 1983, Fama 1981, Fischer and 
Merton 1984, Barro 1990, Vassalou 2003, Reilly and Brown, 2006) have found 
that the relationship between stock returns and future real activity is strong, 
which indicates that stock prices are a leading indicator of economic activity. 
International evidence including that from the UK market, is consistent with the 
US finding. Studies by Klein and Moore (1985), Aylward and Glen (2000), Liew 
and Vassalou (2000), Gregory et al. (2003) showed that stock markets returns 
are significant correlated to future economic growth.  
Seyhun (1992) established the cash flow hypothesis which postulates that 
corporate insiders can predict the future cash flows in their own firms before 
other market participants. To the extent that the changes in cash flows are due 
to the future economy-wide activity, insiders in all firms will also observe similar 
signals in their own firms and also trade in their own firms in the same direction. 
After a while, as changes in economy-wide cash flows become recognized by 
other market participants, the stock prices of all firms will tend to adjust. 
Consequently, aggregate insider trading can predict the future real activity and 
future stock returns. Seyhun’s (1992) empirical work presents the results of 
growth rates of gross national product (GNP), the Index of Industrial Production, 
and after-tax corporate profits and demonstrates these are consistent with the 
cash flow hypothesis: aggregate insider trading is positively correlated with all of 
these three measures of real activity 12 to 20 months in the future. Moreover, 
aggregate insider trading follows an increase in future real activity albeit with a 6 
to 12-month lag. 
Although there is some existing literature on aggregate insider/director trading, 
it is not very extensive. Therefore, this thesis will demonstrate relationship 
between aggregate director trading and future aggregate macroeconomic 
activities. In order to link the connection, it establishes correlation between 
aggregate director trading and future market excess, and correlation between 
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future economic growth and market returns. Also, it examines whether 
aggregate director trading is a good measure of business confidence.  
Besides investigating long-run director trading with regard to the macro-aspects, 
the thesis also concentrates on the micro-aspects. It examines long-run 
performance of market reaction to director trading patterns.  
The information hierarchy hypothesis postulates that the information content of 
transactions depends on the type of director who trades (Seyhun, 1986). 
According to this hypothesis, directors who are familiar with the day-to-day 
operations of the company trade on more valuable information. This may be 
reflected in the returns to their trade, if and when they trade. In other words, if 
directors trade based on their information access, the abnormal returns depend 
on the type of director that makes the trade, which should follow the order by 
category of director: CEO, CFO, other executive directors and other non-
executive directors. 
Some the US and UK studies supports the information hypothesis (Seyhun, 
1986; Lin and Howe, 1990; Gregory et al., 2012). In contrast, some empirical 
works do not support or do not find any evidence of information hierarchy (Jeng 
et al., 1999; 2003; Fidrmuc et al., 2006). Hence, the thesis will investigate long-
run performance of market reaction to director trading patterns in the UK market.   
1.2 Research Questions 
In generally, previous studies have confirmed the relationship between future 
economic growth and stock returns using evidence from the US and 
internationally. Some research has identified a relationship between aggregate 
insider trading and future economic growth in the US but this has not yet been 
demonstrated in the UK. Thus, it is essential to investigate the link between 
aggregate UK director trading and future economic growth. Second, as 
mentioned in Section 1.1, the thesis will examine long-run director trading study 
to study the information hierarchy hypothesis in the UK. Specifically, this 
research addresses the following questions: 
1. Is aggregate director trading activity a useful component in predicting 
future economic activity? 
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2. Is aggregate director trading a leading, coincident or lagging indicator? 
3. Do UK director trading patterns support the information hierarchy 
hypothesis? 
Answering questions 1 and 2, firstly requires examining the evidence as to 
whether aggregate director trading is significantly correlated to future market 
excess returns, this is presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 carries out an 
investigation into the relationship between aggregate director trading and future 
economic growth. Meanwhile, Chapter 6 examines the information hierarchy 
hypothesis to try to solve question 3 through a long-run study.  
1.3 Contribution of this Thesis 
This thesis examines aggregate director trading activity in the UK in a long-run 
study. It confirms that aggregate director trading has a positive significant 
relationship with the future excess returns of market portfolios, and has 
predictive power for future excess stock returns. A further study confirms that 
aggregate director trading is a leading indicator that has a forecasting ability for 
future economic movements. The major contributions of this thesis are: 
 The first and also the most important contribution is that this thesis finds 
evidence that aggregate director trading (also CBI industrial trends 
survey data, CBI business confidence) is a leading indicator that has a 
positive significant forecasting ability of future economic growth. This 
finding covers gap of academic research literature between director 
trading and macroeconomic activities in the UK.  
 Another important contribution is this thesis constructs seasonality 
methods to measure UK aggregate director trading activities. Three 
seasonal adjustments are applied: month dummy, seasonality 
adjustments based on trading assumptions, and based on real 
companies’ fiscal-year ends. Furthermore, it also checks the month-of-
the-year effect on market returns and trading volume in order to minimize 
other unexpected factors that may affect relationship between aggregate 
director trading and future market excess returns.   
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 This thesis tests a firm’s characteristics and the information hierarchy 
hypothesis using director trading patterns. By categorizing directors into 
six non-overlapping groups (CEOs, CFOs, executive chairmen, non-
executive chairmen, other executives and other non-executives), it is 
shown in the long-run study that this hypothesis can be rejected within 
the UK market.  
 In addition to the seasonality adjustments, several measurements of 
director trading transactions are also applied. This thesis employs 
traditional net number of purchase transactions, the net purchase ratio, 
the difference of net purchase ratio, the difference of net purchase 
transaction, and the growth rate of net purchases in order to check the 
performance of aggregate director trading.  
 Finally, 23 years with 276 calendar months of director trading are 
included within the range of January 1986 to December 2008. This is the 
longest time period employed in studies of UK aggregate director trading 
to date.  
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter, whilst 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the relevant literature and the US and UK 
regulation framework related to insiders/directors trading.  
Chapter 3 provides details of director trading data for the UK, and the data filter 
employed and sample characteristics are described. Due to the various fiscal-
year ends of UK-listed companies and UK regulation requirements, director 
trading has to address the issue of seasonality. Thus, in Chapter 3 one 
important aspect is the construction of seasonality adjustments for UK director 
trading.  
Chapter 4 examines the relationship between aggregate director trading and 
future market excess returns. The methods of Seyhun (1988, 1992) and 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) using long-run cumulative excess returns (CERs) 
and buy and hold excess returns (BHERs) are applied with the constructed 
seasonality adjustment. Several measurements of director trading activities are 
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also introduced. This chapter also includes robustness check for director trading 
with firm size control and examining subsample industry performance.  
Chapter 5 tests the relationship between aggregate director trading and future 
macroeconomic movement. A sensitivity test is employed to indicate the 
performance of the relationship between aggregate director trading and future 
economic growth. The multivariate regression method of Liew and Vassalou 
(2001) is applied to link director trading and future economic change by 
controlling for the performance of the stock market and business cycle.   
 
Chapter 6 details the performance of market reaction to director trading through 
firm characteristics and the information hierarchy hypothesis in a long-run study 
in the UK. Fama-French 3-factor and Carhart 4-factor models with calendar time 
abnormal returns are applied to examine whether director trading with firm 
characteristics affects the performance of abnormal returns and whether 
performance of post-trading activities of director trading patterns supports the 
information hypothesis.  
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the major finds of this thesis and addresses the 
limitations of the research and suggests some future studies.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review and Regulatory Framework 
2.1 Literature Review 
Two terms need to first be clarified; that of who are insiders and who are 
directors. Generally speaking, the term ‘insiders’ is applied in US studies while 
the term ‘directors’ is employed in UK studies. In the US, The Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 defines insiders as officers, directors, and shareholders 
of 10% or more of any equity class of securities. Directors in the UK are 
members of the board of directors (both executives and non-executives), and 
therefore the use of this term excludes other key employees and large 
shareholders.  
2.1.1 Director Trading and Future Market Return 
Early investigations into the relationship between director trading activity and 
market performance are well documented in US studies; Jaffe (1974) and 
Finnerty (1976) reported significant abnormal returns associated with directors’ 
trading activity. Seyhun (1986) found that significant abnormal returns 
associated with insiders’ transactions were inversely correlated with firm size, 
and claimed that since small companies have wide spreads it would not be 
possible for outsiders to earn abnormal returns by following insiders’ 
transactions. Seyhun (1988) reported that aggregate insider trading is positively 
correlated to future market returns for the 1975-1981 period. He found an 
increase in current aggregate insider trading was associated with an increase in 
future excess market returns to risk-free rate 2-month ahead. A later paper by 
Seyhun (1990) reported on the transactions of insiders following the 1987 stock 
market crash. Although insiders were neither heavy buyers nor sellers in the 
period leading up to the crash, heavy purchasing activity followed it. This led 
Seyhun to conclude that the fall in share prices at least in part, represented an 
overreaction by the markets, resulting in moving share prices away from their 
fundamental values. He also concluded that insiders used additional information 
in forming their purchasing decisions rather than relying upon ‘a naïve mean 
reversion strategy’ (pp.1381-83) Seyhun (1992) extended his findings on the 
predictive ability of aggregate insider trading by examining the forecasting ability 
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of multi-month aggregate insider trading and the variables that are associated 
with business conditions and fundamental values. He documented the 
predictability of stock returns increasing with the length of forecasting horizon, 
the number of months of past insider trading. Insider trading retains its marginal 
explanatory power when future real activity is included as an additional 
explanatory variable. Moreover, other predictors of time series variation in stock 
returns, such as past stock returns, dividend yields, and term and default 
spreads, do not attenuate the predictive power of aggregate insider trading. The 
evidence suggests that aggregate insider trading captures a component of 
stock returns not related to movement in future real activity, dividend yields, 
past stock returns, and term or default spreads. 
Insider transactions are consistent with a well-informed contrarian approach to 
stock investing (Rozeff and Zaman, 1998; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jenter, 
2005, Jiang and Zaman, 2010). 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) examined insider trading activities for all the 
companies traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX), and NASDAQ during the 1975-1995 period. They found 
only small stock price responses to the reporting announcement of the trade to 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). They found that insiders in 
aggregate trading are contrarian investors, but that they predict market 
movements better than simple contrarian strategies. They also found that the 
limited stock price reaction is more apparent for smaller firms on the buying side, 
but there is no response on the selling side.  Only insider purchases appear to 
be useful, while sales are not associated with low returns, ‘insiders have many 
reasons to sell shares, but the main reason to buy shares is to make money’ 
(Lakonishok and Lee 2001, p.109). 
Meanwhile, empirical works documenting dollar volume and large firm 
performance have failed. Jaffe (1974) examined large dollar volume of trading 
by insiders, but concluded that this was not related to the value of insider 
information. Seyhun (1986) found that the coefficient of dollar volume trading is 
insignificantly different from zero, which suggests that the dollar value of insider 
trading is not related to the value of insider information. His finding is similar to 
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those of Jaffe (1974) and Scholes (1972) who also failed to find a relationship 
between dollar volume of trading and value of insider information. Lakonishok 
and Lee (2001) noted that insider trading based on dollar volume of trading 
contained less information, possibly because it might be influenced by a few 
very large transactions.  
For the insider performance of large firms, Seyhun (1986) found that insiders in 
large firms and large shareholders in all firms trade on less valuable information. 
He explained the lack of information content of the large dollar volume 
transactions as probably being due to the fact that the large dollar volume of 
transactions are proxies for large firms and large shareholders: insiders in large 
firms and large shareholders in all firms who happen to trade the large dollar 
volume transactions, also trade on less valuable information. Lakonishok and 
Lee (2001) found that large companies are priced more efficiently than small 
companies and consequently, insiders have a relative advantage in timing an 
index of small stocks than an index of large stocks. 
In the UK, the earliest investigation of the impact of directors’ trading was by 
King and Roell (1988). Using a filtered sample obtained from the transactions of 
directors published weekly in the financial times for 1986 to 1987, they found 
that significant and very large positive abnormal returns were associated with 
directors’ purchases, but insignificant negative abnormal returns followed 
directors’ sales. The finding of Pope et al. (1990) contradict the results of King 
and Roell, showing that in two of the three sub-periods examined it is the 
negative abnormal returns following directors’ sales which are significant. 
Gregory et al. (1994) demonstrated that both directors’ purchases and directors’ 
sales can produce significant abnormal returns when measured by a 
‘conventional’ event study methodology. However, when a size effect is 
controlled for, only directors’ purchases indicate significant abnormal returns, 
the magnitude of which is considerably reduced. Using as a signal the monthly 
net volume of directors’ trades, Gregory et al. (1997) documented a similar 
conclusion to Gregory et al. (1994), that monthly abnormal returns following a 
purchase signal are small but significantly positive for up to 24 months. The 
returns for the sale signal, though always negative and insignificant, can be 
statistically insignificant in the longer term.  
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Recent UK studies have mainly concentrated on the event study of director 
trading activities. Friederich et al. (2002) used daily data to analyze trades by 
UK directors for the period 1986-1994 and found annualized abnormal returns 
were significantly negative (-2.85%) in the 20 days before a purchase, and then 
the abnormal returns are significantly positive (1.96%) for the 20 days after the 
directors’ trade. Fidrmuc et al. (2006) reported similar results for directors’ 
trades in UK companies over the period 1991-1998, and also considered the 
trade size on the CARs. They investigated the market’s reaction to UK director 
transactions and analyzed whether the reaction depended upon a firm’s 
ownership. They found that ownership by directors and outside shareholders 
did have an impact on the abnormal returns. In addition, they tested the 
hypothesis of information hierarchy and found no evidence that returns from 
trading differed across categories of director. Andriosopoulos and Hoque (2011) 
investigated aggregate director trading activity in the UK and identified 
relationship between directors’ market timing and market sentiment as 
measured by bull (bear) periods. They provided evidence that directors used 
market sentiment as a platform to act like contrarians. However, a limitation of 
their study was that they did not allow for seasonalities in monthly UK aggregate 
director trading, due to UK regulation requirements which impose constraints on 
when directors can trade before earnings announcements. Since companies’ 
earnings announcement tends to be clustered around certain times of the year, 
this will cause seasonal patterns in aggregate director trading. These 
seasonalities need to be allowed for in interpreting the predictive power of 
aggregate director trading. Gregory et al. (2013) found evidence that UK 
directors are contrarians; they bought value stocks and sold glamour stocks 
during a long-run study. This confirmed that directors’ trading signals clearly 
generate significant positive abnormal returns on the buy side and smaller but 
typically insignificant negative returns on the sell side, which is consistent with 
previous insider/director studies.  
To summarize, short-term and long-run studies of insider/director trading all find 
evidence that this has the ability to forecast future market movement.  
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2.1.2 Market Return and Future Economic Growth 
Economic theory suggests that stock prices reflect expectations about future 
corporate earnings. Corporate profits are an important part of GDP and also are 
likely to be correlated with its components, including consumption and 
investment. The forward-looking nature of stock prices would imply that stock 
prices should be valuable as leading indicators of economic activity.  
Previous studies conducted in the US have shown that the relationship between 
stock returns and future real activity is strong, which indicates that stock prices 
are leading indicators of economic activity.  
Fama (1981) documented the presence of a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the market factor and future economic growth in the US. 
He found evidence that real stock returns are positively related to measures of 
real activity, such as capital expenditures, the average real rate of return on 
capital and output. By using production growth rate as a real activity variable 
during the time period 1953-1987, Fama (1990) suggests that a large fraction of 
the variation of stock returns can be explained primarily by time-varying 
expected returns and forecasts real activity.  
Moore (1983) examined the evidence for stock prices as a business cycle 
indicator for the period 1873-1975 and found that stock prices led the business 
cycle for much of that period and were better predictors of timing points than 
were business failures. 
Fischer and Merton (1984) built upon this evidence and found that for the period 
1950 -1982 stock price changes were the best predictor of future growth in GNP 
from among the group of financial variables that they tested. Furthermore, they 
found that stock prices led growth in both investment and consumption, and 
they traced the link between the stock market and consumption and investment. 
They also noted the extensive use that has been made of stock prices as 
leading indicators by academics, governments, and business analysts.  
Barro (1990) examined the link between stock prices, investment and GNP in 
more detail. Using data for the period 1891-1987, he also demonstrated that 
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lagged stock price changes have a significant predictive power for both 
investment and GNP and similar findings have been documented for the 
Canadian market. In addition, for the US market, Barro noted that stock prices 
outperform Tobin's (1969) q as a leading indicator of investment activity.  
Pesaran and Timmermann (1995) examined the robustness of the evidence for 
the predictability of the US stock market. In order to simulate the historical 
process through which an investor may attempt to forecast stock returns, they 
established the type of variables an investor is likely to consider when modelling 
stock returns: dividend yield, earnings-price ratio, 1-month T-bill rate, 12-month 
T-bond rate, year-on-year rate of inflation, year-on-year rate of change in 
industrial output, and year-on-year growth rate in the narrow money stock. They 
also considered time lags between the changes in the business cycle variables 
and stock returns. They confirmed the importance of predicable components in 
stock returns related to the business cycle. They also found that the only 
variable to be included in the forecasting models throughout the entire sample 
period of 1960-1992 was the one-month lagged value of the one-month T-bill 
rate.  
Vassalou (2003) showed that news related to future GDP growth is an important 
factor for explaining the cross-section of book-to-market and size portfolios. The 
Fama-French factors HML and SMB appear to contain mainly news related to 
future GDP growth.  
Reilly and Brown (2006) mentioned the cyclical indicator approach. The 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) examines the behaviour of 
hundreds of economic time series in relation to past business cycles and groups 
various economic series into three major categories based on their relationship 
to the business cycle. Leading indicators include economic series that usually 
reach peaks or troughs before corresponding peaks or troughs in aggregate 
economic activity. Coincident indicators include economic time series that have 
peaks and troughs that roughly coincide with the peaks and troughs in the 
business cycle. Lagging indicators include series that experience their peaks 
and troughs after those of the aggregate economy. In their book, Reilly and 
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Brown (2006) note that the NBER figures the index of 500 common stock prices 
is a leading indicator to aggregate economic activity in the US.   
For international evidence, Klein and Moore (1985) examined measurements of 
leading, coincident and lagging indicators in 10 developed countries (the US, 
Canada, UK, West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden and 
Japan) within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), and confirmed that the stock price index is a leading indicator of 
business cycle.  
Aylward and Glen (2000) investigated the link between stock changes and 
subsequent economic activity (GDP, consumption and investment) in 23 
countries (include the UK) during most of the post-war period. They found 
evidence that stock price changes lead GDP, consumption and investment in 
most countries. The results were stronger for the G7 countries than for the 
emerging markets, both in the percentage of markets where the stock market 
has a predictive power and in the economic significance of the predictability.  
Using data from 10 countries (including the UK), Liew and Vassalou (2000) 
found that the Fama-French factor HML and SMB contained significant 
information about future GDP growth. This information is to a large degree 
independent of that in the market factor. Even in the presence of popular 
business cycle variables, HML and SMB retain their ability to predict future 
economic growth in some countries. However, little evidence is found to support 
such an explanation in the case of WML (winners minus losers, or Momentum 
factor).  
Consistent with Liew and Vassalou (2000), Gregory et al. (2003) found both 
HML and SMB were positively correlated with future GDP growth using UK data 
from July 1980 to December 1998.  
There has been some discussion concerning the relationship between director 
trading and future economic growth. Seyhun (1988) investigated the information 
content of aggregate trading by corporate insiders in their own firms. His 
hypothesis is if the mispricing observed by insiders in their own firms is strictly 
due to firm-specific information, then no relationship between insider trading 
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and changes in economy-wide activity would be expected. However, if part of 
the mispricing observed by insiders in their own firms is caused by changes in 
economy-wide activity that are not yet fully reflected in security prices, then a 
positive relationship between aggregate insider trading activity and subsequent 
market returns would be expected. However, Seyhun (1988) did not identify the 
economy-wide factors that lead to the predictive ability of aggregate insider 
trading, although he extrapolated from his work that net aggregated insider 
trading activity can be a useful component of the leading indicators of future 
economic activity. 
In a further study by Seyhun (1992), he established the cash flow hypothesis 
which postulates that corporate insiders can predict the future cash flows in 
their own firms before other market participants. To the extent that the changes 
in cash flows are due to the future economy-wide activity, insiders in all firms 
will also observe similar signals in their own firms and also trade in their own 
firms in the same direction. After a while, as changes in economy-wide cash 
flows become recognized by other market participants, the stock prices of all 
firms will tend to adjust. Hence, aggregate insider trading will predict the future 
real activity and future stock returns. Empirical work has shown that the results 
of growth rates of GNP, the Index of Industrial Production, and after-tax 
corporate profits are consistent with the cash flow hypothesis. Therefore, 
aggregate insider trading is positively correlated with all these three measures 
of real activity between 12 to 20 months in the future. Moreover, aggregate 
insider trading follows increases in future real activity with a 6- to 12-month lag.  
Generally speaking, the previous studies confirm the relationship between 
future economic growth and stock returns by providing evidence from the US 
and other international markets. The relationship between aggregate insider 
trading and future economic growth has been proven in the US but not for the 
UK or other international markets. Thus, it is essential to investigate aggregate 
director trading and future economic growth in the UK.  
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2.1.3 Director Role and Market Reaction of Director Trading 
The information hierarchy hypothesis postulates that the information content of 
transactions depends on the type of director who trades (Seyhun, 1986). 
According to this hypothesis, directors who are familiar with the day-to-day 
operations of the company trade on more valuable information. In other words, 
the abnormal returns depend on the type of director that makes the trade, which 
should follow the order by category of director: CEOs, CFOs, other executive 
directors and other non-executive directors.  
Seyhun (1986) investigated the determinants of insiders’ superior predictive 
ability using event study by applied daily cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of 
estimate insider trading as dependent variable and used independent variables 
as dummy variables for types of insiders. He found that it appeared that insider 
information arises as a result of insiders’ association with a firm, since insiders 
who are closer to day-to-day decision-making trade on more valuable 
information. Seyhun grouped all insiders into five categories: officers, directors, 
officer-directors, chairmen of the board of directors, and large shareholders. 
Officers traded most frequently, followed by directors, large shareholders, 
officer-directors, and chairmen of the boards of directors. Further tests 
determined that the coefficient of the officer-director group was significantly 
positive at the 1% level, suggesting that on average, officer-directors trade on 
more valuable information than officers. Insiders in large firms and large 
shareholders in all firms account for most of the dollar value of trading, although 
insiders in large firms and large shareholders in all firms trade on less valuable 
information. Differences between all insiders are significant at the 5% level. 
These tests indicate insiders who are more familiar with the overall operations 
of a firm trade on more valuable information.  
Lin and Howe (1990) expected insiders who are more familiar with the 
operations of a firm to trade on more valuable information, and examined 
whether an information hierarchy exists among insiders, as suggested by 
Baesel and Stein (1979), Scholes (1972), and Seyhun (1986). Lin and Howe 
(1990) followed Seyhun’s (1986) procedure and classified insiders in the same 
manner. Instead of the daily CARs, they applied monthly CARs as a dependent 
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variable. They found that there was a positive relationship between abnormal 
returns and insider roles. The chairmen of the board, directors, officer-directors, 
and officers possess a greater amount of information than large unaffiliated 
shareholders. This finding is consistent with previous evidence from the US that 
information hierarchy exists among insiders. Specifically, insiders close to the 
operations of a firm (chairmen of the board, directors, officer-directors, and 
officers) trade on more valuable information than large shareholders. 
Seyhun (1986) and Lin and Howe (1990) both partially confirmed this 
hypothesis using US data. The differences between these two studies are that 
Seyhun (1986) measured the market reaction to insider trades by the CARs 
covering the first 50 and 100 days, respectively, following the day of the trade, 
whilst Lin and Howe (1990) used 6 and 12-month CARs. 
In contrast, some empirical studies do not support or do not find any evidence 
of information hierarchy. Jeng et al. (1999, pp.30-31) questioned whether 
insiders can benefit from their information advantage: 
Some insiders are more ‘inside’ than others. The chief executive, for 
example, is likely to have better information about the firms’ prospects 
than lesser officers. Since the CEO’s trades are likely to be carefully 
scrutinized, both by shareholder and by regulators, he may be more 
reluctant to trade on his informational advantage. The net effect of these 
considerations on the profitability of insider trading is an empirical question.  
Jeng et al. (1999) concluded that insiders benefit ‘handsomely’ from their 
informational advantage, especially from their purchases. However, they did not 
find any support for the information hierarchy hypothesis, as they reported that 
CEOs acquire lower abnormal returns, although not significantly lower, than 
other officers and directors.1 
Jeng et al. (2003) tested the information hierarchy hypothesis and distinguished 
between three categories of corporate insiders as defined by job-title. They 
grouped insiders into three categories: ‘top-executives’ are those corporate 
                                                             
1
 The results of Seyhun (1986) and Lin and Howe (1990) are not directly comparable to those of 
Jeng et al. (1999) given the different methodologies they used in calculating the returns. 
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officers that hold the title of chief executive, chairman of the board and 
president; ‘officers’ includes all corporate officers except for top executives; and 
‘directors’ are members of the corporate board who are not also officers. Unlike 
Seyhun (1998), these categories do not overlap and cover all trades in their 
sample. Jeng et al. (2003) found no evidence that the top executives earned 
higher abnormal returns than other categories of insiders. They found that the 
portfolios based on the officer purchases and the director purchases yield point 
estimates of the abnormal returns that were significant and of a similar order of 
magnitude to the overall purchase portfolio results. In contrast to Seyhun (1986), 
they found insignificant returns for the top-executive purchase portfolios. 
However, they noted that the purchases of the top-executives tended to be 
twice as large as the other categories, and since they also found that abnormal 
returns to large purchases were no larger than the returns to medium-sized 
trades, they were able to reconcile their results with Seyhun’s (1986). 
By investigating gender differences in insider trading behaviour of senior 
corporate executives in the US between 1975 and 2008, Bharath et al. (2009) 
found that both male and female insiders earned economically and statistically 
significant positive returns on average; males earned greater returns than 
females and traded more frequently than females. This difference is particularly 
notable in terms of the value of the trades. These gender differences exist 
across the firm among officers, board directors, top executives, and surprisingly, 
even CEOs and CFOs. They suggested that male executives trade more and 
earn more than their female counterparts which is consistent with the notion that 
males possess an informational advantage over females within firms; however, 
no explanations was proffered as to the potential source(s) of this advantage. 
Instead, exploration of the possibility that the findings are an indication of males’ 
superior communication networks was stated as likely to be more fruitful.  
All the above research was based on US data. Fidrmuc et al. (2006) tested the 
information hierarchy hypothesis using UK data and utilised the Stock 
Exchange Yearbooks to classify directors into five categories: CEOs (including 
joint CEO-chairmen), other executive directors (the deputy CEO and the 
financial officer), chairman (non-executives in more than 90% of the cases), 
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other incumbent directors (both executive and non-executive directors not 
included in the previous categories) and former directors who traded were 
traced for up to 2 months after the end of the financial year during which they 
left the company. It tested the information hierarchy hypothesis in two ways: first, 
they compared the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) earned after 
trades by each of the individual categories of directors; and second, they 
performed a multivariate regression analysis using 2-day CARs as the 
dependent variable and with dummy variables representing the individual 
categories as explanatory variables. The results of the CAARs analysis showed 
CEO and other directors do make significant profit in post-event time. However, 
there was no support for the information hierarchy hypothesis as the differences 
between the 2-day CAARs for the different categories of directors were not 
statistically significant. The results of the cross-sectional multivariate 
regressions with CARs for purchases and sales did not support the information 
hierarchy either.  Fidrmuc et al. (2006) concluded that although CEOs are 
assumed to have the best knowledge about their company’s prospects, the 
information content of their trades is lower than that of other directors’ trades. 
The most plausible explanation for this result is that the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) and the market may follow CEO transactions more closely, 
which causes CEOs to trade more cautiously and at less informative moments. 
Recently, Gregory et al. (2012) re-examined the information hierarchy 
hypothesis, but focused on only two categories of directors (executive and non-
executive) on the basis that this more natural classification encompasses the 
idea that executive directors are involved in the day-to-day management of a 
company and therefore have access to more private information than non-
executives. Furthermore, they tested performance of gender stereotypes. Unlike 
the conclusions of Bharath et al. (2009) who found that women were 
informationally disadvantaged, in the UK sample the returns to female executive 
trades were in fact significantly greater than the male trades in post-trade (10 
days or more) after controlling for firm- and trade-related characteristics.  
Generally speaking, evidence for the information hypothesis in the US and UK 
show that directors have superior information which they can utilise to make 
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significant abnormal returns; however, the different classification of directors 
and gender employed in studies using US and UK data give different results.  
2.2 The Regulatory Framework of Directors’ Trades in the US and 
UK 
2.2.1 The Regulatory Framework of Directors’ Trades in the US 
In the US Insiders are defined as officers, directors, other key employees, and 
shareholders holding more than 10% of any equity class (Lakonishok and Lee, 
2001) and insider trading is regulated by the SEC with the 1934 Securities and 
Exchange Act and its amendments imposing restrictions on insider trading. The 
essence of the US rules on insider trading is that insiders must either abstain 
from trading on undisclosed information or release this information to the public 
before they trade (Hu and Noe, 1997). 
In the US insiders only have to report their holdings within the first 10 days of 
the month following the month of the trade (Persons, 1997). Insider transactions 
are published in the SEC's online Insider Trading Report. Chang and Suk (1998) 
noted that trades normally appear in the online report the same day that the 
SEC is informed, then shortly afterwards the information is published in the Wall 
Street Journal and other publications. 
In the US the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act (ITSFEA) of 
1988 raised the maximum fine for insider trading to $1 million and 10 years 
imprisonment in response to frequent violations of the existing insider 
regulations. The Act also placed the liability for illegal insider trading by any of 
the company's employees with the top management.  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter SOX) constitutes a far-reaching 
federal law aimed at improving the reliability of corporate governance and the 
financial reporting process in the US. Until August 2002 the reporting 
requirements consisted of filing a Form 4 to the SEC within 10 days after the 
close of the calendar month in which the transaction occurred, which could 
result in a delay of up to 40 days. Section 403 of SOX amends this provision of 
Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934 as of August 29, 2002 by requiring 
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insiders to file their Form 4 to the SEC within 2 business days of the transaction 
date. Furthermore, effective from June 30, 2003, Form 4 must be filed 
electronically, and companies with websites are required to post information 
online about the trades the day after they are filed with the SEC. 
2.2.2 The Regulatory Framework of Directors’ Trades in the UK 
Director trading in the UK is regulated by The Companies Act 1985, The 
Criminal Justice Act 1993 (Part V), The Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 and the Listing Rules for publicly listed companies on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE). 
Under the Criminal Justice Act 1993, when a director has inside information 
acquired by virtue of his/her employment, office or profession, he/she is 
prohibited from dealing in any securities that are affected by that information. 
Inside information, broadly defined, is specific or precise information about 
particular securities or an issuer that has not been made public and would be 
likely to have a significant effect on the price of those securities if it were made 
public. Directors must also not disclose inside information, except in the proper 
performance of their job. Breach of the Criminal Justice Act is a criminal offence 
punishable by imprisonment or a fine or both. 
The Companies Act 1985 specifies that a director is obliged to disclose to the 
company any interests in its securities. They must notify the company of all 
changes in those interests and of dealings connected with them within five 
business days. The company must keep a register of the interests notified, 
which must be kept available for inspection. Under the listing rules for 
companies trading on the LSE, the company must notify a regulatory 
information service (RIS) of interests and changes in those interests before the 
end of the next business day following receipt of the information from the 
director. Guidance for companies and directors is available in the Continuing 
Obligations Guide and the Price Sensitive Information Guide which can be 
obtained from the FSA. From 15 April 2002 a new mechanism for disseminating 
regulatory information became effective, allowing listed companies the choice of 
which RIS to use to disclose their regulatory information to the market. The RIS 
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providers include: Business Wire Regulatory Disclosure, Newslink Financial, 
PimsWire, PR Newswire Disclose, and the Regulatory News Service (RNS) 
provided by the LSE. 
Listing rules also require that listed companies must have a code of dealing in 
securities that meets the minimum standards set out in the model code. 
Directors must not deal on considerations of a short-term nature, or during a 
two-month ‘close period’ before the announcement or publication of the annual 
report, the half-yearly (or quarterly) results, or when the director is in possession 
of unpublished price-sensitive information about the company’s listed securities, 
or before receiving clearance from the company chairman or other designated 
director that the proposed dealing may proceed. The model code requirements 
are more extensive than the prohibitions on insider dealing in the Criminal 
Justice Act 1993. 
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) provides the statutory 
framework for the new UK market abuse regime, which became effective on 1 
December 2001. Under the market abuse regime introduced by the FSMA, the 
FSA can impose penalties on companies or individuals. These may comprise 
either an appropriate financial penalty or a public censure. 
The FSA may also apply to the court for injunctions or restitution orders in cases 
of market abuse. Market abuse is widely defined and includes behaviour by a 
person in relation to securities traded on the LSE that amounts to misuse of 
information, the creation of a false or misleading impression, or market 
distortions. 
Since July 2005, the FSA has implemented the market abuse directive (MAD). 
The MAD is an important part of the EU financial services action plan, which 
aims to introduce a common approach to prevent and detect market abuse, 
including insider trading. The MAD is the Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market 
manipulation (market abuse) (No. 2003/6/EC). The existing UK regime is 
generally considered to be more extensive than the MAD and therefore the 
MAD regime has been superimposed over the existing UK structure. However, 
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the MAD insider dealing provisions are more specific than the UK regime. The 
revised definition of inside information is that it is information of a precise nature 
which, is not generally available, relates directly or indirectly to one or more 
issuers of qualifying investments or to one or more of the qualifying investments 
and would, if generally available, be likely to have a significant effect on the 
price of the qualifying investments or on the price of related investments (e.g. 
derivatives). The MAD requires an issuer and persons working on its behalf to 
draw up a list of those persons working for them who have access to insider 
information relating to the issuer on a regular or occasional basis. If requested, 
the issuer must provide this list to the FSA. The list must identity each person 
who has access to inside information, the reason why such person is on the 
insider list and the date on which the list was created and updated. 
In summary, there are substantial differences between the US and UK 
regulatory framework on insider/director trading. Among these, a very important 
difference within the UK regulatory regime is that unlike the US, ‘insiders’ are 
more broadly defined, and in particular include large shareholders, who are 
subject to the same reporting requirements as company officers and directors.  
The UK also discloses director trading information to the public more quickly 
than the US system, even after the execution of SOX. 
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Chapter 3 Data, Sample Characteristics and Seasonality 
Adjustment 
3.1 Data and Data Filter 
The director’s dealing data was obtained from two databases: Directus, which 
covers the trading period 1986-1993, and Hemscott Company Guru Academic 
(HS), which covers 1994-2008. Thus, combining these two datasets, the sample 
covers January 1986 to December 2008, in total 276 calendar months.  
The original file from Directus contains 46,984 entries and includes information 
on company names, LBS number, transaction and announcement dates, price, 
transaction value, and security classes (89 different types).2   
The HS contains 488,671 original transaction records and provides information 
on company names, directors’ names, directors’ shareholdings, directors’ 
positions on the board, transaction and announcement dates, number of shares 
traded, price, transaction types (13 different types)3 and transaction descriptions 
(27 different types).4  
From the earlier research (Seyhun, 1988; 1990; 1992; 1998) it is expected that 
directors’ open market sales and purchases are more likely to represent actions 
taken as a result of special director information. Other empirical studies 
(Seyhun, 1990; Gregory et al., 1994; Fidrmuc et al., 2006) indicated that the 
option-related trade by directors contained lower information and were 
insignificantly related to post-signal abnormal returns. Therefore, in line with 
these studies only open market purchases and sales by directors from 1986 to 
2008 are analysed in this study. This means that the sample data is all for 
ordinary shares or common shares. All other types of directors’ transactions, 
                                                             
2
 The 89 security types include ordinary shares, restricted voting shares, options, warrants, trust, 
etc. 
3 
Transaction types consist of purchase, sale, exercise of option, sale of option shares, in lieu of 
dividend, rights taken up, sale of rights, received on conversion, transfer in between holdings, 
transfer out, n/a, and B&B purchase and sale. 
4 
Transaction descriptions capture any relevant additional information relating to the transaction.  
They include ADRs, ISA, trust, warrants, etc. 
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such rights taken up, exercises of options, shares acquired through a plan and 
so forth are excluded.5  
Following the above adjustments, the sample covers 25,668 directors’ 
transaction records with respect to 3,114 firms from 1986 to 1993, and 60,300 
directors’ transaction records with respect to 1,086 firms from 1994 to 2008.  
One thing need to be mentioned: Among 60,300 directors’ transactions during 
1994 to 2008, they contain company information of AIM (Alternative Investment 
Market, LSE). But there are only 4,979 records of AIM.  The rest is still listed on 
main UK market. Therefore, the market index is used in Chapters are index of 
FTSE All Share.  
Throughout this thesis the sample firms are classified into three size equity 
groups. To form the three size groups, 10 size portfolios were initially created 
based upon the market capitalisation at the end of each September.6 The cut-off 
points for the 10 size portfolios are based on market capitalisation for all the 
listed firms each year. Firms in the top three size deciles are defined as large 
firms, those in the next four size deciles as medium-size firms, and the 
remainder in the smallest three deciles as small firms.  
The data of Monthly/Quarterly FTSE All Share returns, 90-day UK Treasury Bill 
rate (as risk-free interest rate), and firm market capitalisation were obtained 
from the files of the London Share Price Data (LSPD) and DataStream.  
3.2 Summary Characteristics of Sample 
Table 3.1 lists the summary statistics for aggregate director trading for all the 
firms, large firms and small firms. Panel A of Table 3.1 shows that the overall 
sample data contains 55,262 number of transactions by director purchases and 
30,706 by directors sales are from January 1986 to December 2008, with more 
                                                             
5
 Numerous consistency checks on dates, prices, and shares were performed to eliminate 
approximately 10,400 transaction records containing apparent data errors. 
6 
Because of diversified fiscal-end year of UK listed companies, Agarwal and Taller (2008). 
‘Does financial distress risk drive the momentum anomaly?’ Financial Management 37(3): 461-
484.and Gregory et al Gregory, A., R. Tharyan, et al. (2009). ‘Stock market patterns around 
directors’ trades: effects of director category and gender on market timing’ suggest using market 
capitalisation on September 30 of each year as benchmark for these companies. At this step, 
the data check via LSPD deletes companies that have zero or negative market values or do not 
have any value at the end of September of that year. 
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than 25 billion shares of director trading in total. Number of shares based on 
monthly director purchases is greater than the sales (54,172,253 vs. 
38,384,047), whilst the average number of shares purchased per transaction is 
equal to 270,557, which is smaller than the sales (345,014).  
Panel B of Table 3.1 describes the sample data for the large firms and includes 
28,128 transactions of purchases and 17,794 of sales, with approximately 12.55 
billion trading shares in total. Mean shares of purchases trading are slightly 
greater than the sales (23,404,857 vs. 22,065,584). Similarly to Panel A, the 
average number of shares purchased per transaction is equal to 229,655, which 
is also smaller than the sales (342,256).  
Panel C presents the sample data of small firms and includes 12,228 
transactions of purchases and 5,094 of sales, with more than 5.7 billion total 
numbers of trading shares. Mean shares of purchases trading are dramatically 
greater than the sales (15,149,699 vs. 5,623,450). Unlike Panels A and B, the 
average number of shares purchased per transaction is greater than the sales 
(341,946 vs. 304,686). 
In generally, it can be seen that number of shares based on monthly purchases 
trading (mean), total number of shares of director purchases, and total number 
of director transactions are all higher than the sales among all samples and firm 
segmentation, although for small firms it is more apparent. However, for 
average shares per transactions, sales are greater than purchases (except 
small firms). It also can be seen that trading volume and trading transactions of 
big firms are higher and more frequent than small firms.  
3.3 Seasonality Adjustment 
3.3.1 Director Trading Adjustment 
A recent study of UK aggregate director trading (Andriosopoulos and Hoque, 
2011) did not make any allowance for seasonality in monthly UK aggregate 
director trades. As described in Section 3.1, due to diversified fiscal year-end 
date and the UK regulations, a seasonality adjustment for UK directors’ 
transactions is required. Figure 3.1 shows the fiscal year-end of FTSE indices 
for 1986, 1996 and 2008. It can be seen that approximately 25% and 50% of 
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fiscal year-ends are in March and December, respectively. The remainder are 
random and the number of companies is small.  
As requirement of listing rules of the LSE, a company will be required to publish 
annual and semi-annual reports including consolidated financial information for 
the relevant period, together with an accompanying review of the company’s 
business for that period, within four months and two months respectively of the 
relevant financial period. “However, there is a longer delay to the announcement 
of the final earnings report (approximately 12 weeks) than the interim 
announcement (approximately 9 weeks).” (Hiller and Marshall, 2002)。  
Due to no forced reporting time and no academic paper to clarify what financial 
announcement date should be, Therefore, in this Chapter, based on my 
assumption, it supposes companies listed in LSE release their earnings two 
months (8 weeks) after fiscal year-end and for half year-end. 
Furthermore, a regulatory requirement in relation to UK director trading is that 
the directors of companies traded on the LSE cannot trade during the two 
months preceding a preliminary, final, or interim earnings announcement 
(Fidrmuc et al., 2006), and companies typically report earnings twice a year 
(half year report and annual report), with earnings being typically released two 
months after the fiscal year-end. Therefore, for the December year-end there 
should be substantially less directors trading in January, February, July and 
August, with the same situation occurring in April, May, October and November 
for March year-end companies. The regulations on directors’ trades induce 
seasonality into the reported trades and hence, seasonality adjustment one is 
applied, as in Table 3.2. 
The methodology of seasonality adjustment two is a more advanced approach 
of seasonality adjustment one. The purpose of the measurement is to 
investigate seasonality performance using all available firms’ fiscal year-end 
data.  
The layout structures of the two datasets from Directus and HS are total 
different which made the procedure for output fiscal year-end complicated, 
especially for data taken from Directus. Directus has no Stock Exchange Daily 
Official List (SEDOL) or International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) 
ticker number which can be recognised by DataStream; instead it contains 
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London Business School (LBS) company identity number. In order to solve this 
problem London Share Price Data (LSPD) is required. The reason for applying 
the LSPD to the dataset is that it provides the link between LBS number and 
SEDOL number for each company listed on the LSE.  
However, solving this problem caused another; unlike the LBS number which is 
unique for every single company no matter whether it is acquired, merged or 
placed, etc., the SEDOL number of a company changes over time as a result of 
acquisition, merger etc.7 Therefore to solve this new problem, the LBS number 
and SEDOL number were cross-checked in both Directus and the LSPD to 
investigate how many SEDOL numbers correspond to each LBS number for the 
period 1986-1993. In the worst case, LBS number 6353, the company has 11 
different SEDOL numbers during its life time! This method uses the start and 
finish date of a SEDOL number in File N to check the LSPD. The start date of a 
company should not be later than 1994 (one year forward) and the end date 
should not be earlier than 1985 (one year backward). The results in fiscal year-
end data for all the available companies via DataStream. This new file linking 
the Directus data can then be utilised to determine the real number of sample 
companies which had March and December fiscal year-ends.   
This problem is absent from the HS data because there is an ISIN ticker 
number in the original file and the data is more recent (time range is from 1994 
to 2008). Another positive is HS data can be manipulated by employing the 
Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) ten industry classifications. It was not 
possible with the Directus data because ICB classification began in 1994.  
After applying these adjustments, the final results show that there are 280 
companies which had either a March or December year-end out of a total 
number of 367 companies for which fiscal year-end data could be obtained 
during the period 1986- 1993; and 560 companies had either a March or 
December year-end out of a total number of 959 companies for which fiscal 
year-end data could be obtained during the period 1994-2008.  
                                                             
7
 For more detailed reasons for the new SEDOL, please check Source File G and N records of 
the LSPD dataset 
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The next stage is to gather the new seasonal director trading data. This involves 
separately recording the transaction numbers for companies which had a 
December/March fiscal year-end month by month. Similar to seasonality 
adjustment one, for a December year-end there should be substantially less 
directors trading in January, February, July and August, and the same situation 
should occur in April, May, October and November for transactions of 
companies with a March year-end.  
The second step is to determine the monthly seasonality transactions. The first 
step is to calculate the average monthly transaction number of companies with 
a December fiscal year-end without data from January, February, July and 
August. The second step is to add the average transaction number to the 
original transaction number data for the calendar months January, February, 
July and August in order to  achieve new seasonal adjust transaction data 
adjusted for a December fiscal year -end. A similar process must be applied for 
companies with a March fiscal year-end: calculate the average number of 
monthly transactions excluding the data for April, May, October and November, 
then add this to data for April, May, October and November to obtain the final 
seasonally adjusted transaction data. 
Seasonality adjustment three establishes the month dummy variables to test the 
effect of the under-estimated trading months. As can be seen in Table 3.2, for 
December year-end companies the performance of director trading activities in 
January and July should be similar, because these two months are all one 
month after the fiscal year-end and half-year end, whilst February and August 
are both two months later. Similarly, for March year-end companies the 
performance in April and October, May and November, respectively, should be 
similar. Therefore, the calculation treats every January and July of the year in 
the sample as 1 and the remainder as 0; treat February and August as 1, the 
remainder as 0; treat April and October as 1, the remainder as 0; and treat May 
and November as 1, and the remainder as 0.  Table 3.3 illustrated how this 
calculation works.  
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3.3.2 Trading Volume Adjustment 
Another possible method to detect seasonality is to track trading volume. The 
trading volume of the FTSE100 from November 1986 to December 2008 can be 
found through DataStream. 
In order to test the existence of seasonality via trading volume a non-parametric 
method is required (Gultekin and Gultekin, 1983). 
Kruskal and Wallis (1952, henceforth K-W) developed a non-parametric test: 
consider an arrangement of monthly trading volume as a T*12 matrix, V=[vtm], 
with rows of R representing the years and each column representing the month 
of a year. Each element, vtm, of the matrix V, is therefore the trading volume per 
month m of the year t. The K-W procedure can then be used to test the 
hypothesis that all 12 samples (i.e., columns of V) are drawn from the same 
population. Specifically, it tests the hypothesis that the 12 months have identical 
means.  
The basic model of trading volume is: 
                   t=1, 2, …, Tm,     m=1, 2, …, 12, (1) 
Where μ is the unknown overall mean,    is the unknown month m effect 
and     
  
   . This assumes that the error terms for trading volume of every 
month,    , are independent of the other error terms of other months trading 
volume. Moreover, all of the error terms for trading volume are drawn from the 
same continuous distribution.  
For trading volume, it tests the null hypothesis that: 
                 , 
Against the alternatives that all  s are not equal. A rejection of the null 
hypothesis implies that the trading volume exhibits seasonality.  
The K-W test first ranks the M observations (     
  
   ) jointly from least to 
greatest. Let     denote the rank of     in this joint ranking; the test statistic is: 
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   , (2) 
Where    is the average rank received by the trading volume in the  th month 
such that: 
   
 
  
    
  
   , (3) 
Where    
   
 
 is the average rank of all M observations. When    is true, the 
statistic H has an asymptotic chi-square distribution with 11 degrees of freedom. 
The appropriate α-level test is: 
Reject    if      
       , 
Where          is the upper   percentile point of a    distribution with 11 
degrees of freedom.  
Since this procedure uses the rankings of the observations it is not sensitive to 
outliers. Furthermore, the K-W test requires no distributional assumptions about 
the trading volume; therefore it is less restrictive than parametric tests.8 Table 
3.4 shows that the critical value does not reject the null hypothesis and that 
there is no difference among monthly trading volumes. Therefore, there is no 
seasonality effect with regard to trading volume.  
3.3.3 Month-of-the-Year Effort 
After checking the seasonality movements in director trading, the next stage is 
to investigate the existence of seasonality within the capital markets. 
Seasonality, as in the other studies (Fama 1965; Malkiel and Fama 1970; 
Rozeff and Kinney, 1976; Kendall, 1953; Officer 1975; Richards 1979; Gultekin 
and Gultekin 1983), implies that there are significant differences in the month-
to-month mean returns. To test the month-of-the-year effect the K-W test will be 
applied. 
It can be seen that the critical value of K-W test in Table 3.5 does not reject the 
null hypothesis that there is no month-of-the-year effect. This indicates that the 
UK stock market returns do not exhibit a month-of-the-year effect and the 12 
                                                             
8 
See Hollander and Wolfe, 1973, pp.114-120 for more details 
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months of FTSE indices have identical means. Consequently, only the 
seasonality of director trading needs to be considered.  
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Figure 3.1 Fiscal year-end of FTSE 100, 250 and 350 on the year 1986, 1996 
and 2008 
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Table 3.1 Sample Characteristics of Directors Trading From January 1986 to 
December 2008 
 
Panel A: Director Trading Transaction of Overall Sample 
  Purchases Sales 
      
No. of Shares Based on Monthly 
Trading 54,172,253  38,384,047  
Standard Deviation 95,383,620  50,479,984  
Total No. of Shares 14,951,541,746  10,593,996,956  
Total No. of Trading Transactions 55,262  30,706  
Average Shares* 270,557  345,014  
Total No. of Month 276  276  
      
Panel B: Director Trading Transactions of Large Firms 
  Purchases Sales 
      
No. of Shares Based on Monthly 
Trading 23,404,857  22,065,584  
Standard Deviation 62,883,994  39,081,469  
Total No. of Shares 6,459,740,464  6,090,101,200  
Total No. of Trading Transactions 28,128  17,794  
Average Shares* 229,655  342,256  
Total No. of Month 276  276  
      
Panel C: Director Trading Transactions of Small Firms 
  Purchases Sales 
      
No. of Shares Based on Monthly 
Trading 15,149,699  5,623,450  
Standard Deviation 36,999,111 8,779,765 
Total No. of Shares 4,181,316,850  1,552,072,062  
Total No. of Trading Transactions 12,228  5,094  
Average Shares* 341,946  304,686  
Total No. of Month 276  276  
 
* The average shares in Panels A, B and C are per transaction. 
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Table 3.2 Fiscal year-end of UK Director Trading Data & Seasonlity Adjust 
One 
 
Month  Under-Estimated No-change 
March 
(25%) 
Fiscal-year end 
Announcement 
April March 
May 
Half-term 
Announcement 
October September 
November 
December 
(50%) 
 
 
Fiscal-year end 
Announcement 
January December 
February 
Half-term 
Announcement 
July June 
August 
 
This is calculated using the following assumption: 
January Data/(1-0.5) 
February Data/(1-0.5) 
March Data 
April Data/(1-0.25) 
May Data /(1-0.25) 
June Data 
July Data /(1-0.5) 
August Data /(1-0.5) 
September Data 
October Data /(1-0.25) 
November Data /(1-0.25) 
December Data  
 
As discussed in Section 3.3.1, 25% of companies have March year-end and 50% 
of companies have December year-end, and according to my fiscal year-end 
assumption, director trading in April, May, October, November, January, 
February, July and August is under-estimated; director trading in March, 
September, December and June is unchanged. Therefore, the detailed 
seasonality would be: director trading in January, February, July and August is 
                
       
; trading in April, May, October and November is 
                
        
; 
in the rest months (March, June, September and December), the seasonality is 
what real trading data is.  
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Table 3.3 Demonstration of Month Dummy 
Month Jan/Jul Feb/Aug Apr/Oct May/Nov 
Jan 1 0 0 0 
Feb 0 1 0 0 
Mar 0 0 0 0 
Apr 0 0 1 0 
May 0 0 0 1 
Jun 0 0 0 0 
Jul 1 0 0 0 
Aug 0 1 0 0 
Sep 0 0 0 0 
Oct 0 0 1 0 
Nov 0 0 0 1 
Dec 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 3.4 Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test of FTSE 100 
Trading Volume from November 1986 to December 2008 
FTSE 100 Trading Volume 
Month Obs Rank Sum 
January 22 2353 
February 22 3237 
March 22 3016 
April 22 3131 
May 22 2668 
June 22 2900 
July 22 2953 
August 22 3071 
September 22 2761 
October 22 3101 
November 23 3214 
December 23 3106 
   chi-squared =  4.959 with 11 d.f. 
probability = 0.9332 
 chi-squared with ties = 4.959 with 11 d.f. 
probability = 0.9332 
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Table 3.5 Month-to-Month Mean Stock Market Returns and the Tests of Equality of Mean Returns January 1986 to December 
2008; FTSE Indices 
 
  
 
                  K-W testsb 
  Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Stat. Prob. 
FTSEAll Monthly 
Return
a
 0.00880 0.01479 0.00595 0.01845 0.00569 -0.00530 0.00323 0.00098 -0.01677 -0.00102 0.00486 0.02479 13.104 0.2866 
FTSE100 Monthly 
Return
a
 0.00571 0.01174 0.00494 0.01848 0.00472 -0.00465 0.00438 0.00091 -0.01493 0.00114 0.00543 0.02510 13.820 0.2431 
Excess Return of 
FTSEAll Monthly
a
 0.00310 0.00914 0.00039 0.01294 0.00025 -0.01086 -0.00239 -0.00466 -0.02234 -0.00648 -0.00054 0.01939 13.301 0.2741 
Excess Return of 
FTSE100 Monthly
a
 0.000001 0.00610 -0.00062 0.01297 -0.00072 -0.01020 -0.00124 -0.00473 -0.02051 -0.00432 0.00003 0.01970 13.526 0.2604 
 
aNumber of observations is 23 for each month. 
bThe Kruskal-Wallis test statistic is approximately distributed as chi-square with 11 degrees of freedom. It tests the null hypothesis that month-to-month mean returns are 
equal against the alternative that they are not. The critical values for the chi-square distribution with 11 degrees of freedom at 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level are 17.275, 
19.675, and 24.725, respectively. The probability value is the probability that a chi-square statistic is at least as large as the one reported would be obtained if the null 
hypothesis is true, i.e. mean returns are equal. 
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Chapter 4 Aggregate Director Trading and Market Excess 
Returns 
4.1. Introduction  
As discussed in Chapter 2, this study investigates the information content of 
aggregate trading by company directors in their own firms. It follows the earlier 
stated hypothesis that director trading that is information-related trading by 
company directors is in response to factors that affect security returns, i.e., firm-
specific, industry-wide, or economy-wide factors; therefore, analysis of director 
trading can potentially uncover the sources of these factors not currently 
reflected in security prices.  
Section 4.2 describes the data and the seasonality methodology. The time 
period of director trading is from January 1986 to December 2008 and three 
seasonality adjustments are discussed and applied.  
Section 4.3 describes the methodology. Several measurements of aggregate 
director trading, methods of calculating market excess returns and 
econometrics tests which could avoid potential statistical problems are 
discussed. To describe director trading activities, the aggregate net number of 
director purchases (ANP), net number of director purchase ratio (NPR), 
difference of aggregate net purchase ratio (∆NPR), difference of aggregate net 
purchase (∆NP) and change of aggregate net number of director purchases 
(NPGR) are employed. To measure excess returns, cumulative excess returns 
(CERs) and buy and hold abnormal returns (BHERs) are introduced into the 
model. To avoid potential econometric issues, a serial correlation test, the 
Newey-West t-test (Newey and West, 1987) and the White test (White, 1980) 
are applied.  
Section 4.4 presents the empirical results and analyses the relationship 
between aggregate director trading and market returns in different ways. A time-
series method is applied to investigate the performance of the aggregate 
director in the short-term and long-run. The size effect is noted in other 
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empirical studies and is also considered, the model controls for firm-size and 
industry.  
Finally, Section 4.5 summarises the results and concludes Chapter 4.  
4.2 Data and Seasonality 
The aggregate director trading data is from January 1986 to December 2008 
and is taken from two datasets (Directus and HS). By following the data filtering 
methods of previous studies, the final sample covers 25,668 directors’ 
transaction records with respect to 3,114 firms from 1986 to 1993, and 60,300 
directors’ transaction records with respect to 1,086 firms from 1994 to 2008.  
Due to diversified fiscal year-end dates and the UK regulations, seasonality 
adjustments for director trading are applied. Three seasonality adjustment 
measurements are used. Seasonality adjustment one is based on December 
and March fiscal year-end assumptions, seasonality adjustment two is based on 
December and March fiscal year-end observations, and seasonality adjustment 
three employs month dummies based on December and March fiscal year-ends 
to test the effect of the under-estimated trading months. Details of the data, 
sample characteristics and seasonality adjustment measurements of director 
trading are fully described and discussed in Chapter 3.  
The data for Monthly FTSE All Share returns, 90-day UK Treasury Bill rate (as 
risk-free interest rate), and dividend yield of FTSE All Share can be obtained 
from the files of the LSPD and DataStream dataset. The firm capitalisation and 
book-to-market values can be obtained from both LSPD and DataStream.  
For macro-economy variables, the majority of the UK data can be accessed 
from the Office for National Statistics (ONS, 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/index.html). From the official ONS website the 
monthly retail prices index (RPI) and monthly seasonal adjusted index of total 
production industries can be obtained.  
Data of money supply measured by UK notes and coins in circulation outside of 
the Bank of England (M0, the narrow definition) and spot price of oil (both WTI 
and Brent) are also available from DataStream.  
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4.3 Methodology 
Seyhun (1988; 1992; 1998) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) showed that 
aggregate insider trading significantly forecasts future US stock market 
movements in the  long-run. This thesis mostly follows the methodology of a 
time series study and the evidence presented in this section uses regression 
analysis to examine the relationship between aggregate director trading and 
returns in the UK stock market.  
4.3.1 Aggregate Director Trading Activity 
In order to detect the relationship between corporate directors’ (executive 
directors and non-executive directors) transactions and stock market returns, a 
measure of standardised aggregate director trading is constructed:  
The net number of purchase transactions in firm i and month t, NPi,t , is defined 
as follows:  
 


N
j
tijti HNP
1
,,, , (4) 
Where N denotes the number of purchases and sales by directors in firm i and 
month t, Hj,i,t equals 1 if transaction j is a purchase and -1 if transaction j is a 
sale.  
Defined as: 
                                                                                                                                                
k = all firms or large firms or medium firms or small firms, where Ik is equal to 
the total number of firms in group k and SANPk,t refers to the standardized 
aggregate net number of purchases transactions by directors in firm-size group 
k and in month t.  
In addition: 
 
SANPk,t = (NPi,t -NPi ) / s(NPi )
i=1
Ik
å , (5)
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and: 
 
 
Hence, SANPk,t is calculated by subtracting the mean and dividing by the 
sample standard deviation of net number of transactions over the 276 calendar 
months among January 1986 to December 2008, then totalled across firms for 
each firm-size group. Standardisation ensures that each firm receives 
approximately the same weight in the measure of aggregate director trading, 
thereby ensuring against the possibility that several firms receive an inadequate 
weight in the results.  
The aggregate net number of transactions by directors in each month t and 
group k,     
  is computed by totalling the net number of transactions across 
firms:  
 ANPt
k = NPi,t
i=1
K
å , (8) 
Where K denotes the number of firms in group k - all firms, large firms, medium 
firms or small firms. 
Calculation of the aggregate number of purchases transactions (AP), 
standardised aggregate number of purchases transactions (SAP), aggregate 
number of sales transactions (AS), and aggregate number of sales transactions 
(SAS) is similar to ANP and SANP.  
    
   ,    
   and    
    are plotted in Figure 4.1 and appear to be a slow-moving, 
mean-stationary series. The result also can be tested using the Unit Root test 
and the results of this are shown in Appendix A. 
The net number of director purchase ratio (NPR) was introduced by John and 
Lang (1991) in an event study of US insider trading. It is defined as the ratio of 
net number purchases (the number of director purchases minus the number of 
director sales) / the total number of director transactions. Lakonishok and Lee 
(2001) employed this ratio to investigate aggregate insider trading activities in 
NPi = NPi,t / 276
t=1
276
å , (6)
s(NPi )= (NPi,t -NPi )
2 / 275
t=1
276
å , (7)
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long-run US studies. The advantage of ratio methodology is it is ‘not sensitive to 
changes in the number of firms or trading activity over time. Moreover, the ratio 
does not display heteroscedasticity or extreme outliers’ (Seyhun, 1990). In 
addition, the purchase ratio (PR, denotes as ratio of the number of purchases to 
total director transactions) and sales ratio (SR, denotes as ratio of the number 
of sales to total director transactions) are also applied.  
NPR = (AP-AS) / (AP+AS), (9) 
PR = AP / (AP+AS), (10) 
SR = AS / (AP+AS),(11) 
Where AP is the aggregate number of director purchases transactions, AS is 
the aggregate number of director sales transactions, and AP+AS is total number 
of all director transactions.  
In addition, a change of director transaction ratio is applied. The concept behind 
this method comes from the work of Knewtson et al. (2010), who applied the 
difference of aggregate net purchase ratio (∆NPR) as an independent variable 
to examine the returns of value and growth markets. Similarly this thesis 
calculates the difference of aggregate purchase ratio (∆PR), and difference of 
aggregate sale ratio (∆SR) as independent variables to describe director trading 
activities.  
DNPR = NPRt -NPRt-m, (12) 
DPR = PRt -PRt-m, (13) 
DSR = SRt -SRt-m, (14) 
Where t denotes director trading in month t and t-m denotes director trading in 
the previous mth month.  
Next, the change of director transaction is applied to study director trading in 
order to avoid potential statistical problems when measuring aggregate director 
trading. It calculates the difference of aggregate net number of purchases 
(∆ANP), difference of aggregate number of purchases (∆AP), and difference of 
aggregate number of sales (∆AS). 
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DANP = ANPt -ANPt-m, (15) 
DAP = APt -APt-m, (16)  
DAS = ASt -ASt-m, (17) 
Where ANP is the aggregate net number of director purchases transactions, AP 
is the aggregate number of director purchases transactions, AS is the 
aggregate number of director sales transactions, t denotes director trading in 
month t, and t-m denotes director trading in the previous mth month.  
Finally, the change of director transaction is applied to study the director trading 
to avoid potential statistics problem when measuring aggregate director trading. 
The change of aggregate net number of purchase (NPGR), change of 
aggregate number of purchases (APGR) and change of aggregate number of 
sales (ASGR) are calculated: 
NPGR = (ANPt -ANPt-m) / ANPt-m, (18) 
APGR = (APt -APt-m) / APt-m, (19) 
ASGR= (ASt -ASt-m) / ASt-m, (20)  
Where ANP is the aggregate net number of director purchases transactions, AP 
is the aggregate number of director purchases transactions, AS is the 
aggregate number of director sales transactions, t denotes director trading in 
month t, and t-m denotes director trading in the previous mth month.  
In addition to using the aggregate number of director trading, the aggregate 
number of director trading shares and aggregate sterling volume of director 
trading transactions are also applied. However, only the evidence regarding 
aggregate number of director trading is significant, as previous literature 
(Scholes, 1972; Jaffe, 1974; Seyhun, 1986; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001) has 
noted that insider trading based on dollar volume of trading contains less 
information, because it may be influenced by a few very large transactions.  
Statistical properties of the aggregate number of director trading are shown in 
Appendix B. It can be seen that when the correlation coefficient is high and 
significant, many of them are significant even at 1%. Therefore, as Seyhun 
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(1988) noted, first-order and higher-order serial correlation tests need to be 
applied to detect autocorrelation. To check the first-order serial correlation, the 
Durbin-Watson d-statistic and Durbin's alternative test for serial correlation in 
the disturbance is employed. To detect the higher-order serial correlation, the 
Breusch-Godfrey test for higher-order serial correlation in the disturbance is 
applied.  
4.3.2 Cumulative Excess Returns 
Cumulative excess returns (CERs) for a time series regression of future excess 
stock returns is as follows: 
CER = (Rk
i -Rk
f )
k=t
t+m-1
å , (21)  
Where   
  is the returns on return of firm portfolio group k in month t, and   
 
 is 
90-day Treasury Bills in month t.  
4.3.3 Buy and Hold Excess Returns 
Buy and hold excess returns (BHERs) are also applied to examine the 
relationship between aggregate director trading and the market returns: 
BHER = (1+Rk
i )- (1+Rk
f )
k=t
t+m-1
Õ
k=t
t+m-1
Õ , (22) 
Similar to CER,   
  is the returns on return of firm portfolio group k in month t, 
and    
 
 is 90-day Treasury Bills in month t.  
The main difference between these two measures of returns is that CERs 
ignores compounding, while raw returns and BHERs account for it.9  
4.3.4 The Recursive Modelling Strategy 
The methodology of Pesaran and Timmermann (1995, 2000) is utilised. In their 
papers, to simulate investors' search for a forecasting model a set of regressors 
needs to be established over which the search is to be conducted; in addition, 
                                                             
9
 Barber and Lyon (1997) provide a detailed description of the consequences of such 
differences during an event study. 
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the functional form of the estimated models and the criteria used to select a 
particular regression model also need to be specified.  
Pesaran and Timmermann (1995, 2000) distinguished between three 
hierarchies of regressors: core, focal and potentially relevant. tA  is the highest 
level of regressors and are a set of 'core variables' believed to be important in 
forecasting stock returns on theoretical grounds and are always included in 
forecasting equations. The second set of regressors, referred to as 'focal' and 
denoted by tB , are always considered in forecasting exercises as potentially 
important for capturing short-term variations in risk premia due to business 
cycle fluctuations, although some or all of these regressors may be left out of 
the preferred forecasting model according to the model selection criterion 
employed. The combined set of regressors in tA  and tB  will be referred to as 
the 'base set'. Finally, a third set of regressors, tC , are considered as potentially 
relevant, but are utilised by investors only if they discover clear evidence of the 
failure of the forecasting models obtainable from the regressors in the base set. 
This last set of variables is only occasionally considered since agents have 
weak reasons to believe that they should be included in the forecasting 
equations. A search across variables in the tC  set is triggered at time t  when 
the most recent residual from the excess return equation using variables in the 
base set exceeds three (recursive) standard errors.10  
Based on Pesaran and Timmermann (1995, 2000), it was decided on the 
following three sets of regressors: 
},,3,,{ 211  tttt PIIYALLcA  
},,,3{ 11 tttt JANDGILTDIB   
},,0,{ 122  tttt DPSPOTDMDIPC  
                                                             
10 For a broad class of distributions of stock returns, it seems reasonable to consider three 
standard errors from the mean as representing an extreme event. An alternative interpretation 
of this procedure can be found in the literature on Value at Risk and is provided by Duffie and 
Pan (1997). 
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Where c is the constant, YALL is the dividend yield on the FTSE All Share Index, 
I3 is the 90-day T-bill rate, DI3 = I3-I3(-1), PI is the rate of change of retail prices, 
DGILT is the change in the yield on a 2.5% government consol, JAN is a 
January dummy (which takes the value of unity in January of each year and 
zeros elsewhere), DIP is the rate of change in the index of industrial production, 
DM0 is the rate of change of the money supply (the narrow definition), and 
DPSPOT is the rate of change in the spot price of oil.11  
4.3.5 Serial Correlation Test 
The Durbin–Watson statistic (Durbin and Watson, 1950) tests for first-order 
serial correlation in the disturbance when all the regressors are strictly 
exogenous. Durbin’s alternative test is used to identify a serial correlation in the 
disturbance and does not require that all the regressors be strictly exogenous. 
The Breusch–Godfrey test is used for a higher-order serial correlation in the 
disturbance, and like Durbin’s alternative test, it does not require that all the 
regressors be strictly exogenous. 
The Durbin–Watson test is used to determine whether the error term in a linear 
regression model follows an AR(1) process. For a linear model: 
               
Where the AR(1) process can be written as:  
                 
In general, an AR(1) process requires only that    be independent and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.). The Durbin–Watson test, however, requires    to be 
distributed N (0,   ) for the statistic to have an exact distribution. In addition, the 
Durbin–Watson test can only be applied when the regressors are strictly 
exogenous. A regressor x is strictly exogenous if Corr(  ;   ) = 0 for all s and t, 
which precludes the use of the Durbin–Watson statistic with models where 
lagged values of the dependent variable are included as regressors. 
                                                             
11 
Definitions and descriptions of these variables are provided in Appendix C.  
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The null hypothesis of the test is that there is no first-order autocorrelation. The 
Durbin–Watson d statistic can take on values between 0 and 4 and under the 
null d is equal to 2. Values of less than 2 suggest positive autocorrelation ( >0), 
whereas values of d greater than 2 suggest a negative autocorrelation ( <0). 
Calculating the exact distribution of the d statistic is difficult, but empirical upper 
and lower bounds have been established based on the sample size and the 
number of regressors. Extended tables for the d statistic have been published 
by Savin and White (1977).  
When lagged dependent variables are included among the regressors, the past 
values of the error term are correlated with those lagged variables at time t, 
implying that they are not strictly exogenous regressors. The inclusion of 
covariates that are not strictly exogenous causes the d statistic to be biased 
toward the acceptance of the null hypothesis. Durbin (1970) suggested an 
alternative test for models with lagged dependent variables and extended that 
test to the more general AR(p) serial correlation process: 
                           
Where    is i.i.d. with variance  
  but is not assumed or required to be normal 
for the test. 
The null hypothesis of Durbin’s alternative test is: 
               
Where the alternative is that at least one of the  ’s is non-zero. Although the null 
hypothesis was originally derived for an AR(p) process, this test turns out to 
have power against MA(p) processes. Hence, the actual null of this test is that 
there is no serial correlation up to order p because the MA(p) and the AR(p) 
models are locally equivalent alternatives under the null (see Godfrey, 1988, 
pp.113–115, for a discussion of this result). 
Durbin’s alternative test is in fact a Lagrange Multiplier test (LM test), but it is 
most easily computed using a Wald test on the coefficients of the lagged 
residuals in an auxiliary ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the 
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residuals on their lags and all the covariates in the original regression. Consider 
the linear regression model: 
                   , 26) 
In which the covariates    through    are not assumed to be strictly exogenous 
and    is assumed to be i.i.d. and to have finite variance. The process is also 
assumed to be stationary. Estimating the parameters in (26) by an OLS 
regression gives the residuals   . Next, another OLS regression is performed of 
  . on     .,…,      and the other regressors:  
                                   , (27) 
Where    stands for the random-error term in this auxiliary OLS regression. 
Durbin’s alternative test is then obtained by performing a Wald test where 
        are jointly zero. This test can be made robust to an unknown form of 
heteroscedasticity by using a robust variance-covariance matrix of the 
estimators (VCE) when estimating the regression in (27). When there are only 
strictly exogenous regressors and p = 1, this test is asymptotically equivalent to 
the Durbin–Watson test. 
The Breusch–Godfrey test is also an LM test of the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation versus the alternative that    follows an AR(p) or MA(p) process. 
Like Durbin’s alternative test, it is based on the auxiliary regression (27), and it 
is computed as N R2, where N is the number of observations and R2 is the 
simple R2 from the regression. This test and Durbin’s alternative test are 
asymptotically equivalent. The test statistic N R2 has an asymptotic    
distribution with p degrees of freedom. It is valid with or without the strict 
exogeneity assumption but is not robust to conditional heteroscedasticity, even 
if a robust VCE is used when fitting (27). 
In fitting (27), the values of the lagged residuals will be missing in the initial 
periods. As noted by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), the residuals will not be 
orthogonal to the other covariates in the model in this restricted sample, which 
implies that the R2 from the auxiliary regression will not be zero when the 
lagged residuals are omitted. Hence, Breusch and Godfrey’s N R2 version of the 
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test may over reject in small samples. To correct this problem, Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1993) recommended setting the missing values of the lagged 
residuals to zero and running the auxiliary regression in (27) over the full 
sample used in (26). This small-sample correction has become conventional for 
both the Breusch–Godfrey and Durbin’s alternative test.  
 
Consider the regression: 
                   , (28) 
Where some of the covariates are not strictly exogenous; in particular, some of 
the     may be lags of the dependent variable. It is interested in whether there 
are serially correlated. 
The Durbin–Watson d statistic is: 
  
          
    
   
   
  
   
      
Where    represents the residual of the the observation. 
To compute Durbin’s alternative test and the Breusch–Godfrey test against the 
null hypothesis that there is no pth order serial correlation, fit the regression in 
(28), compute the residuals, and then fit the following auxiliary regression of the 
residuals    on p lags of    and on all the covariates in the original regression in 
(28): 
                                   , (30) 
Durbin’s alternative test is computed by performing a Wald test to determine 
whether the coefficients of             are jointly different from zero. By default, 
STATA (it is one economics software) outputs the statistic and is assumed to be 
distributed      . If a small sample is specified, the statics are assumed to 
follow an F(p, N-p-k) distribution (where k is number of parameters).  
The Breusch–Godfrey test is computed as N R2, where N is the number of 
observations in the auxiliary regression (30) and R2 is the R2 from the same 
regression (30). Like Durbin’s alternative test, the Breusch–Godfrey test is 
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asymptotically distributed      , but specifying for small samples, causes the p-
value to be computed using an F (p, N-p-k) by STATA. 
4.3.6 Newey-West t-test and White Test 
The Huber/White/sandwich robust variance estimator (White, 1980) produces 
consistent standard errors for OLS regression coefficient estimates in the 
presence of heteroscedasticity. The Newey–West (1987) variance estimator is 
an extension that produces consistent estimates when there is autocorrelation 
in addition to possible heteroscedasticity. 
Calculating the estimates: 
  
   
                
      
   
       
  
                 
That is, the coefficient estimates are simply those of an OLS linear regression. 
For no autocorrelation, the variance estimates are calculated using the White 
formulation:  
             
 
   
    
   
        
 
 
Here               , where xi is the ith row of the X matrix,   is the number of 
observations, and   is the number of predictors in the model, including a 
constant if there is one.  
For the autocorrelated process, the variance estimates are calculated using the 
Newey-West (1987) formulation: 
             
 
   
    
 
   
 
 
   
    
 
     
        
          
          
Where xt is the row of X matrix observed at time t, l stands for lag, m is number 
of lags, if lag(m), m>0.  
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4.4 Empirical Results  
The evidence presented in this section uses regression analysis to examine the 
relationships between aggregate director transaction activities and future 
market excess returns. 
The relationship between aggregate director trading and market excess returns 
was described by Seyhun (1988): if all director transactions occur due to firm-
specific reasons, then no relationship between aggregate director trading and 
the market excess returns would be expected. If directors recognise the effects 
of changes in economy-wide factors in their own firms at the same time as other 
market investors do, and if they trade on the basis of their observations, then 
the relationship between aggregate director trading and excess market returns 
is expected to be positive and contemporaneous. If a director recognises the 
effects of changes in economy-wide activity before other market participants, 
and trades on these beliefs, then a positive relationship between current 
director trading and future excess market returns is expected.  
4.4.1 Aggregate Director Trading and Market Returns 
Table 4.1 indicates the results of regressing aggregate director trading on 
excess market returns. The results show the effect of applying different 
aggregate director trading variables of seasonality adjustments. The dependent 
variable in the regression is the difference between the monthly returns of FTSE 
All Share Index and the 90-day Treasury Bills returns. This difference presents 
the excess return to the market portfolio. The independent variables are the 
contemporaneous and lagged term of the aggregate director trading, as 
described in Section 4.3. As noted by Seyhun (1988), in order to avoid the 
potential issue of first-order and high order serial correlation, first-order and 
higher-order serial correlation tests are applied and there is no serial correlation 
in any of the models (serial correlation test are not shown in the table). The 
significance levels of the estimated coefficients are computed using the Newey 
and West (1987) covariance matrix to determine if there is a serial correlation, 
and the White (1980) covariance matrix is employed to test if the serial 
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correlation is not significant. Two lag terms of the residuals are used to compute 
the Newey-West covariance matrix.  
In models 1-3, the dependent variable is the excess return to market portfolio 
and the independent variable is the aggregate net number of director purchase 
transactions by all firms (ANP). In model 1, the independent variables are 1- 
and 2-month lagged terms of ANP (ANPt-1 and ANPt-2). The estimated 
coefficient of ANPt-2 is insignificant and negative, while coefficient of ANPt-1 is 
positive and insignificant. The insignificant coefficients of ANP in model 1 is 
probably caused by positive correlations between ANPt-1 and ANPt-2 (see 
Appendix B), hence, ANPt-1 and ANPt-2 tend to proxy for each other.  
In model 2, the independent variables include the contemporaneous term, ANPt 
as well as the lagged terms, ANPt-1 and ANPt-2. The estimated coefficient of 
ANPt-1 is positively significant at the 1% level. This regression suggests that an 
increase in current aggregate directors’ purchases is associated with an 
increase in the future excess return of the market portfolio one month later. 
Given that the sample standard deviation is 78.48 (see Appendix C), the 
coefficient estimated is 0.000221, it indicates that one standard deviation 
change in ANP is associated with 1.7% change in the future excess market 
returns. Meanwhile, ANPt is negative and significant at the 1% significance level, 
whilst the estimated coefficient of ANPt-2 is insignificantly positive.  
Model 3 includes the one monthly leading term ANPt+1. It shows that the 
estimated coefficient of ANPt-1 from model 2 is basically unchanged and is 
positively significant at the 1% significance level. Contemporaneous and leading 
terms of ANP are all negatively correlated to current market excess returns, 
while the leading term of ANP is negatively significant at the 1% significance 
level.  
Models 4-9 apply the seasonal adjustment measurements. Models 4-6 use 
seasonally adjusted ANP for December and March fiscal year-ends by 
assumption (ANP_ADJ_1, also known as seasonality adjustment one 12) as 
independent variable. All these three models indicate similar results to models 
                                                             
12
 Details of seasonality adjustment are fully described in Chapter 3.  
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1-3, but the estimated coefficient of ANP_ADJ_1t-1 is significant at the 5% 
significance level, which is less significant than the ANP.   
Models 7-9 use the seasonally adjusted ANP for December and March fiscal 
year-ends by observation (ANP_ADJ_2, also known as seasonality adjustment 
two 13 ) as independent variable. The result of the estimated coefficient of 
ANP_ADJ_2t-1 is significant at the 1% significance level which is similar to that 
of models 1-3, and the t-statics are better than those of ANP_ADJ_1t-1 for 
models 4-6.  
Models 1-9 duplicate Seyhun’s (1998) work as they use the same measure of 
director trading-aggregate net number of director purchases (ANP). Models 10-
18 apply the aggregate net number of director purchases ratio (NPR) to 
examine the performance of director trading. Models 10-12 present the 
performance of the real NPR, models 13-15 present the performance of the 
seasonally adjusted NPR for December and March fiscal year-ends by 
assumption (NPR_ADJ_1, seasonality adjustment one), and models 16-18 
present the seasonally adjusted NPR for December and March fiscal year-ends 
by observation (NPR_ADJ_2, seasonality adjustment two).  
In model 10, the independent variables are 1- and 2-month lagged terms of 
NPR (NPRt-1 and NPRt-2). The estimated coefficient of NPRt-2 is insignificant and 
negative, while the coefficient of NPRt-1 is positive and significant at the 10% 
significance level. In model 11, the independent variables include the 
contemporaneous term, NPRt as well as the lagged terms, NPRt-1 and NPRt-2. 
The estimated coefficient of NPRt-1 is positively significant at the 5% level 
significance level. Consistent with model 2, this regression suggests that an 
increase in current aggregate directors’ purchases is associated with increases 
in future excess returns of the market portfolio one month later. Given that the 
sample standard deviation is 0.24 (see Appendix C), the coefficient estimated at 
0.057 indicates that one standard deviation change in NPR is associated with 
almost 1.4% change in future excess market returns. Meanwhile, NPRt is 
negative and significant at the 1% significance level, while the estimated 
coefficient of NPRt-2 is insignificantly positive. Model 12 includes the one 
                                                             
13
 Details of seasonality adjustment are fully described in Chapter 3. 
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monthly leading term NPRt+1. It shows that the estimated coefficient of NPRt-1 is 
positively significant at the 1% significance level. Contemporaneous and leading 
terms of NPR are all negatively correlated to current market excess returns, 
while the leading term of NPR is negatively significant at the 1% significance 
level.  
Due to the mechanism of seasonality adjustment one, the performance of 
NPR_ADJ_1 in models 13-15 is exactly the same as in models 10-12. Models 
16-18 use NPR_ADJ_2 as independent variable and the results of the 
estimated coefficient of NPR_ADJ_2t-1 is similar to that of models 10-12, but the 
t-value of the 1-month lagged NPR is better than in models 10-12.  
The results of the standardised aggregate net number of director purchase 
transactions are reported in Appendix E. Models 1-3 use standardised 
aggregate net number of transactions by all firms (SANP) as independent 
variable, while models 4-6 utilise the standardised seasonality adjustment one 
(SANP_ADJ_1) and models 7-9 utilise the standardised seasonality adjustment 
two (SANP_ADJ_2). The performance of all the standardised aggregate director 
trading is similar to that in models 1-9, Table 4.1.  
In generally, the results presented in Table 4.1 suggest that aggregate director 
trading can forecast future market excess returns. An increase in current 
aggregate directors’ purchases is associated with an increase in the future 
excess return of the stock market portfolio one month later. In contrast, the 
significantly negative contemporaneous or leading coefficients of series 
variables of aggregate director trading (real and seasonality adjustment 
measurements) indicate that directors reverse the direction of their transactions 
after the realisation of the stock price movements. These results show that 
directors are contrarian: they tend to purchase stock following market 
decreases and sell stock following market increases. Different measurements of 
aggregate director trading display similar results but the significant levels of t-
values are slightly different.  
Furthermore, to examine the forecasting power of aggregate director trading to 
market excess returns, a further regression was employed. Table 4.2 presents 
the results of the regression of market excess return on aggregate director 
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trading and regressors, as applied by Pesaran and Timmermann (2000). 
Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance 
estimates are applied and two lag terms of the residuals are used to compute 
the Newey-West covariance matrix.  
The dependent variable in the regression is the difference between the monthly 
returns of the FTSE All Share Index and the 90-day Treasury Bills returns. The 
independent regressors are: NPR, the aggregate net number of director 
purchases, JAN is a January dummy (which takes the value of unity in January 
of each year and zeros elsewhere), YALL is the dividend yield on the FTSE All 
Share Index, I3 is the 90-day T-bill rate, DI3 = I3t-I3t-1, PI is the rate of change of 
retail prices, DGILT is the change in the yield on a 2.5% government consol, 
DM0 is the rate of change of the money supply (the narrow definition), DIP is 
the rate of change in the index of industrial production, and DPSPOT is the rate 
of change in the spot price of oil.14  
Models 1 and 2 duplicate the models of Pesaran and Timmermann (2000). 
Model 1 includes all the regressors with the January dummy, while model 2 
includes all the regressors without the January dummy. Consistent with Pesaran 
and Timmermann (1995, 2000), the 1-month lagged dividend yield (YALL) is 
positively correlated to current excess returns. This may reflect the mean 
reversion in returns caused either by investor overreaction or persistent time-
varying risk-premia. The rate of change in the index of industrial production (DIP) 
is positively correlated to the future market excess returns, and the rate of 
inflation (PI) and growth in the monetary supply (DM0) are all negative 
coefficients in the excess return regression. The interest rate (I3, DI3) and 
change in the gilt yield (DGILT) appear to be weakly correlated with future 
excess returns. All these regressors measure different aspects of the economy’s 
inflation rate. The change in the log of oil prices is negatively correlated with 
stock returns. However, unlike Pesaran and Timmermann (2000), the significant 
levels are totally different: only dividend yield of FTSE All Share is significant at 
the 10% significance level, whilst all other independent variables are 
insignificant. The January dummy does not show any significance, which is 
                                                             
14
 Definitions and descriptions of these variables are presented in Appendix D.  
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consistent with the findings of Section 3.3.3, which showed that there is no 
significant January effect during the sample period from January 1986 to 
December 2008. Compared with Pesaran and Timmermann (2000), model 1 
with the January dummy could only achieve 2.78% adjusted R-square, while the 
value of adjusted R-square for model 2 without the January dummy is 2.89% 
(adjusted R-square for the excess return regression without January dummy is 
12% in Pesaran and Timmermann’s paper).  
Models 3 and 4 report the results of adding the aggregate director trading 
variable (aggregate net number of director purchases ratio, NPR) as 
independent variable into Pesaran and Timmermann’s (2000) model; model 3 
includes the January dummy, while model 4 excludes it. It can be seen that the 
coefficient of NPR in both models is positively significant at the 10% 
significance level for future excess returns. The performance of the remaining 
regressors matches those of models 1 and 2. The adjusted R-square is 
improved from 2.78% (model 1) to 3.43% (model 3), and from 2.89% (model 2) 
to 3.86% (model 4).  
Overall, the results in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 indicate that consistent with previous 
insider/director studies, aggregate director trading is positively significantly 
correlated to future excess returns and has the ability to forecast to future 
market excess returns. Adding aggregate director trading into Pesaran and 
Timmermann’s (2000) model improves the performance of the excess market 
return regression.  
4.4.2 Aggregate Director Trading and Market Returns-Sensitivity Test 
The evidence presented in this section uses the regression analysis method to 
examine the relationships between aggregate director transaction activities and 
returns to stock market in the long-run. It uses different length of time periods 
(3-, 6-, 9- and 12-month) to measure the performance of aggregate director 
transactions. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) explained that the reason for using 
longer time periods is that calculating director trading measures based on short 
periods (such as one month), probably results in many companies having no 
trading activity. Therefore, to obtain a better picture of aggregate director trading, 
applying a longer time period is rational and valuable.   
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Tables 4.3 and 4.4 employ regression analysis to examine the relationship 
between aggregate director trading measured by real data, seasonality 
adjustments one, two and three, and future market excess returns using buy-
and-hold excess returns (BHERs):  
P
k=t
t+m-1
(1+
i
R )- Pk=t
t+m-1
(1+
f
R )=a0 +a1DT(t-n,t-1), (35) 
Where DT represents the director trading variables. A summary of cumulative 
excess returns (CERs) and buy-and-hold excess returns (BHERs) is presented 
in Appendix F. 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 measure the extent to which different length multi-month 
aggregate director trading predicts future excess stock returns. The dependent 
variables are future 3-, 6-, 9- and 12-month excess stock returns, defined as the 
difference between monthly FTSE All share and the returns on monthly 90-day 
Treasury Bills using the methodology of BHERs. Seyhun (1992, 1998) 
calculated excess stock returns for all firms and groups of firms using non-
overlapping periods. As discussed by Lakonishok and Lee (2001), the 
advantage of using this measurement is that it avoids possible problems when 
testing aggregate insider trading and market returns. However, this procedure 
introduces another issue: the extremely small number of observations. In this 
study there are only 276 calendar months from January 1986 to December 
2008, therefore if Seyhun’s methodology was utilised there would be too few 
observations in the regression and this would lead unreliable and spurious 
results. Therefore, this study uses longer time horizons of past director trading 
data and consequently has overlapping periods. Instead of calculating t-
statistics, Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity-consistent 
covariance estimates as suggested by Lakonishok and Lee (2001) will be 
applied. Two lag terms of the residuals are used to compute the Newey-West 
covariance matrix.  
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 represent the performance of aggregate director trading for 
all firms after applying the different seasonality adjustment methods. Table 4.3 
employs seasonality adjustments one and two to measure director trading, 
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while seasonality adjustment three is utilised to examine director transactions in 
Table 4.4.15  
The independent variables in the regression shown in Table 4.3 are the past 3-, 
6-, 9- and 12-month aggregate net number of director purchases ratio (NPR) for 
all firms in Panels A to D, respectively. Panel A presents the regression of future 
m=3-, 6-, 9- and 12-month market excess returns for the past n=3-month NPR. 
It can be seen that the coefficients of NPR are all positively correlated to future 
market excess returns. To forecast the future 6-month excess returns, the 
coefficients of NPR after different seasonal adjustments are all significant, but 
others are not. In addition, no trend can be detected demonstrating that longer 
future excess returns have a better forecasting ability that aggregate director 
trading has.  
Panel B presents the regression of future m=3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-month market 
excess returns on past n=6-month NPR. It is clear that the longer time periods 
of future excess returns, the better the explanatory ability of NPR. The 
coefficients of NPR are all positively correlated to future excess returns. NPR 
for different seasonality adjustments is all positively significant at the 1% 
significance level when using past 6-months NPR to forecast the future 12-
month excess returns. Among the different seasonality adjustments, seasonality 
adjustment two results in the best adjusted R-square, while seasonality 
adjustment one gives the second best. Compared with Panel A, the 
performance of long-run forecasting ability is much improved in predicting long-
run excess returns.  
Seyhun (1992) stated: ‘if aggregation over time smoothes out the variations in 
the aggregate insider trading that are not related to future stock returns, then 
the use of longer horizons to measure aggregate insider trading should lead to 
increased forecasting ability.’ Consequently, coefficients of NPR and adjusted R-
square in Panels C and D are expected to be more significant and better than 
those in Panels A and B.  
                                                             
15
 Details of the seasonality adjustments are fully described in Chapter 3. 
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Panel C presents the regressions for future m=3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-month market 
excess returns on past n=9-month NPR. The coefficients of NPR are all 
positively correlated to future excess returns and are all positively significant at 
the 1% significance level when using past 9-month NPR to forecast future 9-, 
and 12-month excess returns. There is a trend that the longer future excess 
returns, the better the forecasting power of the NPR. The best predicting ability 
is for the future 12-month excess return following the different seasonality 
adjustments of NPR; seasonality adjustment two always gives the best 
performance, while seasonality adjustment one results in the second best. The 
best adjusted R-square is 22.29% which is observed following seasonality 
adjustment two.  
Panel D presents the regressions for future m=3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-month market 
excess returns on past n=12-month NPR. The coefficients of NPR are all 
positively correlated to future excess returns. Furthermore, except for 
forecasting future 3-month excess returns, the coefficients of NPR are all 
positively significant at the 1% significance level for the ability to forecast future 
6-, 9- and 12-month excess returns. The longer the time horizons of future 
excess returns, the better the predicting ability of NPR. The best adjusted R-
square is for future 12-month excess returns following different seasonal 
adjustments of the NPR. Consistent with Panels B and C, seasonality 
adjustment two always results in the best performance, while seasonality 
adjustment one results in the second best. The best adjusted R-square is 
achieved by seasonality adjustment two which gives 24.19%.  
Consistent with Seyhun (1992), compared to Panels A and B, it can be seen 
that the long-run forecasting ability of aggregate director trading is dramatically 
improved in Panels C and D. Generally speaking, the overall results of Table 4.3 
show that the coefficients of aggregate director trading are positively correlated 
to future market excess returns, and the coefficients are also positively 
significant when using longer time horizons of past aggregate director trading to 
forecast long-run future market excess returns. In addition, Panels C and D 
confirm the findings of previous insider/director studies: the longer the length of 
past aggregate director trading and future excess returns, the better the results, 
both in terms of significance and forecasting ability. By applying the seasonality 
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measurements, it can be seen that seasonality adjustments one and two give a 
similar performance to the real director trading activities, but increase the 
adjusted R-square of the model. Between these two measurements, seasonality 
adjustment two always has a better forecasting ability than seasonality 
adjustment one.  
Table 4.4 employs seasonality adjustment three 16  to measure aggregate 
director trading. The dependent variables are future m=3-, 6-, 9- and 12-month 
excess market returns, defined as the difference between monthly FTSE All 
share and the returns on monthly 90-day Treasury Bills by applying BHERs 
methodology. The independent variables are the past n=3-, 6-, 9- and 12-month 
aggregate net number of director purchases ratio (NPR) of all firms with month 
dummies17 in Panels A to D, respectively. Panel A uses the past n=3-month 
NPR to forecast future excess returns. The coefficients of NPR are all positively 
correlated to future excess returns and only the NPR to future 6-month excess 
returns is significant at the 5% significance level (Newey-West t-value is 1.98). 
Panel B presents the results for the past n=6-month NPR to future excess 
returns. The coefficients of NPR are all positively correlated to future excess 
returns and the NPR to future 12-month excess returns is significant at the 1% 
significance level (Newey-West t-value is 2.63). The best adjusted R-square is 
8.49% which can be observed for the future 12-month excess returns. Panel C 
presents the past n=9-month NPR to future excess returns. The coefficients of 
NPR are all positively correlated to future excess returns, and the NPR to future 
9-month and 12-month excess returns are significant at the 1% significance 
level. Consistent with Panel B, the best forecasting ability is for future 12-month 
excess returns with an adjusted R-square of 19.62%. Panel D presents the past 
12-month NPR to future excess returns. The coefficients of the past n=12-
month NPR are all positively correlated to future excess returns, and the NPR to 
future 6-, 9- and 12-month market excess returns are significant at the 1% 
significance level. The best adjusted R-square is 21.48% which is for the future 
12-month excess returns.  
                                                             
16
 Details of seasonality adjustment are fully described in Chapter 3. 
17
 Details of the month dummy are fully described in Chapter 3.  
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In generally, the results in Table 4.4 are consistent with the findings in Table 4.3; 
aggregate director trading is positively correlated to future excess market 
returns, and there is a trend that the longer the length of both past director 
trading and future excess returns, the better the forecasting ability of aggregate 
director trading (the best adjusted R-square is 21.48% which is achieved when 
using the past 12-month NPR to forecast future 12-month market excess 
returns). None of the month dummy variables are significant at any level which 
indicates that the month dummies do not have a significant effect on future 
market excess returns.   
The regression of CERs gives similar results. The robustness tests use different 
measurements of aggregate director trading as noted in Section 4.3 as 
independent variables are applied. These tests showed that some 
measurements of aggregate director trading (ANP, AS, ∆P, PR and SR) give 
similar results to the NPR while others did not (AP, ∆NPR, ∆PR, ∆SR, ∆NP, ∆S, 
NPGR, APGR and ASGR).   
4.4.3 Aggregate Director Trading and Portfolio Returns by Firm Size 
Previous studies in the US found that a small firm effect exists for aggregate 
insider trading. As mentioned in Section 3.1, firms were classified into 10 size 
groups by firm capitalisation for each year, and then further defined into large 
firms, medium-size firms, and small firms. Seyhun (1990) and Lakonishok and 
Lee (2001) employed this method to study aggregate insider trading activities in 
long-run studies in the US.  The aggregate net number of director purchases 
ratio (NPR) is applied in this study which has the advantage of not being 
‘sensitive to changes in the number of firms or trading activity over time. 
Moreover, the ratio does not display heteroscedasticity or extreme outliers’ 
(Seyhun, 1990). Table 4.5 displays the performance of NPR by different firm 
size.  
The dependent variable in the regression is the difference between the monthly 
equal- or value-weighted returns of firm size portfolios and the 90-day Treasury 
Bills returns using the methodology of BHERs. Similar to Table 4.3, the 
independent variable is past n=3-, 6-, 9- and 12-month NPR for different firm 
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sizes in Panels A to D, respectively. Equal- and value-weighted portfolio excess 
returns are compared in each panel.  
Panel A presents the regression of future m=3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-month portfolio 
excess returns for the past n=3-month NPR. It can be seen that the coefficients 
of NPR for different firm sizes are all positively correlated to the future excess 
returns except for medium firms. The results of the equal-weighted excess 
returns shows that only the NPR of large firms demonstrates a positive 
significance at the 10% significance level when forecasting future 6- and 9-
month excess returns. The results of the value-weighted excess returns show 
that except performance of medium firms, the NPR of all firm sizes is positively 
correlated to future portfolio excess returns, although none of the coefficients of 
NPR are significant when forecasting future 3-month excess returns. Similar to 
the equal-weighted excess returns, only the NPR of large firms is significant at 
the 5% significance level when predicting future 6-month excess returns. In 
forecasting the future 9-month excess portfolio returns, the NPR for all, large 
and small firms are positively significant, and the coefficients of large firms is 
significant at the 5% significance level while all firms and small firms are 
significant at the 10% significance level. For future 12-month excess returns, 
the NPRs of all firms and small firms are positively significant at the 5% and 10% 
significance levels, respectively, and the best predicting ability is 1.97% which is 
the result for all firms.  
Panel B presents the regression of future m=3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-month portfolio 
excess returns for the past n=6-month NPR. The coefficients of most the NPRs 
of different sized firms are positively correlated to the future excess returns. The 
results of the equal-weighted excess returns show that none of the NPRs in firm 
size classifications are significant. The performance of the NPR on value-
weighted excess returns tells another story: for future 3-month excess returns, 
the coefficients of NPR for all firms is positively significant at the 10% level;  for 
future 6-month excess returns, the coefficients of NPR for all firms and large 
firms are positively significant at the 10% and 5% significance levels, 
respectively; for future 9-month excess returns, the coefficients of NPR for all 
firms and large firms are positively significant at the 5% significance level, while 
the coefficients of NPR for small firms is significant at the10% significance level; 
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and for future 12-month excess returns, the coefficients of NPR for all firms is 
positively significant at 1% with value of adjusted R-square 3.56%, while the 
NPRs of large firms and small firms are significant at the 10% significance level.  
Consistent with the previously studies, the results in Panels A and B indicate 
that there is a trend that the longer the forecasting horizon, the better the 
predicting ability of all the firms. Aggregate director trading of large firms shows 
a strong significant ability to forecast future excess large firm portfolio returns, 
while past 3-month and 6-month aggregate director trading of small firms does 
not give more significant results than large firms or all firms.  
Panel C presents the regression of future m=3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-month portfolio 
excess returns for the past n=9-month NPR. Except for medium sized firms, the 
coefficients of the NPR are positively correlated to the future excess returns. 
The results of the equal-weighted excess returns show that although the NPR 
coefficients of medium firms are negatively significant to future 3-, 6-, 9- and 12-
month excess portfolio returns, the adjusted R-square demonstrates that the 
forecasting ability of medium sized firms is very poor. The coefficients of the 
NPR of all firms, large firms and small firms only result in a positive significant 
correlation when forecasting future 12-month excess returns: the coefficients of 
the NPR of large firms and small firms are significant at the 5% significance 
level, while the coefficients of the NPR of all firms is significant at the 1% 
significance level with adjusted R-square of 6.33%. The performance of the 
NPR for value-weighted excess portfolio returns is similar to that of the equal-
weighted returns. The coefficients of the NPR of medium sized firms are 
negatively significant for future excess portfolio returns, whilst all other firm 
sizes are positively correlated to future excess returns. The NPRs of all firms, 
large firms and small firms are not significant for future 3- and 6-month excess 
returns. To predict the future 9-month excess returns, the NPR of all firms is 
significant at the 5% significance level, while for large firms and small firms it is 
significant at the 10% significance level. To forecast future 12-month excess 
returns, the NPR of all firms is significant at the 1% significance level with 
adjusted R-square of 4.56%, while that of large firms and small firms are 
significant at the 5% significance level.  
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Panel D presents the regression of future m=3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-month portfolio 
excess returns for the past n=12-month NPR. The coefficients of NPR for all 
firm sizes (except medium sized firms) are positively correlated to the future 
excess returns. The results of the equal-weighted excess returns show that 
there is no significance of the NPR in the different firm size groups for future 3- 
and 6-month excess returns. For future 9-month excess returns, the coefficients 
of the NPR for all firms, large firms, and small firms are significant at the 1%, 10% 
and 5% significance levels, respectively. For future 12-month excess returns, 
the coefficients of NPR for all firms is significant at the 1% significance level 
with adjusted R-square of 10.27%, while large firms and small firms are 
significant at the 5% significance level. The performance of the NPRs for value-
weighted excess returns shows that for future 3-month excess returns none of 
the aggregate director trading are significant. Only the coefficients of the NPR 
for all firms demonstrate significance at the 10% significance level when 
forecasting future 6-month excess returns. For future 9-month excess returns, 
the coefficients of NPR for all firms and small firms are significant at the 1% 
significance level with adjusted R-square of 7.45% and 3.45%, respectively. The 
NPR of large firms is significant at the 5% significance level with 4.64% 
adjusted R-square. For future 12-month abnormal returns, the performance of 
NPR significance is the same as for future 9-month returns, but forecasting 
ability increases: the adjusted R-square of all firms, large firms and small firms 
are 7.76%, 4.73% and 4.78%, respectively.  
The results of Panels C and D indicate that there is a significant trend that the 
longer the length of the forecasting time horizon and past director trading, the 
better the performance of directors. The performance of small firms 
demonstrates a higher significance and forecasting ability than large firms. 
Compared to Panels A and B, the performance of the NPR for all firms by equal-
weighted excess returns results in a better forecasting ability than for the value-
weighted excess returns in Panels C and D.  
To conclude, the results in Table 4.5 are consistent with those of other studies, 
past director trading activities are positively significantly correlated to future 
portfolios movement: directors purchase (sell) stocks before a market goes up 
(down). The longer the forecasting horizon and past director trading, the better 
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predicting ability of aggregate director trading achieved. In addition to the small 
firm effect, the performance of large firms maintains a positively significant 
correlation to future large firm stock changes. Equal-weighted excess returns 
have a better predicting ability than value-weighted when longer past director 
trading is included in forecasting longer time horizons of future excess returns. 
This is probably caused by the better performance of small firm effects in the 
long-run. Seasonality measurements of director trading with BHER method 
were also applied and the results are similar to those presented in Table 4.5.  
4.4.4 Aggregate Director Trading in Ten Industries 
Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 examined the performance of future market excess 
returns on past aggregate director trading, while Section 4.4.3 analysed the 
performance of aggregate director trading for different firm size groups. This 
section tests the performance of aggregate director trading by industry 
segmentation using the sample data described in Section 3.1 (60,300 
transactions with respect to 1,086 firms from 1994 to 2008). The sample firms 
are grouped using the ICB 10 classifications:18 oil and gas (OS), basic materials 
(BM), industrials (I), consumer goods (CG), health care (HC), consumer 
services (CS), telecommunications (TC), utilities (U), financials (F), and 
technology (T). Using the ISIN code provided by HS, DataStream could provide 
the ICB classification for every single company. For the firms with ISIN codes 
not recognised by DataStream, the data was collected by hand using relevant 
information provided by HS, such as company name, director name, etc. For 
the industries portfolios data, value-weighted industry indices and UK 90-day 
Treasury Bills were applied as a risk-free rate provided by DataStream. The 
dependent variable in the regression is the difference between the monthly 
returns to industry indices and the 90-day Treasury Bills returns using the 
methodology of BHERs. The independent variables are past aggregate director 
trading of industries.  
                                                             
18 The Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) is a definitive system categorizing more than 
70,000 companies and 75,000 securities globally. It classifies company listed within a country by 
10 industries. They are Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials, Consumer Goods, Health Care, 
Consumer Services, Telecommunications, Utilities, Financials, and Technology.  
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Table 4.6 presents the results, and it applies the aggregate net number of 
purchases ratio (NPR) among industries to measure aggregate director trading 
activities. Panel A presents the regression for future m=3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-month 
industry excess returns for the past n=3-month NPR. The results show that 
except for performance of consumer services, industrials and utilities, almost 
the NPR for the remaining industries are all positively correlated to future 
industries excess returns: for basic materials, the NPR is significant at the 10% 
significance level when forecasting future 9-month excess industry returns; for 
financials, the NPR is significant at the 10% and 1% significance levels when 
predicting future 9- and 12-month excess industry returns, respectively; for 
health care, the NPR is significant at the 5% significance level when forecasting 
future 6-month excess industry returns; for oil and gas, the NPR is all significant 
at least the 10% significance level for future 3-, 6-, 9- and 12-month excess 
industry returns; and for technology, the NPR is significant at the 1% 
significance level for future 12-month excess industry returns. The best 
forecasting ability among industries is obtained by financials, which has 
adjusted R-square of 6.05% when forecasting the future 12-month financial 
industry.  
Panel B presents the regression for future m=3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-month industry 
excess returns for the past n=6-month NPR. The results show that except for 
the performance of consumer services and utilities, most NPRs for the other 
industries are positively correlated to future industries excess returns: for basic 
materials, the NPR is significant at the 5% significance level when forecasting 
future 6-month excess industry returns; for financials, the NPR is significant at 
the 5% and 1% significance levels when predicting future 9- and 12-month 
excess industry returns, respectively; for health care, the NPR is significant at 
the 10% significance level when forecasting future 3- and 6-month excess 
industry returns; for oil and gas, the NPR is significant at the 1% significance 
level for future 12-month excess industry returns; and for technology, the NPR 
is significant at the 1% significance level when predicting future 9- and 12-
month industry excess returns. Among these industries, the best forecasting 
ability is by financials, which has adjusted R-square of 9.29% when forecasting 
the future 12-month financial industry. 
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Panel C presents the regression for future m=3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-month industry 
excess returns for the past n=9-month NPR. The results show that except for 
the performance of consumer services, health care and utilities, most of the 
NPR of the remaining industries is positively correlated to future industries 
excess returns: for basic materials, the NPR is significant at the 10% 
significance level when forecasting future 6-month excess industry returns; for 
financials, the NPR is significant at least the 10% significance level when 
predicting future 6-, 9- and 12-month excess industry returns; for oil and gas, 
the NPR is significant at least the 5% significance level for future 9- and 12-
month excess industry returns; for technology, the NPR is significant at least the 
5% significance level when forecasting future 6-, 9- and 12-month excess 
industry returns; and for telecommunications, the NPR is significant at the 5% 
significance level when predicting future 12-month industry excess returns. 
Among all the industries, the best predicting ability is still by financials, which 
has adjusted R-square of 14.39% when forecasting the future 12-month 
financial industry. 
Panel D presents the regression for future m=3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-month industry 
excess returns for the past n=12-month NPR. The results show that except for 
the performance of consumer goods, consumer services, health care and 
utilities, the NPR of the remaining industries is positively correlated to future 
industries excess returns: for financials, the NPR is significant at least the 10% 
significance level when predicting future 6-, 9- and 12-month excess industry 
returns; and for oil and gas, technology and telecommunications, the NPR is 
significant at least the 5% significance level for future 6-, 9- and 12-month 
excess industry returns (NPR of telecommunications is significant at the 5% 
significance level for future 3-month excess industry returns as well). Among all 
the industries, the best predicting ability this time was achieved by oil and gas 
with adjusted R-square of 23.77% when forecasting the future 12-month oil and 
gas industry.  
These findings show that the NPR of consumer goods, consumer services, 
industrials and utilities are not always positively significantly correlated to future 
industry excess returns, while that of the remaining industries are. The past 3-, 
6-, 9-, and 12-month NPR of financials, oil and gas, and technology are 
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positively significantly correlated to future 9-, and 12-month excess industry 
returns. The performance of basic materials shows that past 3-, 6- and 9-month 
aggregate director trading is positively significantly correlated to future 6- or 9-
month excess industry returns and the performance of health care illustrates 
that the past 3- and 6-month NPR is positively significantly correlated to future 
6-month excess industry returns. The past 9- and 12-month aggregate director 
trading of telecommunications is positively significantly correlated to future 12-
month excess industry returns. In long-run forecasting, aggregate director 
trading transactions in financials, oil and gas, technology and 
telecommunications, are better indicators of future industry excess returns. 
Hence, other market participants could follow the trading activities among these 
industries.  
Generally speaking, the performance of the NPR of industries to future industry 
excess returns is consistent with aggregate director trading to future market 
excess returns. The reason for this is the high correlation between market 
return and industry returns and the high correlation between the trading activity 
of directors of all firms and industry firms (Correlations are shown in Appendix 
G).  
4.5 Conclusions 
The evidence presented in this study documents a strong relationship between 
past aggregate director trading and future excess market returns. Considering 
the seasonality issue in UK director trading by following Seyhun’s (1988) 
methodology, it confirms that aggregate director trading activity in a given month 
is significantly positively correlated to the return to the market portfolio in next 
month. The results also show directors are contrarian: they increase their stock 
purchases prior to an increase in the stock market and decrease their stock 
purchases following an increase in the stock market. Other models (Seyhun, 
1992; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001) have also been applied and these indicate 
that aggregate director trading have a good ability to forecast future excess 
market returns in the long-run. Different measurements of director trading were 
employed but the results do not show large differences after the three 
seasonality methodologies of director trading were applied.  
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As mentioned in previous studies, this study includes models which analyse a 
robust check of the firm size effect of director trading. The results show that the 
performance of both large firms and small firms are positively significantly 
correlated to future excess firm size portfolio returns. In the long-run, small firms 
show a greater significance and better forecasting power than large firms. The 
results of the robust test of subsample industry are consistent with the findings 
of aggregate director trading. A plausible reason for this is the high correlation 
between return of market and industries, and trading activity between all firms 
and firms within different industries. 
In short, aggregate director trading has sufficient power to forecast future 
market excess returns. The predictability of market excess returns increases 
with the length of forecasting horizon and the number of months of past director 
trading. A new finding is that aggregate director trading of large firms is also 
significant and has as a good a forecasting ability as all firms and small firms for 
future excess portfolio returns of firm size group.  
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Figure 4.1 Monthly aggregate net number of transactions (ANP), aggregate purchases (AP) and aggregate sales (AS) in all firms 
from January 1986 to December 2008 
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Table 4.1  Regression of the Excess Monthly Market Returns against the 
leading, Contemporaneous, and Lagged Values of Monthly Aggregate Net 
Number of Director Purchases (ANP) or Aggregate Net Number of Director 
Purchases Ratio (NPR) by All Firms 
 
 Constant   ANPt+1   ANPt   ANPt-1   ANPt-2 
1 -0.0045 
 
… 
 
… 
 
0.000053 
 
-0.000007 
 (-0.91) 
     
(1.01) 
 
(-0.14) 
2 0.003301 
 
… 
 
-0.000275 
 
0.000221 
 
0.000015 
 (0.89) 
   
(-4.04)*** 
 
(3.68)*** 
 
(0.35) 
3 0.011935 
 
-0.000289 
 
-0.000102 
 
0.000242 
 
0.000015 
 (3.12)*** 
 
(-5.55)*** (-1.49) 
 
(4.05)*** 
 
(0.35) 
 Constant 
 
ANP_ADJ_1t+1 ANP_ADJ_1t ANP_ADJ_1t-1 ANP_ADJ_1t-2 
4 -0.00211 
 
… 
 
… 
 
0.000013 
 
-0.0000005 
 (-0.44) 
     
(0.50) 
 
(-0.02) 
5 0.00438 
 
… 
 
-0.000117 
 
0.000071 
 
0.000009 
 (1.16) 
   
(-3.26)*** 
 
(2.39)** 
 
(0.30) 
6 0.011497 
 
-0.000148 
 
-0.000046 
 
0.000070 
 
0.000033 
 (2.89)*** 
 
(-4.75)*** 
 
(-1.26) 
 
(2.26)** 
 
(1.13) 
 Constant 
 
ANP_ADJ_2t+1 ANP_ADJ_2t ANP_ADJ_2t-1 ANP_ADJ_2t-2 
7 -0.00302 
 
… 
 
… 
 
0.000044 
 
-0.000019 
 (-0.59) 
     
(0.92) 
 
(-0.38) 
8 0.00357 
 
… 
 
-0.000226 
 
0.000181 
 
0.000009 
 (0.91) 
   
(-3.57)*** 
 
(3.24)*** 
 
(0.20) 
9 0.011089 
 
-0.000269 
 
-0.000069 
 
0.000198 
 
0.000032 
 (2.83)*** 
 
(-5.34)*** 
 
(-1.06) 
 
(3.50)*** 
 
(0.72) 
 
Sample periods are 276 months from 1986 to 2008. ANP is aggregate net number of director 
purchases transactions. ANP_ADJ_1 denotes seasonal adjusted ANP based on December and 
March fiscal year end by assumption, ANP_ADJ_2 denotes seasonal adjusted ANP based on 
December and March fiscal year end by Observations. Both methods of seasonal adjustment 
are fully described in Chapter 3. Excess market returns is defined as the actual return to the 
FTSE All Share index minus the return on the monthly 90-day Treasury Bills. The Newey-West 
t-statistics of estimated coefficients are shown in parentheses. The symbol *, **, *** presents 
significant level at the 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.  
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Table 4.1   (Continued) 
 
 
Constant 
 
NPRt+1 
 
NPRt 
 
NPRt-1 
 
NPRt-2 
10 -0.0078 
 
… 
 
… 
 
0.054 
 
-0.016 
 (-0.85) 
     
(1.77)* 
 
(-0.52) 
11 0.0002 
 
… 
 
-0.074 
 
0.057 
 
0.016 
 (0.05) 
   
(-3.81)*** 
 
(2.50)** 
 
(1.12) 
12 0.0084 
 
-0.083 
 
-0.024 
 
0.066 
 
0.012 
 (1.84)   (-4.84)***   (-1.39)   (3.14)***   (0.85) 
 Constant 
 
NPR_ADJ_1t+1 
 
NPR_ADJ_1t 
 
NPR_ADJ_1t-1 
 
NPR_ADJ_1t-2 
13 -0.0078 
 
… 
 
… 
 
0.054 
 
-0.016 
 (-0.85) 
     
(1.77)* 
 
(-0.52) 
14 0.0002 
 
… 
 
-0.074 
 
0.057 
 
0.016 
 (0.05) 
   
(-3.81)*** 
 
(2.50)** 
 
(1.12) 
15 0.0084 
 
-0.083 
 
-0.024 
 
0.066 
 
0.012 
 (1.84)   (-4.84)***   (-1.39)   (3.14)***   (0.85) 
 Constant 
 
NPR_ADJ_2t+1 
 
NPR_ADJ_2t 
 
NPR_ADJ_2t-1 
 
NPR_ADJ_2t-2 
16 -0.0066 
 
… 
 
… 
 
0.047 
 
-0.012 
 (-0.70) 
     
(1.39) 
 
(-0.34) 
17 0.0001 
 
… 
 
-0.085 
 
0.069 
 
0.014 
 (0.03) 
   
(-3.73)*** 
 
(2.60)** 
 
(0.89) 
18 0.0082 
 
-0.093 
 
-0.028 
 
0.082 
 
0.010 
 (1.82)*   (-4.74)***   (-1.39)   (3.33)***   (0.62) 
 
Sample periods are 276 months from 1986 to 2008. NPR denotes monthly aggregate net 
number of purchases trading ratio, calculated by dividing the net number of purchases (number 
of purchases minus number of sales) by the total number of director transaction of all firms (P-
S)/(P+S). NPR_ADJ_1 denotes seasonal adjusted NPR based on December and March fiscal 
year end by assumption, NPR_ADJ_2 denotes seasonal adjusted NPR based on December 
and March fiscal year end by Observations. Both methods of seasonal adjustment are fully 
described in Chapter 3. Excess market returns is defined as the actual return to the FTSE All 
Share index minus the return on the monthly 90-day Treasury Bills. The Newey-West t-statistics 
of estimated coefficients are shown in parentheses. The symbol *, **, *** presents significant 
level at the 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.  
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Table 4.2  Regression of the Excess Monthly Market Returns on all the 
Regressors: Jan 1986 to Dec 2008 
 
Regressors Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
         Constant 
 
-0.0170 
 
-0.0169 
 
-0.0175 
 
-0.0175 
  
(-0.70) 
 
(-0.70) 
 
(-0.79) 
 
(-0.71) 
Jant 
 
0.0019 
 
… 
 
0.0004 
 
… 
  
(0.17) 
   
(0.03) 
  YALLt-1 
 
1.0653 
 
1.0658 
 
0.8767 
 
0.8762 
  
(1.89)* 
 
(1.89)* 
 
(1.69)* 
 
(1.70)* 
I3t-1 
 
-1.5223 
 
-1.5181 
 
-0.3019 
 
-0.2976 
  
(-0.53) 
 
(-0.53) 
 
(-0.10) 
 
(-0.10) 
PI12t-2 
 
-0.1631 
 
-0.1636 
 
-0.2278 
 
-0.2281 
  
(-0.57) 
 
(-0.57) 
 
(-0.78) 
 
(-0.79) 
DI3t-1 
 
5.1106 
 
5.2400 
 
2.8643 
 
2.8829 
  
(0.48) 
 
(0.49) 
 
(0.26) 
 
(0.27) 
DGILTt-1 
 
-0.3346 
 
-0.3485 
 
-0.1504 
 
-0.1526 
  
(-0.26) 
 
(-0.28) 
 
(-0.12) 
 
(-0.12) 
DM012t-2 -0.0817 
 
-0.0817 
 
-0.1206 
 
-0.1207 
  
(-0.37) 
 
(-0.37) 
 
(-0.54) 
 
(-0.55) 
DIP12t-2 
 
0.0841 
 
0.0839 
 
0.0907 
 
0.0907 
  
(0.56) 
 
(0.56) 
 
(0.60) 
 
(0.60) 
DPSPOTt-1 -0.0142 
 
-0.0141 
 
-0.0127 
 
-0.0127 
  
(-0.59) 
 
(-0.59) 
 
(-0.54) 
 
(-0.54) 
NPRt-1 
 
… 
 
… 
 
0.0173 
 
0.0173 
      
(1.71)* 
 
(1.76)* 
Adj R2  0.0278  0.0289  0.0343  0.0386 
 
Sample periods are 276 months from 1986 to 2008. NPR denotes monthly aggregate net 
number of purchases trading ratio, calculated by dividing the net number of purchases (number 
of purchases minus number of sales) by the total number of director transaction of all firms (P-
S)/(P+S). Excess market returns is defined as the actual return to the FTSE All Share index 
minus the return on the monthly 90-day Treasury Bills. YALL is the dividend yield on the FTSE 
All Share Index, I3 is the 90-day T-bill rate, DI3 = I3t-I3t-1, PI is the rate of change of retail prices, 
DGILT is the change in the yield on a 2.5% government consol, JAN is a January dummy (which 
takes the value of unity in January of each year and zeros elsewhere), DIP is the rate of change 
in the index of industrial production, DM0 is the rate of change of the money supply (the narrow 
definition), and DPSPOT is the rate of change in the spot price of oil. The Newey-West t-
statistics of estimated coefficients are shown in parentheses. The symbol *, **, *** presents 
significant level at the 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.  
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Table 4.3  Time Series Regression of Future Excess Market Returns on Past, 3-, 6-, 9- and 12-Month Aggregate Net Number of 
Director Trading Ratio by All Firms 
 
Panel n=3 
 
n=3 
 
n=3 
 
n=3 
A m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
-0.0225 0.068 0.0211 
 
-0.0374 0.123 0.0417 
 
-0.0333 0.113 0.0246 
 
-0.0440 0.149 0.0363 
 
(-1.21) (1.38) 
  
(-1.61) (2.02)** 
  
(-1.12) (1.43) 
  
(-1.28) (1.57) 
 Seasonal 
Adj_1 
-0.0223 0.067 0.0207 
 
-0.0365 0.119 0.0397 
 
-0.0328 0.110 0.0240 
 
-0.0454 0.152 0.0392 
(-1.18) (1.33) 
  
(-1.55) (1.94)* 
  
(-1.10) (1.40) 
  
(-1.33) (1.63) 
 Seasonal 
Adj_2 
-0.0229 0.064 0.0205 
 
-0.0388 0.117 0.0423 
 
-0.0379 0.118 0.0309 
 
-0.0511 0.159 0.0474 
(-1.22) (1.38)      (-1.65) (2.06)**     (-1.27) (1.62)     (-1.48) (1.81)*   
Panel n=6 
 
n=6 
 
n=6 
 
n=6 
B m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
-0.0254 0.081 0.0219 
 
-0.0340 0.113 0.0249 
 
-0.0433 0.144 0.0305 
 
-0.0819 0.271 0.0975 
 
(-1.13) (1.28) 
  
(-1.11) (1.33) 
  
(-1.17) (1.37) 
  
(-2.32)** (2.63)*** 
 Seasonal 
Adj_1 
-0.0240 0.075 0.0194 
 
-0.0327 0.107 0.0232 
 
-0.0447 0.146 0.0336 
 
-0.0843 0.275 0.1062 
(-1.05) (1.18) 
  
(-1.06) (1.27) 
  
(-1.22) (1.44) 
  
(-2.44)** (2.82)*** 
 Seasonal 
Adj_2 
-0.0256 0.074 0.0218 
 
-0.0364 0.112 0.0286 
 
-0.0490 0.150 0.0397 
 
-0.0888 0.271 0.1142 
(-1.15) (1.31)     (-1.21) (1.46)     (-1.35) (1.61)     (-2.58)** (2.96)***   
Panel n=9 
 
n=9 
 
n=9 
 
n=9 
C m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
-0.0220 0.069 0.0110 
 
-0.0451 0.145 0.0338 
 
-0.0809 0.261 0.0895 
 
-0.1318 0.428 0.2074 
 
(-0.82) (0.88)  
  
(-1.33) (1.48) 
  
(-2.39)** (2.64)*** 
  
(-5.82)*** (6.39)*** 
 Seasonal 
Adj_1 
-0.0206 0.064 0.0097 
 
-0.0441 0.140 0.0340 
 
-0.0807 0.257 0.0941 
 
-0.1312 0.421 0.2168 
(-0.77) (0.83) 
  
(-1.31) (1.48) 
  
(-2.45)** (2.74)*** 
  
(-5.80)*** (6.63)*** 
 Seasonal 
Adj_2 
-0.0228 0.066 0.0125 
 
-0.0473 0.140 0.0387 
 
-0.0844 0.251 0.1006 
 
-0.1349 0.403 0.2229 
(-0.88) (0.97)     (-1.45) (1.65)     (-2.61)*** (2.92)***     (-5.98)*** (6.66)***   
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Table 4.3 (Continued) 
 
Panel n=12 
 
n=12 
 
n=12 
 
n=12 
D m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
-0.0362 0.111 0.0301 
 
-0.0811 0.257 0.1046 
 
-0.1282 0.408 0.2123 
 
-0.1473 0.483 0.2265 
 
(-1.38) (1.42) 
  
(-2.98)*** (3.12)*** 
  
(-6.23)*** (6.47)*** 
  
(-5.59)*** (6.51)*** 
 Seasonal 
Adj_1 
-0.0351 0.106 0.0303 
 
-0.0787 0.245 0.1055 
 
-0.1256 0.394 0.2192 
 
-0.1445 0.467 0.2346 
(-1.37) (1.41) 
  
(-2.93)*** (3.10)*** 
  
(-6.13)*** (6.58)*** 
  
(-5.46)*** (6.52)*** 
 Seasonal 
Adj_2 
-0.0361 0.101 0.0312 
 
-0.0804 0.233 0.1070 
 
-0.1274 0.372 0.2188 
 
-0.1489 0.449 0.2419 
(-1.46) (1.51)      (-3.08)*** (3.26)***     (-6.23)*** (6.54)***     (-5.71)*** (6.73)***   
 
Sample periods are 276 months from 1986 to 2008. NPR denotes monthly aggregate net number of purchases trading ratio, calculated by dividing the net 
number of purchases (number of purchases minus number of sales) by the total number of director transaction of all firms (P-S)/(P+S), Seasonal Adj_1 
denotes seasonal adjusted director trading transactions based on December and March fiscal year end by assumption, Seasonal Adj_2 denotes seasonal 
adjusted director trading transactions based on December and March fiscal year end by Observations. Both methods of seasonal adjustment are fully 
described in Chapter 3. Excess market returns is defined as buy-and-hold excess returns between the actual return to the FTSE All Share index and the 
return on the monthly 90-day Treasury Bills. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Newey-West t-
statistics present in parentheses. 
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Table 4.4  Time Series Regression of Future Excess Market Returns on Past 3-
Month, 6-Month, 9-Month and 12-Month Aggregate Director Trading by All 
Firms 
 
 
Panel A n=3 
 
n=3 
 
n=3 
 
n=3 
 
m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
α0 -0.027 (-1.45) 
 
-0.041 (-1.70)* 
 
-0.038 (-1.22) 
 
-0.048 (-1.33) 
α1 0.071 (1.42) 
 
0.123 (1.98)** 
 
0.117 (1.45) 
 
0.150 (1.54) 
D1,7 -0.0029 (-0.23) 
 
0.0081 (0.49) 
 
-0.0061 (-0.36) 
 
0.0099 (0.49) 
D2,8 -0.0040 (-0.29) 
 
0.0024 (0.15) 
 
-0.0098 (-0.55) 
 
0.0007 (0.03) 
D4,10 0.0171 (1.41) 
 
0.0066 (0.44) 
 
0.0202 (1.07) 
 
0.0080 (0.42) 
D5,11 0.0137 (1.19) 
 
0.0033 (0.24) 
 
0.0154 (0.92) 
 
0.0047 (0.25)  
Adj R2 0.0144   0.0276   0.0154   0.0218 
Panel B n=6 
 
n=6 
 
n=6 
 
n=6 
 
m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
α0 -0.029 (-1.30)  
 
-0.038 (-1.21) 
 
-0.047 (-1.26)  
 
-0.087 (-2.42)** 
α1 0.080 (1.27) 
 
0.114 (1.32) 
 
0.143 (1.36)  
 
0.271 (2.63)*** 
D1,7 -0.0030 (-0.23) 
 
0.0090 (0.55) 
 
-0.0030 (-0.17) 
 
0.0164 (0.78) 
D2,8 -0.0023 (-0.18) 
 
0.0063 (0.40) 
 
-0.0040 (-0.23) 
 
0.0100 (0.50) 
D4,10 0.0178 (1.42) 
 
0.0067 (0.41) 
 
0.0206 (1.06) 
 
0.0069 (0.39) 
D5,11 0.0117 (1.00) 
 
0.0008 (0.05)  
 
0.0112 (0.67)  
 
-0.0018 (-0.11) 
Adj R
2
 0.0142   0.0106   0.0191   0.0849 
Panel C n=9 
 
n=9 
 
n=9 
 
n=9 
 
m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
α0 -0.027 (-0.98)  
 
-0.049 (-1.42)  
 
-0.087 (-2.56)** 
 
-0.138 (-5.70)*** 
α1 0.071 (0.90)  
 
0.146 (1.47) 
 
0.265 (2.71)*** 
 
0.430 (6.33)*** 
D1,7 -0.0028 (-0.22) 
 
0.0090 (0.54) 
 
-0.0047 (-0.29) 
 
0.0100 (0.54) 
D2,8 -0.0042 (-0.31) 
 
0.0012 (0.08) 
 
-0.0120 (-0.77) 
 
-0.0003 (-0.01)  
D4,10 0.0181 (1.44) 
 
0.0095 (0.57) 
 
0.0267 (1.27) 
 
0.0145 (0.83) 
D5,11 0.0128 (1.07) 
 
0.0050 (0.33) 
 
0.0193 (1.15) 
 
0.0091 (0.59)  
Adj R2 0.0039   0.0197   0.0844   0.1962 
Panel D n=12 
 
n=12 
 
n=12 
 
n=12 
 
m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
α0 -0.040 (-1.55) 
 
-0.086 (-3.11)*** -0.133 (-6.05)*** -0.153 (-5.53)*** 
α1 0.111 (1.41)  
 
0.257 (3.12)*** 
 
0.408 (6.45)*** 
 
0.484 (6.48)*** 
D1,7 0.00001 (0.00) 
 
0.0148 (0.82)  
 
0.0024 (0.16) 
 
0.0124 (0.69) 
D2,8 -0.0008 (-0.06) 
 
0.0078 (0.53) 
 
-0.0032 (-0.23) 
 
0.0054 (0.32) 
D4,10 0.0169 (1.37) 
 
0.0063 (0.43) 
 
0.0184 (1.09) 
 
0.0096 (0.56) 
D5,11 0.0099 (0.86) 
 
-0.0001 (-0.01) 
 
0.0125 (0.82)  
 
0.0054 (0.34)  
Adj R2 0.0203   0.0925   0.2029   0.2148 
 
Sample periods are 276 months from 1986 to 2008. NPR denotes monthly aggregate net 
number of purchases trading ratio, calculated by dividing the net number of purchases (number 
of purchases minus number of sales) by the total number of director transaction of all firms (P-
S)/(P+S), Table 4.4 presents performance of aggregate director trading with Seasonality 
Adjustment three which applies method of monthly dummy variables. Method of seasonality 
adjustment three is fully described in Chapter 3. D1,7 is January and July dummy, which is takes 
the value of unity in January and July of each year and zeros elsewhere. D2,8 is February and  
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Table 4.4 (Continued) 
 
August dummy, which is takes the value of unity in February and August of each year and zeros 
elsewhere. D4,10 is April and October of unity in February and August of each year and zeros 
elsewhere. D4,10 is April and October dummy, which is takes the value of unity in April and 
October of each year and zeros elsewhere. D5,11 is May and November dummy, which is takes 
the value of unity in May and November of each year and zeros elsewhere. Excess market 
returns is defined as buy-and-hold excess returns between the actual return to the FTSE All 
Share index and the return on the monthly 90-day Treasury Bills. The symbols *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Newey-West t-statistics 
present in parentheses. 
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Table 4.5  Time Series Regression of Future Excess Portfolio Returns on Past 3-Month, 6-Month, 9-Month and 12-Month 
Aggregate Net Director Purchase Ratio 
 
 
Panel n=3   n=3   n=3   n=3 
A 
 
m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
(i,j) 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
EW 
A,A 
-0.015 0.040 0.0022 
 
-0.037 0.116 0.0180 
 
-0.042 0.117 0.0112 
 
-0.033 0.087 0.0030 
(-0.64) (0.64) 
  
(-1.25) (1.51) 
  
(-1.20) (1.26) 
  
(-0.76) (0.73) 
 
L,L 
-0.007 0.022 -0.0029 
 
-0.028 0.123 0.0079 
 
-0.044 0.172 0.0131 
 
-0.036 0.194 0.0111 
(-0.37) (0.58) 
  
(-0.95) (1.95)* 
  
(-1.30) (1.92)* 
  
(-0.90) (1.37) 
 
M,M 
-0.017 0.005 -0.0034 
 
-0.026 0.018 -0.0023 
 
-0.045 0.016 -0.0031 
 
-0.045 0.002 -0.0037 
(-1.19) (0.37) 
  
(-1.08) (0.83) 
  
(-1.41) (0.50) 
  
(-1.25) (0.05) 
 
S,S 
-0.044 0.054 -0.0009 
 
-0.087 0.104 0.0011 
 
-0.119 0.196 0.0056 
 
-0.136 0.244 0.0065 
(-1.12) (0.56)     (-1.58) (0.77)     (-1.88)* (1.31)     (-1.77)* (1.38)   
VW 
A,A 
-0.024 0.092 0.0060 
 
-0.026 0.130 0.0048 
 
-0.055 0.221 0.0113 
 
-0.061 0.317 0.0197 
(-0.98) (1.50) 
  
(-0.82) (1.59) 
  
(-1.44) (1.97)* 
  
(-1.33) (2.19)** 
 
L,L 
-0.004 0.055 0.0015 
 
-0.021 0.159 0.0152 
 
-0.033 0.224 0.0217 
 
-0.020 0.226 0.0155 
(-0.23) (1.51) 
  
(-0.73) (2.53)** 
  
(-0.93) (2.32)** 
  
(-0.50) (1.62) 
 
M,M 
-0.016 0.004 -0.0035 
 
-0.021 0.017 -0.0025 
 
-0.040 0.007 -0.0036 
 
-0.042 -0.004 -0.0037 
(-1.09) (0.31) 
  
(-0.86) (0.81) 
  
(-1.28) (0.25) 
  
(-1.22) (-0.10) 
 
S,S 
-0.045 0.060 0.0000 
 
-0.085 0.109 0.0017 
 
-0.129 0.247 0.0098 
 
-0.145 0.292 0.0103 
(-1.24) (0.68)     (-1.67) (0.86)     (-2.23)** (1.69)*     (-1.98)** (1.68)*   
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Table 4.5   (Continued) 
 
Panel n=6   n=6   n=6   n=6 
B 
 
m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
(i,j) 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
EW 
A,A 
-0.024 0.069 0.0091 
 
-0.036 0.111 0.0112 
 
-0.042 0.112 0.0066 
 
-0.063 0.182 0.0182 
(-0.86) (0.90) 
  
(-0.98) (1.09) 
  
(-0.95) (0.89) 
  
(-1.31) (1.25) 
 
L,L 
-0.011 0.039 -0.0018 
 
-0.024 0.113 0.0034 
 
-0.045 0.177 0.0092 
 
-0.042 0.216 0.0096 
(-0.51) (0.75) 
  
(-0.74) (1.51) 
  
(-1.17) (1.51) 
  
(-0.99) (1.41) 
 
M,M 
-0.017 0.005 -0.0033 
 
-0.024 0.012 -0.0028 
 
-0.044 0.008 -0.0035 
 
-0.046 -0.004 -0.0037 
(-1.24) (0.50) 
  
(-1.01) (0.64) 
  
(-1.37) (0.25) 
  
(-1.25) (-0.11) 
 
S,S 
-0.055 0.080 0.0011 
 
-0.095 0.121 0.0013 
 
-0.139 0.239 0.0070 
 
-0.170 0.315 0.0096 
(-1.25) (0.71)     (-1.51) (0.77)     (-1.80)* (1.26)     (-2.00)** (1.50)   
VW 
A,A 
-0.039 0.144 0.0138 
 
-0.041 0.184 0.0088 
 
-0.076 0.292 0.0158 
 
-0.109 0.477 0.0356 
(-1.48) (1.94)* 
  
(-1.17) (1.84)* 
  
(-1.76)* (2.13)** 
  
(-2.22)** (2.77)*** 
 
L,L 
-0.007 0.067 0.0020 
 
-0.019 0.153 0.0089 
 
-0.034 0.233 0.0161 
 
-0.036 0.287 0.0188 
(-0.33) (1.34) 
  
(-0.58) (2.05)** 
  
(-0.90) (1.98)** 
  
(-0.84) (1.90)* 
 
M,M 
-0.016 0.005 -0.0033 
 
-0.019 0.012 -0.0028 
 
-0.041 0.005 -0.0037 
 
-0.044 -0.006 -0.0036 
(-1.16) (0.51) 
  
(-0.81) (0.69) 
  
(-1.31) (0.16) 
  
(-1.25) (-0.18) 
 
S,S 
-0.054 0.079 0.0013 
 
-0.097 0.135 0.0027 
 
-0.158 0.314 0.0134 
 
-0.190 0.391 0.0455 
(-1.31) (0.75)     (-1.66)* (0.91)     (-2.18)** (1.67)*     (-2.33)** (1.86)*   
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Table 4.5   (Continued) 
 
Panel n=9   n=9   n=9   n=9 
C 
 
m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
(i,j) 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
EW 
A,A 
-0.019 0.052 0.0019 
 
-0.031 0.089 0.0038 
 
-0.065 0.182 0.0179 
 
-0.118 0.349 0.0633 
(-0.60) (0.56) 
  
(-0.73) (0.72) 
  
(-1.46) (1.36) 
  
(-3.15)*** (3.00)*** 
 
L,L 
-0.002 0.008 -0.0037 
 
-0.012 0.060 -0.0021 
 
-0.037 0.141 0.0028 
 
-0.053 0.250 0.0208 
(-0.11) (0.13) 
  
(-0.36) (0.73) 
  
(-1.01) (1.33) 
  
(-1.35) (2.00)** 
 
M,M 
-0.013 -0.010 -0.0010 
 
-0.015 -0.024 0.0012 
 
-0.035 -0.038 0.0029 
 
-0.047 -0.024 -0.0015 
(-1.00) (-2.26)** 
  
(-0.66) (-3.22)*** 
 
(-1.15) (-3.04)*** 
 
(-1.39) (-1.71)* 
 
S,S 
-0.076 0.130 0.0067 
 
-0.121 0.180 0.0055 
 
-0.167 0.297 0.0101 
 
-0.232 0.451 0.0391 
(-1.64) (1.12)     (-1.79)* (1.08)     (-2.13)** (1.53)     (-2.94)*** (2.18)**   
VW 
A,A 
-0.035 0.134 0.0080 
 
-0.034 0.156 0.0033 
 
-0.094 0.345 0.0276 
 
-0.149 0.603 0.0456 
(-1.12) (1.42) 
  
(-0.84) (1.27) 
  
(-2.08)** (2.37)** 
  
(-3.24)*** (3.63)*** 
 
L,L 
0.001 0.041 -0.0021 
 
-0.007 0.107 0.0012 
 
-0.024 0.188 0.0067 
 
-0.042 0.304 0.0267 
(0.04) (0.70) 
  
(-0.22) (1.30) 
  
(-0.65) (1.76)* 
  
(-1.03) (2.44)** 
 
M,M 
-0.012 -0.010 -0.0012 
 
-0.010 -0.024 0.0011 
 
-0.032 -0.040 0.0036 
 
-0.045 -0.025 -0.0013 
(-0.92) (-2.20)** 
  
(-0.44) (-3.26)*** 
 
(-1.07) (-3.29)*** 
 
(-1.38) (-1.80)* 
 
S,S 
-0.071 0.121 0.0059 
 
-0.118 0.182 0.0059 
 
-0.174 0.344 0.0132 
 
-0.237 0.492 0.0322 
(-1.63) (1.11)     (-1.82)* (1.13)     (-2.34)** (1.82)*     (-3.15)*** (2.44)**   
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Table 4.5   (Continued) 
 
Panel n=12   n=12   n=12   n=12 
D 
 
m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
(i,j) 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
EW 
A,A 
-0.022 0.057 0.0022 
 
-0.059 0.172 0.0215 
 
-0.122 0.355 0.0721 
 
-0.156 0.470 0.1027 
(-0.66) (0.57) 
  
(-1.46) (1.41) 
  
(-3.83)*** (3.54)*** 
  
(-4.56)*** (4.55)*** 
 
L,L 
-0.005 0.011 -0.0037 
 
-0.018 0.075 -0.0016 
 
-0.056 0.201 0.0281 
 
-0.064 0.294 0.0437 
(-0.21) (0.17) 
  
(-0.60) (0.81) 
  
(-1.73) (1.90)* 
  
(-1.57) (2.15)** 
 
M,M 
0.011 -0.085 0.0064 
 
0.002 -0.081 -0.0008 
 
-0.055 0.010 -0.0038 
 
-0.062 0.017 -0.0038 
(0.31) (-0.94) 
  
(0.04) (-0.61) 
  
(-1.05) (0.06) 
  
(-1.11) (0.09) 
 
S,S 
-0.091 0.160 0.0100 
 
-0.161 0.266 0.0141 
 
-0.240 0.460 0.0455 
 
-0.286 0.572 0.0582 
(-1.85)* (1.30)     (-2.49)** (1.60)     (-3.46)*** (2.47)**     (-3.53)*** (2.60)**   
VW 
A,A 
-0.041 0.149 0.0089 
 
-0.060 0.239 0.0103 
 
-0.136 0.477 0.0745 
 
-0.170 0.672 0.0776 
(-1.31) (1.49) 
  
(-1.55) (1.79)* 
  
(-3.26)*** (3.31)*** 
  
(-3.28)*** (3.72)*** 
 
L,L 
-0.004 0.055 -0.0011 
 
-0.013 0.125 0.0021 
 
-0.041 0.247 0.0464 
 
-0.053 0.350 0.0473 
(-0.18) (0.87) 
  
(-0.46) (1.36) 
  
(-1.24) (2.23)** 
  
(-1.24) (2.61)** 
 
M,M 
0.011 -0.083 0.0053 
 
0.010 -0.089 -0.0003 
 
-0.043 -0.016 -0.0038 
 
-0.051 -0.012 -0.0038 
(0.31) (-0.92) 
  
(0.20) (-0.68) 
  
(-0.86) (-0.10) 
  
(-0.93) (-0.07) 
 
S,S 
-0.086 0.153 0.0097 
 
-0.154 0.260 0.0135 
 
-0.233 0.474 0.0345 
 
-0.278 0.583 0.0478 
(-1.90)* (1.34)     (-2.50)** (1.61)     (-3.60)*** (2.62)***     (-3.69)*** (2.76)***   
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Table 4.5   (Continued) 
 
Sample periods are 276 months from 1986 to 2008. NPR denotes monthly aggregate net number of purchases trading ratio, calculated by dividing the net 
number of purchases (number of purchases minus number of sales) by the total number of director transaction of all firms (P-S)/(P+S), Excess portfolio 
returns is defined as buy-and-hold excess returns between the actual return to the sample firm portfolios and the return on the monthly 90-day Treasury Bills. 
EW is equal-weighted buy-and-hold excess returns. VW is value-weighted buy-and-hold excess returns. A,A presents buy-and-hold excess returns of all 
sample firms with NPR of all sample firms. L,L presents buy-and-hold excess returns of large sample firms with NPR of large sample firms. M,M presents 
buy-and-hold excess returns of medium sample firms with NPR of medium sample firms. S,S presents buy-and-hold excess returns of small sample firms with 
NPR of small sample firms. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Newey-West t-statistics present 
in parentheses. 
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Table 4.6  Time Series Regression of Future Excess Market Returns on Past 3-Month, 6-Month, 9-Month and 12-Month 
Aggregate Net Director Purchases Ratio by ICB 10 industry classifications 
 
 
Panel n=3   n=3   n=3   n=3 
A m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
I,j α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2 
BM 
-0.0089 0.02621 -0.0010   -0.0225 0.09417 0.0275   -0.0168 0.12141 0.0309   0.0210 0.07183 0.0038 
(-0.33) (0.66)      (-0.60) (1.61)     (-0.38) (1.82)*     (0.39) (0.85)   
CG 
-0.0135 0.03044 -0.0023 
 
-0.0371 0.09030 0.0093 
 
-0.0520 0.13503 0.0173 
 
-0.0268 0.09175 0.0038 
(-0.46) (0.56) 
  
(-0.88) (1.16) 
  
(-0.96) (1.37) 
  
(-0.52) (0.95) 
 
CS 
-0.0037 -0.02239 -0.0024   -0.01202 -0.00888 -0.0056   -0.0236 0.03024 -0.0042   -0.0152 0.00615 -0.0060 
(-0.22) (-0.43)     (-0.47) (-0.13)     (-0.64) (0.41)     (-0.33) (0.07)   
F 
0.0047 -0.01015 -0.0055 
 
-0.0045 0.02854 -0.0046 
 
-0.0530 0.15790 0.0196 
 
-0.1019 0.29589 0.0605 
(0.18) (-0.17) 
  
(-0.12) (0.33) 
  
(-1.29) (1.67)* 
  
(-2.04)** (2.62)*** 
 
HC 
-0.0047 0.01789 0.0008   -0.0230 0.06858 0.0490   0.0035 0.02941 0.0002   0.0114 0.03031 -0.0017 
(-0.36) (0.86)     (-1.21) (2.33)**     (0.13) (0.76)     (0.30) (0.54)   
I 
0.0213 -0.07109 0.0092 
 
-0.0019 -0.02015 -0.0053 
 
-0.0143 0.01398 -0.0058 
 
0.0101 -0.04003 -0.0050 
(0.94)  (-1.16) 
  
(-0.04) (-0.21)  
  
(-0.26) (0.12) 
  
(0.16) (-0.28) 
 
OS 
-0.0203 0.05310 0.0373   -0.0133 0.06453 0.0325   0.0069 0.06107 0.0174   -0.0080 0.11495 0.0538 
(-1.10) (2.36)**     (-0.49) (1.97)*     (0.24) (1.66)*     (-0.22) (2.47)**   
T 
-0.0139 -0.02640 -0.0036 
 
-0.0349 0.00719 -0.0058 
 
-0.0925 0.15017 0.0159 
 
-0.1410 0.27396 0.0516 
(-0.41)  (-0.53) 
  
(-0.60) (0.08) 
  
(-1.41) (1.51) 
  
(-2.11)** (2.72)*** 
 
TC 
-0.0165 0.02701 0.0026   0.0053 0.00361 -0.0058   0.0219 -0.00020 -0.0060   0.0022 0.06033 0.0008 
(-0.66) (0.85)     (0.13) (0.07)     (0.38) (-0.00)     (0.03) (0.63)   
U 
0.0100 -0.00267 -0.0054 
 
0.0297 -0.01526 0.0002 
 
0.0552 -0.03530 0.0130 
 
0.0809 -0.04679 0.0141 
(0.73) (-0.18)     (1.39) (-0.66)     (2.06)** (-1.16)     (2.24)** (-1.13)   
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Table 4.6 (Continued) 
 
Panel n=6   n=6   n=6   n=6 
B m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
i,j α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2 
BM 
-0.0265 0.07312 0.0202   -0.0438 0.15315 0.0553   -0.0205 0.14076 0.0290   0.0182 0.08594 0.0037 
(-0.85) (1.36)     (-1.08) (2.12)**     (-0.39) (1.52)     (0.29) (0.76)   
CG 
-0.0155 0.03614 -0.0028 
 
-0.0494 0.11987 0.0111 
 
-0.0331 0.10305 0.0026 
 
-0.0122 0.06393 -0.0032 
(-0.50) (0.57) 
  
(-1.10) (1.34) 
  
(-0.58) (0.93) 
  
(-0.22) (0.54) 
 
CS 
0.0037 -0.05170 0.0067   -0.00697 -0.02887 -0.0042   -0.0090 -0.01988 -0.0056   -0.0054 -0.03175 -0.0052 
(0.20) (-0.80)     (-0.24) (-0.36)     (-0.22) (-0.20)     (-0.11) (-0.25)   
F 
0.0001 -0.00119 -0.0059 
 
-0.0389 0.10148 0.0052 
 
-0.1160 0.29790 0.0557 
 
-0.1657 0.43787 0.0929 
(0.00) (-0.02) 
  
(-0.99) (1.04) 
  
(-2.40)** (2.51)** 
  
(-2.84)*** (2.98)*** 
 
HC 
-0.0230 0.05554 0.0321   -0.0214 0.06514 0.0233   -0.0005 0.03644 -0.0004   0.0209 0.00617 -0.0061 
(-1.31) (1.89)*     (-0.94) (1.82)*     (-0.01) (0.69)     (0.50) (0.09)   
I 
0.0077 -0.03890 -0.0031 
 
-0.0128 0.01096 -0.0059 
 
-0.0084 0.00576 -0.0061 
 
-0.0101 0.01232 -0.0061 
(0.24) (-0.44) 
  
(-0.23) (0.08) 
  
(-0.12) (0.03) 
  
(-0.12) (0.06) 
 
OS 
-0.0183 0.04863 0.0158   -0.0111 0.05919 0.0129   -0.0155 0.09737 0.0283   -0.0595 0.19484 0.0884 
(-0.64) (1.29)     (-0.29) (1.10)     (-0.35) (1.51)     (-1.23) (2.74)***   
T 
-0.0205 -0.00659 -0.0058 
 
-0.0767 0.12503 0.0093 
 
-0.1489 0.30865 0.0571 
 
-0.1867 0.38565 0.0730 
(-0.55) (-0.10) 
  
(-1.42) (1.44) 
  
(-2.40)** (2.85)*** 
  
(-2.45)** (2.95)*** 
 
TC 
-0.0134 0.02100 -0.0020   0.0004 0.00990 -0.0056   -0.0079 0.04683 -0.0013   -0.0482 0.14060 0.0227 
(-0.45) (0.53)     (0.01) (0.14)     (-0.12) (0.48)     (-0.61) (1.22)   
U 
0.0110 -0.00692 -0.0038 
 
0.0308 -0.02143 0.0031 
 
0.0613 -0.04973 0.0218 
 
0.0795 -0.04327 0.0066 
(0.74) (-0.38)     (1.38) (-0.77)     (2.11)** (-1.29)     (2.01)** (-0.84)   
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Table 4.6 (Continued) 
 
Panel n=9   n=9   n=9   n=9 
C m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
i,j α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2 
BM 
-0.0316 0.09098 0.0278   -0.0369 0.14678 0.0415   -0.0089 0.12010 0.0152   0.0168 0.09812 0.0045 
(-0.99) (1.56)     (-0.83) (1.77)*     (-0.16) (1.16)     (0.26) (0.79)   
CG 
-0.0280 0.06377 0.0012 
 
-0.0301 0.08391 0.0001 
 
-0.0068 0.04767 -0.0049 
 
0.0172 -0.00045 -0.0063 
(-0.85) (0.89)  
  
(-0.66) (0.87) 
  
(-0.11) (0.37) 
  
(0.28) (-0.00) 
 
CS 
0.0045 -0.05944 0.0062   0.00024 -0.05705 -0.0008   -0.0035 -0.04512 -0.0041   -0.0095 -0.01979 -0.0060 
(0.24) (-0.90)     (0.01) (-0.64)     (-0.08) (-0.38)     (-0.18) (-0.14)   
F 
-0.0143 0.02881 -0.0046 
 
-0.0819 0.19759 0.0270 
 
-0.1604 0.39710 0.0800 
 
-0.2429 0.61124 0.1439 
(-0.43) (0.34) 
  
(-1.98)** (1.85)* 
  
(-2.90)*** (2.78)*** 
  
(-3.95)*** (3.91)*** 
 
HC 
-0.0098 0.02761 0.0010   -0.0094 0.04019 0.0021   0.0236 -0.01778 -0.0052   0.0461 -0.05201 -0.0006 
(-0.60) (1.01)     (-0.40) (1.01)     (0.77) (-0.35)     (1.22) (-0.77)   
I 
0.0001 -0.01705 -0.0056 
 
-0.0071 0.00101 -0.0061 
 
-0.0207 0.03964 -0.0055 
 
-0.0800 0.19687 0.0068 
(0.00) (-0.16) 
  
(-0.11) (0.01) 
  
(-0.27) (0.19) 
  
(-0.77) (0.74) 
 
OS 
-0.0196 0.05086 0.0131   -0.0307 0.09331 0.0315   -0.0553 0.16270 0.0684   -0.1075 0.27390 0.1377 
(-0.62) (1.14)     (-0.70) (1.45)     (-1.20) (2.30)**     (-2.18)** (3.58)***   
T 
-0.0515 0.07987 0.0043 
 
-0.1177 0.24082 0.0358 
 
-0.1861 0.39748 0.0726 
 
-0.2408 0.50267 0.0988 
(-1.30) (1.12) 
  
(-2.02)** (2.36)** 
  
(-2.54)** (3.00)*** 
  
(-2.82)*** (3.25)*** 
 
TC 
-0.0232 0.03744 0.0051   -0.0359 0.07022 0.0107   -0.0690 0.14817 0.0369   -0.1164 0.25717 0.0802 
(-0.81) (0.92)     (-0.73) (0.97)     (-1.06) (1.49)     (-1.57) (2.28)**   
U 
0.0092 -0.00521 -0.0050 
 
0.0301 -0.02057 0.0007 
 
0.0561 -0.03826 0.0072 
 
0.0752 -0.03292 -0.0003 
(0.61) (-0.26)     (1.35) (-0.68)     (1.89)* (-0.89)     (1.91)* (-0.59)   
 
 
Page 95 of 224 
 
Table 4.6 (Continued) 
 
Panel n=12   n=12   n=12   n=12 
D m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
i,j α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2 
BM 
-0.0255 0.08092 0.0173   -0.0255 0.12202 0.0225   -0.0015 0.10702 0.0085   0.0215 0.09556 0.0026 
(-0.77) (1.31)      (-0.56) (1.39)     (-0.03) (0.97)     (0.32) (0.73)   
CG 
0.0066 -0.00770 -0.0060 
 
0.0195 -0.02459 -0.0058 
 
0.0423 -0.06183 -0.0046 
 
0.0893 -0.16312 0.0049 
(0.19) (-0.10) 
  
(0.38) (-0.21) 
  
(0.68) (-0.45) 
  
(1.31) (-1.06) 
 
CS 
0.0058 -0.06357 0.0056   -0.00005 -0.05916 -0.0013   -0.0095 -0.02406 -0.0058   -0.0182 0.01387 -0.0063 
(0.30)  (-0.94)     (-0.00) (-0.58)     (-0.21) (-0.19)     (-0.33) (0.09)   
F 
-0.0370 0.08052 0.0027 
 
-0.1047 0.24834 0.0371 
 
-0.2099 0.50903 0.1098 
 
-0.3311 0.80926 0.2092 
(-1.02) (0.87) 
  
(-2.07)** (1.89)* 
  
(-3.49)*** (3.37)*** 
  
(-5.88)*** (6.13)*** 
 
HC 
-0.0097 0.02751 -0.0003   0.0036 0.00945 -0.0058   0.0366 -0.05063 0.0005   0.0710 -0.11177 0.0159 
(-0.53) (0.86)     (0.15) (0.23)     (1.29) (-0.96)     (2.03)** (-1.70)*   
I 
0.0059 -0.03075 -0.0049 
 
-0.0130 0.01509 -0.0061 
 
-0.0662 0.15891 0.0042 
 
-0.1194 0.30184 0.0208 
(0.16) (-0.29) 
  
(-0.22) (0.09) 
  
(-0.80) (0.74) 
  
(-1.12) (1.12) 
 
OS 
-0.0350 0.07861 0.0338   -0.0693 0.15770 0.0850   -0.1010 0.23838 0.1287   -0.1771 0.38833 0.2377 
(-1.05) (1.61)     (-1.61) (2.45)**     (-2.25)** (3.46)***     (-3.54)*** (5.00)***   
T 
-0.0670 0.12142 0.0144 
 
-0.1392 0.27978 0.0443 
 
-0.2224 0.45805 0.0922 
 
-0.2685 0.53806 0.1058 
(-1.56) (1.54) 
  
(-2.04)** (2.21)** 
  
(-2.80)*** (2.96)*** 
  
(-2.99)*** (3.08)*** 
 
TC 
-0.0468 0.07928 0.0409   -0.0840 0.15275 0.0695   -0.1224 0.24127 0.1024   -0.1696 0.35619 0.1515 
(-1.73)* (2.00)**     (-1.92)* (2.25)**     (-2.14)** (2.66)***     (-2.45)** (3.44)***   
U 
0.0084 -0.00088 -0.0061 
 
0.0245 -0.00315 -0.0061 
 
0.0489 -0.01867 -0.0034 
 
0.0632 0.00262 -0.0064 
(0.57) (-0.04)     (1.12) (-0.10)     (1.71)* (-0.41)     (1.66)* (0.05)   
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Table 4.6 (Continued) 
 
Sample periods are 276 months from 1986 to 2008. NPR denotes monthly aggregate net number of purchases trading ratio, calculated by dividing the net 
number of purchases (number of purchases minus number of sales) by the total number of director transaction of all firms (P-S)/(P+S), Excess market returns 
is defined as buy-and-hold excess returns between the actual return to the FTSE ICB 10 industry indices and the return on the monthly 90-day Treasury Bills. 
BM denotes buy-and-hold excess returns of index of Basic Material with NPR of Basic Material firms. CG denotes buy-and-hold excess returns of index of 
Consumer Goods with NPR of Consumer Goods firms. CS denotes buy-and-hold excess returns of index of Consumer Services with NPR of Consumer 
Services firms. F denotes buy-and-hold excess returns of index of Financials with NPR of Financials firms. HC denotes buy-and-hold excess returns of index 
of Health Care with NPR of Health Care firms.  I denotes buy-and-hold excess returns of index of Industrials with NPR of Industrials firms. OS denotes buy-
and-hold excess returns of index of Oil & Gas with NPR of Oil & Gas firms. T denotes buy-and-hold excess returns of index of Technology with NPR of 
Technology firms. TC denotes buy-and-hold excess returns of index of Telecommunications with NPR of Telecommunications firms. U denotes buy-and-hold 
excess returns of index of Utilities with NPR of Utilities firms. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Newey-West t-statistics present in parentheses. 
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Chapter 5: Aggregate Director Trading and 
Macroeconomy 
5.1 Introduction 
As discussed and analysed in Chapter 4, director trading could forecast future 
market excess returns. Furthermore, economic theory and empirical evidence 
suggest that stock prices reflect expectations about future corporate earnings 
and that stock prices are valuable indicators of economic activity. This chapter 
will therefore investigate the relationship between director trading and a series 
of macroeconomic variables related to the state of the UK macroeconomy. 
Aggregate director trading can be used as a measurement of ‘business 
confidence’ due to the cash flow hypothesis established by Seyhun (1992). This 
postulates that directors can predict future cash flows in their own firms earlier 
than other market participants. If changes in a firm’s cash flows are due to 
future economy-wide activity, directors in all firms will observe similar signals in 
their own firms, and will trade their own firms in the same direction. After a while, 
as changes in economy-wide cash flows are recognised by other market 
participants, the stock prices of all firms will tend to adjust. Hence, aggregate 
insider trading will predict the future stock returns and future real activity. Figure 
5.1 illustrates this logic, showing that aggregated director trading has the ability 
to predict future excess market returns, as discussed in Chapter 4. And 
previous literature indicates that the market index is a leading indicator of 
changes to macroeconomy. In this chapter, it will therefore investigate whether 
aggregate director trading can contribute to the forecasting of variables such as 
market returns, which in turn allow us to predict changes in GDP. Another 
indicator examined in this chapter is the industrial trends survey data provided 
by Confederation of British Industry (CBI business confidence), which is treated 
as a measurement of ‘business confidence’ in the UK economy. This chapter 
also analyses this CBI business confidence variable to investigate whether it 
forms a key predictor of the performance of the economy. 
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Section 5.2 presents the data sources. These sources relate to the aggregate 
economy activities and business cycle. It includes data such as nominal and 
real GDP, industrial trends survey data provided by Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI business confidence), index of industrial production, dividend yield 
of FTSE All Share and TERM spread, etc.  
Section 5.3 describes the methodology, and introduces the Fama-French 3 
factors and multicollinearity test. 
Section 5.4 presents the empirical results. Sensitivity test is applied. It then 
employs models with aggregate director trading, Fama-French 3-factor and 
business cycle variables to predict future aggregate economic change. 
Finally, Section 5.5 summarises the results and concludes the chapter. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Links between aggregate director trading, future market returns 
and future GDP growth 
5.2 Data 
The sources for aggregate director trading data are fully described in Chapter 3. 
Data on Monthly/Quarterly FTSE All Share returns, the 90-day UK Treasury Bill 
rate (as risk-free interest rate), the yield to maturity of UK 10-year government 
Aggregate 
Director 
Trading 
Market 
Returns 
GDP 
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bond (as long-run rate) and dividend yield of FTSE All Share are obtained from 
the files of LSPD and dataset DataStream. Furthermore, the firm capitalisation 
and book-to-market value are collected via both LSPD and DataStream. 
For macroeconomic variables, the majority of UK data can be accessed from 
Office for National Statistics (ONS, http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/index.html). From 
the official website of ONS, I can obtain quarterly nominal UK GDP from 1955 
Q1 to 2010 Q3 (annual GDP is available from 1948 to 2009). Ticker YBHA 
offers data on seasonal adjusted GDP at current market prices (Unit: £Million). 
Real GDP is normally calculated by applying Consumer Price Inflation (CPI); 
however, CPI data is available only from January 1988 onwards. Therefore, I 
use Retail Prices Index (RPI) rather than CPI to calculate inflation. There are 
two tickers used for verification purposes: ticker CHAW denotes RPI of all items 
index (13 January 1987=100), while CZBH represents RPI of all items 
percentage change over 12 months. Monthly, quarterly and annual indices of 
production are available from 1980 to the present day (2006=100), ticker CKYW 
presents a seasonally adjusted index of total production industries. Term spread 
is calculated according to the methodology used by Hardouvelis (1994), 
subtracting the 90-day UK Treasury Bill rate on last business day of the quarter 
from the yield to maturity of UK 10-year government bond. 
In addition to aggregate director trading, it will also use industrial trends survey 
data provided by Confederation of British Industry (CBI business confidence) as 
another measurement of business confidence. The time range of CBI business 
confidence data is from 1986 Q1 to 2009 Q4. To compile this survey data, 
respondents are asked the question: ‘Are you more or less optimistic than you 
were three months ago about the general business situation in your industry?’, 
to which they can answer ‘more’, ‘the same’ or ‘less’. Finally, the balanced result 
is calculated by subtracting the weighted percentage of firms saying that they 
are less optimistic from those who are more optimistic.19 
To check the macro effect, 3 macro-environment variables are also used: 
business cycle, growth rate cycle, and depression periods. The first two 
                                                             
19 Many thanks to Confederation of British Industry provided data of CBI business confidence.  
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variables are provided by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI), and 
the last one is obtained from Mitchell et al.’s 2009 report. 
ECRI co-founder Geoffrey H. Moore establishes dates using the same 
approach as that employed by The National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) to measure the US business cycle. ECRI has determined recession 
start and end dates for 20 other countries (data available from ECRI: 
http://www.businesscycle.com/). Dates of the UK business cycle from trough to 
peak are May 1981 to May 1990 and March 1992 to May 2008; dates from peak 
to trough are May 1990 to March 1992 and May 2008 to January 2010. Dates of 
the UK growth rate cycle from trough to peak are: December 1985 to January 
1988; April 1991 to July 1994; August 1995 to July 1997; February 1999 to 
January 2000; February 2003 to March 2004; May 2005 to September 2007; 
and February 2009 to June 2010. Meanwhile, dates from peak to trough are: 
January 1988 to April 1991; July 1994 to August 1995; July 1997 to February 
1999; January 2000 to February 2003; March 2004 to May 2005; and 
September 2007 to February 2009. The UK depressions of recent decades 
occurred between March 1990 to March 1993, and from April 2008 to the 
present day (for the purposes of this sample, it will examine the current 
depression up until December 2008). If it applies a time dummy to the business 
cycle and the growth rate cycle, it treats peak to trough as -1 and trough to peak 
as 0 (for business cycle: 81 quarters as 0 and 15 quarters as -1; and for growth 
rate cycle: 47 quarters as 0 and 49 quarters as -1). For periods of depression 
time, it treats depressions as -1, and the rest as 0 (77 quarters as 0 and 19 
quarters as -1). 
5.3 Methodology 
5.3.1 Fama-French 3 factors 
The main methodology builds upon and improves the methods of Liew and 
Vassalou (2000) and Gregory et al. (2003), applying Fama-French 3-factor 
model to detect the explanatory power of the model and adding in aggregate 
director trading as an independent variable. This chapter will start by introducing 
the Fama-French 3-factor model. 
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Fama and French (1993) presented size and book-to-market control as 
essential to carrying out time-series regressions with returns. Therefore, they 
constructed SMB (small minus big) and HML (high minus low). In June of each 
year from 1963 to 1991, all NYSE stocks were ranked on firm value via the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Fama and French took this data, 
and used median NYSE size to split NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ stocks into 
two groups: small (S) and big (B). They then divided NYSE, Amex and 
NASDAQ stocks into three book-to-market equity groups, based on the 
breakpoints for the bottom 30% (Low, L), medium 40% (Medium, M), and top 30% 
(High, H) of the ranked values of B/M for NYSE stocks. After that, they 
constructed six portfolios (S/L, S/M, S/H, B/L, B/M, B/H) from the intersections 
of the two market values and the three B/M groups.  
The portfolio SMB (small minus big), meant to mimic the risk factor in returns 
related to size, is the monthly difference between the simple average of the 
returns on the three small-stock portfolios (S/L,S/M, and S/H) and the simple 
average of the returns on the three big-stock portfolios (B/L, B/M, and B/H). 
Thus, SMB is the difference between the returns on small- and big-stock 
portfolios with about the same weighted-average B/M equity. This difference 
should be largely free of the influence of B/M, focusing instead on the 
differences between the return behaviours of small and big stocks. 
The portfolio HML (high minus low), meant to mimic the risk factor in returns 
related to B/M equity, is similarly defined. HML is the monthly difference 
between the simple average of the returns on the two high-B/M portfolios (S/H 
and B/H) and the average of the returns on the two low-B/M portfolios (S/L and 
B/L). The two components of HML are returns on high- and low-B/M portfolios 
with about the same weighted-average size. Thus, the difference between the 
two returns should be largely free of the influence of size, focusing instead on 
the difference between the return behaviours of high- and low-B/M firms. 
This method is the basis for analysing US data. However, there is a big problem 
in trying to build Fama-French factors for the UK: it is difficult to find a UK proxy 
for the NYSE break points which are used to form the factors and portfolios on 
Ken French’s website. ‘There is an important issue as the London Stock 
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Exchange exhibits a large ‘tail’ of small and illiquid stocks, which are almost 
certainly not part of the tradable universe of the major institutional investors that 
make up a large part of the UK market’ (Gregory et al., 2011). 
SMB and HML of UK come from the Xfi Centre for Finance and Investment, 
University of Exeter.20 It follows the largest firms method, explained in Gregory 
et al. (2001, 2003) and Gregory and Michou (2009). All these papers recognise 
the importance of this effect by using the median of the 350 largest firms (by 
market capitalisation) and of the 70th percentile of firms in forming the size 
breakpoints for market value, in both cases excluding financial stocks (banks, 
insurance companies, investment funds and property companies). Gregory et al. 
(2001) base their book-to-market breakpoints on the 30th and 70th percentiles of 
the 350 largest firms. More typically, other UK studies use the median of all 
firms (Al-Horani et al., 2003; Fletcher, 2001; Fletcher and Forbes, 2002; 
Hussain et al., 2002; Liu et al., 1999; Miles and Timmerman, 1996). 
In detail, the portfolios are formed as follows. Using the proxy for the Fama-
French NYSE cut-off, paper (Gregory et al., 2011) uses the median firm in the 
350 largest companies by market capitalisation (excluding financials) for the 
size breakpoint, and uses the top 350 firms to set the cut-offs for the book-to-
market portfolios. For the Fama-French factors, the following six intersecting 
portfolios are formed: S/H; S/M; S/L; B/H; B/M; B/L (where ’S’ denotes small 
firms, ‘B’ denotes big firms, and ‘H’, ‘M’ and ‘L’ denotes high, medium, and low 
book-to-market firms, respectively). The SMB and HML factor portfolios are then 
formed using the universe of UK main-market stocks, for which market 
capitalisation, returns, and book-to-market ratios can be constructed from any of 
DataStream and LSPD. Following the logic of Agarwal and Taffler (2008), who 
note that 22% of UK firms have March year end, with only 37% of firms have 
December year end, it applies March year t accounting data and end of 
September year t market capitalization data. The portfolios are formed at the 
beginning of October in year t, and financial firms, negative book-to-market 
stocks and alternative Investment Market (AIM) stocks are all excluded. Exactly 
                                                             
20  Many thanks to Prof. Alan Gregory, Dr. Rajesh Tharyan and Dr. Angela Huang for 
constructing the Fama-French 3-factor and momentum factors in the UK.  Available at: 
http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/areas/centres/xfi/research/famafrench/  
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as described on Ken French’s website, the factors are constructed using the six 
value-weighted portfolios, so that SMB is the average return on the three small 
portfolios minus the average return on the three big portfolios, whilst HML is the 
average return on the two value portfolios minus the average return on the two 
growth portfolios.  
The other issue when applying the model used by Liew and Vassalou (2000) 
and Gregory et al. (2003) is that mentioned in Section 4.3: the models end up 
with overlapping periods. Therefore, in calculating t-statistics, it is necessary to 
employ Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity-consistent 
covariance estimates (Newey and West, 1987). 
5.3.2 Multicollinearity Test 
It will probably meet regression problem of multicollinearity when applying the 
models of Liew and Vassalou (2000) and Gregory et al. (2003) (these will be 
discussed in the following pages). Therefore, it is necessary to test for variance 
inflation factor. 
Assume that it already fits the regression model 
            
where X is    . 
The predicted value is defined as        
It can calculate the centred variance inflation factor (VIFC) (Chatterjee and Hadi, 
2006, 235-239) for    using the formula 
         
 
     
       
where    
  is the square of the centred multiple correlation coefficient that results 
when    is regressed with intercept against all the other explanatory variables. 
The uncentered variance inflation factor (VIFuc) (Belsley, 1991, 28-29) for    is 
given by the formula 
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where    
  is the square of the uncentred multiple correlation coefficients that 
results when    is regressed without intercept against all the other explanatory 
variables, including the constant term. 
5.4 Empirical Evidence 
As discussed in Chapter 2 and Section 5.1, there should logically be a 
connection between aggregate director trading or CBI business confidence and 
future macroeconomic changes. It will use empirical methods in an attempt to 
find solid evidence for a link between aggregate director trading or CBI business 
confidence and future changes in aggregate economic activities. 
5.4.1 Sensitivity test 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 display the results of the sensitivity test between future 
nominal GDP change and the two business confidence variables of aggregate 
director trading and CBI Industrial Survey Data (CBI business confidence). The 
test uses longer horizons of director trading or CBI and GDP data, and ends up 
with overlapping periods. Instead of calculating t-statistics, the Newey-West 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance estimation is 
applied. 
The independent variables are the past j=1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-quarter aggregate 
director trading (Table 5.1) or CBI business confidence (Table 5.2). The 
dependent variables are future i=1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-quarter GDP growth in Panel A 
to D, respectively. Using the aggregate net number of director trading ratio 
(NPR) to measure aggregate director trading, the results in Table 5.1 indicate 
that forecasting power increases with a longer horizon to measure both past 
director trading and future nominal GDP growth rate. For real NPR, adjusted R-
square changes from 0.97% (past 2-quarter NPR and future 1-quarter nominal 
GDP growth rate) to 24.22% (past 4-quarter NPR and future 4-quarter nominal 
GDP change). For seasonality adjustment one,21 adjusted R-square changes 
from -0.54% (past 1-quarter and future 1-quarter) to 24.59% (past 4-quarter and 
                                                             
21 
Details of seasonality adjustment are fully described in Chapter 3. 
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future 4-quarter). For seasonality adjustment two,22 adjusted R-square changes 
from 1.74% (past 2-quarter and future 1-quarter) to 27.17% (past 4-quarter and 
future 4-quarter). Among these different measurements of NPR, seasonality 
adjustment two consistently offers the best performance of explanation. Most of 
the Newey-West t-values are significant at least 10% significance level. 
Coefficients of NPR are all positively correlated with future nominal GDP growth, 
which means directors tend to buy more of their own company’s stocks when 
economic performance is about to improve, and sell the stocks when it is about 
to deteriorate. The overall results indicate that different seasonality 
measurements of NPR have similar significant level, but the magnitude of 
explanatory power varies. 
For real GDP growth (Appendix H), results show a similar trend, where 
forecasting ability increases with a longer horizon on both past NPR and future 
growth of real GDP. Similarly to the results shown in Table 5.1, coefficients of 
director trading are all positively correlated with future real GDP growth. The 
longer the past director trading, the better forecasting power it achieves. 
However, compared with Table 5.1, the significance and forecasting power are 
much weaker than they are for nominal GDP growth. This probably implies that 
directors pay more attention to the growth rate of nominal GDP than to that of 
real GDP. This is parallel to the observed phenomenon that people who put 
money into banks are more concerned about the bank’s nominal interest rate 
than about real interest rate, which inflation of the entire economy is considered.  
Table 5.2 presents the growth rate of nominal GDP and CBI business 
confidence. The results show that the coefficients of CBI business confidence 
are all positively significant at least 5% significance level. However, 
contrastingly with the results of aggregate director trading trends shown in Table 
5.1, a longer period of CBI business confidence does not result in better 
forecasts of future GDP, but short-term CBI business confidence does. The best 
adjusted R-square is 18.99%, with past j=2-quarter CBI business confidence 
forecasting future i=2-quarter GDP growth. Furthermore, when the fixed growth 
rate of nominal GDP is unchanged (i unchanged), the CBI business confidence 
                                                             
22 
Details of seasonality adjustment are fully described in Chapter 3. 
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of the past two quarters always obtains the best explanatory power (except in 
forecasting future 3-quarter GDP, where the best adjusted R-square occurs on 
past j=1-quarter CBI business confidence). Table 5.2 shows that CBI business 
confidence data has better predictive power in forecasting GDP change 2 
quarters ahead; but beyond that time span, CBI business confidence retains its 
explanatory power but its accuracy decreases a little. Appendix I presents the 
results of growth rate of real GDP and CBI business confidence; this indicates a 
similar performance to that seen in Table 5.2, but the significance level and 
explanatory power decreases. 
Thus far, the empirical results confirm that the measures of business confidence, 
aggregate director trading and CBI business confidence, are significantly 
positively correlated with future aggregate economy activities when using full 
sample size. It will now break down the sample into different periods of 
macroeconomic conditions, as measured by business cycles, growth rate cycles 
and depression. 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the results of nominal GDP growth with aggregate 
director trading (aggregate net number of director purchases ratio, NPR) and 
CBI business confidence respectively, under different macro-conditions. Panels 
A, C, E and G present performance during periods of macroeconomic success, 
as measured by business cycle, growth rate cycle and depression. The rest of 
the grey-shaded panels (Panels B, D, F and H) display sensitivity tests for 
periods of macroeconomic difficulty. Results of real GDP change on past NPR 
and CBI business confidence are shown in Appendices J and K respectively. 
For successful periods: Panel A of Table 5.3 displays future i=1-quarter growth 
rate of nominal GDP, with past j=1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-quarter NPR. It shows that 
coefficients of NPR are all positively significant to future GDP change. The best 
adjusted R-squares of growth rate cycle and depression, which happened on 
past 4-quarter NPR, are 6.17% and 8.24% respectively. For business cycle, the 
best performance is 6.03% when using past 1-quarter NPR to forecast. 
Panel C indicates the results of future i=2-quarter growth rate of nominal GDP. 
The coefficients of all NPR are positively significant at least 10% significance 
level (except past j=1-quarter NPR by growth rate cycle measurement, which is 
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positive but does not show any significance) in periods of economic success. 
Here, the best adjusted R-squares appear on past 4-quarter NPR of business 
cycle, growth rate cycle and depression measurements (16.56%, 15.67% and 
22.30%, respectively). Compared with Panel A, the significance of longer time 
length of past NPR is much improved and the explanatory power of NPR 
increases. 
Panel E shows the performance of future i=3-quarter growth rate of nominal 
GDP. Results of aggregate director trading in periods of economic success by 
all measurements show that the longer the horizon of past NPR, the better 
adjusted the R-square. The best forecasting powers of business cycle, growth 
rate cycle and depression are 20.91%, 14.56% and 25.73% respectively, all of 
which occurred on past j=4-quarter NPR. However, the best explanatory power 
of economic success in growth rate cycle decreases from 15.67% in Panel C to 
14.56%. 
Panel G presents the results of future i=4-quarter growth rate of nominal GDP. 
For business cycle and depression, the best explanatory power appears on past 
j=4-quarter NPR, while the best adjusted R-square is on past j=3-quarter NPR 
for growth rate cycle. The best adjusted R-squares of business cycle, growth 
rate cycle and depression are 23.55%, 15.79% and 29.72%, respectively. 
Results of macroeconomic success periods indicate: for business cycle, to 
forecast future 1-quarter growth of nominal GDP, the best adjusted R-square 
happens on past 1-quarter NPR, while the best explanatory power appears on 
past 4-quarter when predicting future 2-, 3- and 4-quarter GDP change. From 
this, it follows that, as shown in Table 5.1, the longer the time length of both 
future GDP growth and past director trading, the better the explanatory power. 
For growth rate cycle, to predict future 1-, 2- and 3-quarter GDP, the best 
adjusted R-square is on past 4-quarter NPR; however, the best explanatory 
power of future 3-quarter decreases from 15.67% (future 2-quarter GDP) to 
14.56%. To forecast future 4-quarter GDP growth, the best performance is on 
past 3-quarter with adjusted R-square 15.79% (which is the overall best 
adjusted R-square on growth rate cycle measurement). For periods of 
depression, it shows that (as seen from Table 5.1) the longer the horizon of 
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future GDP growth and past director trading activities, the better the forecasting 
power achieved. The adjusted R-square could reach to 29.72% (future 4-
quarter and past 4-quarter), which is better than the best performance of NPR in 
Table 5.1. If it compares this with the full sample in Table 5.1, it can see that the 
best explanatory result of business cycle and growth rate cycle time 
measurements is not as good as that shown in Table 5.1. However, the results 
of aggregate director trading in periods of depression are generally better than 
the full sample performance, and the best adjusted R-square could reach to 
29.72% compared with 24.22% of real NPR in Table 5.1. 
For periods of macroeconomic difficulty, Panel B shows future i=1-quarter 
growth rate of nominal GDP with past j=1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-quarter NPR. 
Coefficients of NPR of business cycle and depression are all negatively 
significant, and the best adjusted R-square appears on past 4-quarter NPR 
(71.02% and 60.51% respectively). For growth rate cycle, NPR is not significant, 
and all adjusted R-squares have negative value, signifying that there is no 
explanatory power whatsoever. 
Panel D gives the results of future i=2-quarter growth rate of nominal GDP. 
Coefficients of NPR of all business cycle and depression are negative, as is 
most of the growth rate cycle. NPR of all business cycle and depression is 
significant at least 5% significance level, while growth rate cycle does not show 
any significance, with negative adjusted R-square. 
Panel F shows performance of future i=3-quarter growth rate of nominal GDP. 
Coefficients of NPR of business cycle and depression are all negatively 
significant at 1% significance level, while growth rate cycle does not show any 
significance. However, in this case, adjusted R-square of growth rate cycle on 
past 4-quarter NPR shows a none-zero positive value (0.24%). 
Panel H presents the results of future i=4-quarter growth rate of nominal GDP. 
Coefficients of NPR on periods of macro-economic difficulty are all negative. 
NPR of business cycle and depression is significant at least 5% significance 
level, while NPR of growth rate cycle does not show any significance. 
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The results for difficult macro-economic periods indicate: first, unlike in periods 
of economic success (Panels A, C, E and G), most of coefficients of NPR are 
negative. Even worse, NPR of business cycle and depression is all negatively 
significant to future GDP change. Meanwhile, adjusted R-square of growth rate 
shows neither negative nor very small positive value, which does not have 
sufficient explanatory power. Second, there is no relationship whereby a longer 
horizon of both past aggregate director trading and future GDP growth leads to 
better forecasting power. Third, there is very big adjusted R-square on business 
cycle and depression time, the largest adjusted R-square can reach to 89.96% 
(past 3-quarter with future 3-quarter) and 77.63% (past 4-quarter with future 2-
quarter). 
Table 5.4 presents the CBI business confidence variable for periods of both 
good and bad economic performance. As in Table 5.3, Panels A, C, E and G 
show the results for successful periods, while the other panels (B, D, F and H) 
show periods of macroeconomic difficulty. 
In Panel A, for future i=1-quarter nominal GDP growth, the coefficients of NPR 
of all three time measurements are positive. Most NPR of business cycle and 
depression are positively significant. The best explanatory result of all time 
measurements occurs when past j=4-quarter NPR is used to forecast. 
In Panel C is similar to Panel A, in that for future i=2-quarter nominal GDP 
growth coefficients of NPR of all time are positive. All NPR of business cycle 
and depression are positively significant at least 10% significance level, while 
the growth rate cycle does not show any significance. The best explanatory 
result of all time measurements appears on past j=4-quarter NPR. 
In Panel E, for future i=3-quarter nominal GDP growth, coefficients of all NPR 
are positive. All NPR of business cycle and depression are positively significant 
at least 5% significance level. For growth rate cycle, coefficients of NPR on past 
j=3- and 4-quarter are positively significant at 10% significance level. The best 
explanatory power of business cycle and depression appears on past 4-quarter, 
while growth rate cycle occurs on past 3-quarter. 
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In Panel G, for future i=4-quarter nominal GDP growth, the coefficients of all 
NPR are positive. All NPR of business cycle and depression are positively 
significant at least 10% significance level. For growth rate cycle, coefficients of 
NPR on past j=2- and 3-quarter are positively significant at 10% significance 
level. The best explanatory power of business cycle and depression is on past 
4-quarter, while growth rate cycle is on past 2-quarter. 
The results relating to periods of macroeconomic success indicate that by 
looking at these periods rather than the full sample, the CBI business 
confidence shows the trend where the longer the horizon of past aggregate 
director trading and future GDP growth, the better the performance. However, 
among these time measurements, the best adjusted R-square is 16.87% (on 
past 4-qaurter and future 4-quarter on business cycle) with Newey t-statics 
significant at 5%; in the full sample (Table 5.2), the best explanatory ability could 
reach to 18.99%, with Newey t-statics significant at 1% (on past 2-quarter and 
future 2-quarter). 
For periods of weaker macroeconomic performance, the results are similar to 
those of Table 5.3: most NPR are neither negatively significant nor positive, but 
do not show any significance. Compared with the full sample (Table 5.2) or 
periods of good performance (Panels A, C, E and G), adjusted R-square of bad 
time is neither too big nor too small. 
Results of real GDP change with aggregate director trading and CBI business 
confidence shown in Appendices J and K are all not good, and none of them 
show valuable information. 
The robustness check in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 shows that results for periods of 
good macroeconomic performance, as measured by a variety of standards, 
present similar findings to those of the full sample: the longer the horizon of 
future aggregate economic activities, past aggregate director trading and CBI 
business confidence, the better its forecasting power. However, for periods of 
poor macroeconomic performance, it does not show any valuable information: 
the coefficients of NPR/CBI business confidence are neither negatively 
significant nor positive, but do not show any significance. Generally speaking, 
when controlling for macroeconomic performance, it finds that aggregate 
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director trading and CBI business confidence have more success in a good 
macro-environment. However, another possible explanation is that the totally 
different performance between good and bad economic periods is caused by 
sample size: there are only 15 quarters of bad economic performance 
measured by business cycle, and 19 quarters measured by depression. By 
contrast, there are 81 quarters and 77 quarters of good economic performance 
measured by business cycle and depression, respectively. Compared with 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4, it can be seen that the longer the forecasting period in good 
economic conditions, the better the significance level and adjusted R-square 
NPR and CBI business confidence. However, a longer past horizon of NPR 
results in better performance than that of CBI business confidence. 
To sum up Tables 5.1-5.4, the results of the sensitivity test indicate that 
aggregate director trading and CBI business confidence are well able to 
forecast future economic movements. The longer the horizon of both future 
macroeconomic change and past director trading, the better the explanatory 
power of director trading. For the CBI business confidence variable, the overall 
predictive power is good, but the best adjusted R-square occurs within past 2 
quarters. Furthermore, aggregate director trading and CBI business confidence 
is much better at forecasting future nominal GDP than real GDP. They also have 
better explanatory power in periods of macroeconomic success than in periods 
of difficulty. This implies two things. First, that directors pay more attention to 
nominal than real economic indicators when comparing their own company’s 
situation to the future economy. Second, that directors have a better view of 
their own companies and industries when they are operating in a successful 
macro-environment. 
5.4.2 Aggregate Director Trading and Market Factors 
As explained and proved in Chapter 4, aggregate director trading is one 
significant forecasting variable used to predict future market movements 
(excess returns). This section will therefore compare the explanatory power of 
aggregate director trading with other measurements of market movement. As 
mentioned in Section 5.3, it will apply Fama-French 2 factors (SMB and HML) 
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as dependent variables to evaluate their relationship to aggregate director 
trading.23  
The results are shown in Appendices L and M, which present the interactions of 
aggregate director trading with SMB and HML, respectively. Appendix L 
illustrates future m=1-, 3-, 6-, 9- and 12-month SMB on the past n=1-, 3-, 6-, 9-, 
12-month aggregate net number of director purchases trading ratio (NPR). The 
results of past n=1-, 3-, 6-, 9-, 12-month NPR are presented in Panels A-E, 
respectively. The results show that no matter how NPR is measured (through 
real data or seasonality methods), there is no significance between future SMB 
and past NPR (only past 1-month with future 1-month shows significance). The 
adjusted R-square is neither negative nor positive, as its value is very small. 
The overall results indicate that aggregate director trading does not have 
sufficient ability to explain future SMB. 
The sensitivity test in Appendix M illustrates the performance of future HML on 
past NPR. It illustrates future m=1-, 3-, 6-, 9- and 12-month HML on past n=1-, 
3-, 6-, 9-, 12-month NPR. Results of past n=1-, 3-, 6-, 9-, 12-month NPR are 
presented in Panels A-E, respectively. All coefficients of NPR are negatively 
correlated with future HML, and all NPRs except past 1-month with future 1-
month are negatively significant at least 5% significance level (Newey-West t-
statistics). Adjusted R-square increases from minimum 0.17% (future 1-month 
HML on past 1-month real NPR) to maximum 18.76% (future 12-month HML on 
past 12-month NPR of seasonality adjustment two). Seasonality adjustment two 
usually achieves the best results. The overall results show that the longer the 
horizon of past aggregate director trading and future HML, the better its 
explanatory power. 
As an extra robustness check to test the relationship between HML and 
aggregate director trading, it applies change in the net director purchase ratio 
(∆NPR), which was introduced by Knewtson et al. (2010). Here, it applies their 
sensitivity test (Table 7, Knewtson et al., 2010, p. 12) to UK data. The result is 
                                                             
23 
The relationship between the Fama-French factor of aggregate market excess returns and 
aggregate director trading has already been examined in detail by previous US/UK studies and 
in Chapter 4.  
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shown in Appendix N. Knewtson et al. (2010) called HML as Value Premium, 
and referred to ∆NPR as ∆Insider Demand. Results of past n=1-, 3-, 6-, 9- and 
12-month ∆NPR are presented in Panels A-E, respectively. Like those of 
Knewtson et al. (2010), results show past 1-month ∆NPR (∆Insider Demand) is 
positively significant. However, results regarding explanatory power are totally 
different to those of Knewtson et al. (2010): the significance and adjusted R-
square in Appendix N is just 10% significant and 0.70%, respectively, while in 
Knewtson et al. (2010) it is 1% significant and 10.57%, respectively. It also finds 
that the coefficients of past 12-month ∆NPR to future 1-, 3-, and 6-month HML 
(Panel E) are significant, but that this significance decreases with as the length 
of future HML increases. Also, the best adjusted R-square appears among them, 
but it is much weaker than the NPR shown in Appendix M. Furthermore, there is 
no relationship between the length of aggregate director trading and the 
accuracy in forecasting HML. 
In summary, results show that aggregate director trading is significantly 
correlated with future HML, but there is no evidence for such a relationship 
between aggregate director trading and SMB. These findings imply that 
aggregate director trading probably is more sensitive to the firms under B/M 
classification than capitalisation. Further evidence shows aggregate director 
trading (NPR) is negatively significant correlated with future HML. The longer 
the horizon of past NPR and future HML, the better explanatory ability 
aggregate director trading it has. 
5.4.3 Aggregate Director Trading, Market Factors and Macroeconomy 
Liew and Vassalou (2000), Vassalou (2003) and Gregory et al. (2003) all argue 
that Fama-French 3 factors contain information about future macroeconomic 
changes. This section examines the relation between MKT (excess returns 
between return of FTSE All Share and 90-day T-bill rate), SMB (small minus big, 
the difference in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and big 
stocks), HML (high minus low, the difference in the returns of a value-weighted 
portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks) and 
aggregate director trading together with future GDP growth using univariate and 
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multivariate regression analysis. First, it tests the effect of Fama-French 3 
factors on future GDP growth. 
5.4.3.1 Regressions with Fama-French 3 factors 
Regressions applying quarterly data on future GDP growth to past holding 
period returns in MKT, SMB and HML take the form: 
)4,(),4()4,( Re*   tttttt tFactorbaGDPGrowth   , (39)
 
where GDPGrowth represents nominal and real growth rates of the UK; 
FactorRet denotes MKT (excess returns between return of FTSE All Share and 
90-day T-bill rate), SMB (small minus big, the difference in the returns of a 
value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and big stocks), HML (high minus low, 
the difference in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market 
stocks and low book-to-market stocks); and  )4,( tt  is the residual term of the 
regression. 
GDP growth rates are observed at quarterly frequencies; consecutive annual 
growth rates therefore have three overlapping quarters. This induces serial 
correlation in the residuals of the regressions. To correct for this, it uses the 
Newey and West (1987) estimator and set the lag parameter to three. 
Fama (1981) documents the presence of a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the market factor and future economic growth in the US. 
Aylward and Glen (2000) build upon this analysis using international data. Liew 
and Vassalou (2000) also provide evidence for this relationship, and Gregory et 
al. (2003) offer UK evidence supporting this existence. More importantly, these 
studies show that a positive and equally strong relation also exists between 
future economic growth and the performance of HML and SMB. 
A positive relationship would exist if high returns in SMB and HML were 
associated with good future economic performance. That would mean that high 
B/M and small capitalisation stocks are better able to prosper than low B/M and 
big capitalisation stocks when periods of high economic growth are expected. 
The observed positive relation between HML and future GDP growth makes 
sense. Presumably, investors would rather hold stocks whose returns are 
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relatively high when they discover that the economy is struggling. They 
therefore hold onto low B/M stocks with good potential for growth. 
Table 5.5 shows the regression of future change of GDP on past MKT, SMB and 
HML. Panels A and B display the results of growth rate of nominal and real GDP 
respectively. Performance of univariate regression (model 1-3 and 8-10) 
illustrates that Fama-French 3 factors are all positively correlated to future 
nominal and real GDP growth. However, only MKT shows significance at 10% 
significance level in Panel A and 5% significance level in Panel B; SMB and 
HML do not show any significance. Models 4 and 11 present the results of 
future GDP change with SMB and HML. The coefficients of SMB and HML in 
these two models are insignificant. Models 5-6 and 12-13 indicate the results of 
MKT with SMB/HML. It can be seen that coefficient of SMB does not have 
sufficient significance to future GDP change. However, Models 6 and 13 show 
that MKT and HML are positively significant, and Newey-West t-statistic of real 
GDP (1% significance for MKT and 5% significance for HML, Panel B) is more 
significant than nominal GDP (5% significance for MKT and 10% significance for 
HML, Panel A). Meanwhile, the adjusted R-square increases from 11.94% 
(Model 5) to 18.89% (Model 6) in Panel A, and from 11.92% (Model 12) to 18.53% 
(Model 13) in Panel B. This shows that HML has more explanatory ability than 
SMB by introducing MKT into the model. Models 7 and 14 show future GDP 
growth together with Fama-French 3 factors. As in Models 5-6 and 12-13, the 
coefficients of MKT and HML are positively significant at least 10% significance 
level, while SMB is positive but does not show significance. Compared with 
model of MKT and HML (Models 6 and 13), model of the Fama-French 3 factors 
together decrease explanatory power, implying that SMB does not contain 
sufficient information on future GDP growth. 
Generally, it can be seen from Table 5.5 that the Fama-French 3 factors are all 
positively correlated with future change in GDP. Performance of past MKT and 
HML contains more valuable information on future aggregate economic 
activities. The coefficients of MKT and HML on future growth rate of real GDP 
are more significant than those on nominal GDP, but the adjusted R-square 
does not: the forecasting power of nominal GDP growth is better than real GDP. 
The performance of the model with Fama-French 3 factors, does not achieve 
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best explanatory result, but the model without SMB does. This implies that SMB 
does not include valuable information about future aggregate economic change. 
This is reflected in Models 5-7 and 12-14. 
Furthermore, the information about economic growth contained in the returns of 
HML and SMB is largely independent of the information contained in the market 
factor. Appendices O and P show the results of regressions of SMB and HML 
respectively on the market factor. They show that the coefficients are generally 
small and often statistically insignificant. Therefore, the positive relation 
between SMB, HML and future economic growth is unlikely to be due to the 
known positive relation between the market factor and future economic growth. 
This hypothesis is also supported by the results of the following section. 
5.4.3.2 Multiple regressions with Fama-French 3 factors and aggregate director trading 
This section compares the information content aggregate director trading and 
CBI business confidence with that of MKT, SMB and HML. 
The estimated regressions include the market factor and the return on a trading 
strategy: 
)4,(),4(),4()4,( /*Re*   tttttttt kCBIDTdtFactorcaGDPGrowth , (40)
 
)4,(),4(),4(),4()4,( /*Re**   tttttttttt kCBIDTdtFactorcMKTbaGDPGrowth , (41)
 
where MKT is the quarterly excess market return over the risk-free rate; 
FactorRet stands for the quarterly returns on SMB and HML; DT/CBI business 
confidence denotes aggregate director trading or CBI business confidence; and 
)4,( ttk  are the residuals of the regression. GDP growth rates are observed at 
quarterly frequencies; and consecutive annual growth rates therefore have 
three overlapping quarters. This induces serial correlation in the residuals of the 
regressions. To correct for this, it uses the Newey and West (1987) estimator 
and set the lag parameter to three. 
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 show evidence of aggregate director trading: Table 5.6 
displays models without MKT, while Table 5.7 presents models with MKT. Both 
tables indicate the results using aggregate net number of director purchases 
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ratio (NPR). In both tables, Panels A and B display the real data of NPR to 
future nominal and real GDP growth, respectively; Panels C and D present 
seasonality adjustment one of NPR to future change in nominal and real GDP, 
respectively; and Panels E and F show seasonality adjustment two of NPR to 
future growth rate of nominal and real GDP, respectively.  
Both tables indicate that the coefficients of NPR are all positively correlated with 
future GDP growth, and are positively significant at a level of 1% under Newey-
West t-test to future growth rate of nominal GDP. NPR has better power to 
explain future nominal than real GDP growth, which is consistent with the 
results of the sensitivity tests. Different seasonality measurements of aggregate 
director trading do not affect the significance of NPR. Among these 
measurements, Seasonality Adjustment Two shows the best forecasting ability, 
while Seasonality Adjustment One has a better result than real NPR. 
In both tables, coefficients of SMB are shown to be positively correlated with 
future GDP, but do not show any significance. Meanwhile, the coefficients of 
HML are all positively correlated to future GDP growth and significant at least 10% 
significance level in all panels. In Table 5.7, most coefficients of MKT are 
positively correlated with future changes in nominal and real GDP, but do not 
show any significance. Furthermore, in Table 5.7, the best adjusted R-squares 
to future nominal GDP change all appear in models with MKT, HML and NPR, 
but not those with Fama-French 3 factors and NPR. This finding is consistent 
with the results shown in Table 5.5: by introducing MKT into the model to 
forecast future GDP, the best results occur in models with MKT and HML, but 
not the model with all Fama-French 3 factors together. 
Compared with performance of Fama-French 3 factors in Table 5.5, MKT loses 
its significance dramatically when forecasting future growth rate of nominal and 
real GDP in Table 5.7. This is probably due to multicollinearity among MKT and 
aggregate director trading. However, as discussed in Section 5.3.2, variance 
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inflation factors (VIF) test for the independent variables of multicollinearity does 
not show marginal significance between them.24 
The performance of CBI business confidence is presented in Table 5.8. Panels 
A and B indicate the results of models without MKT to forecast future change of 
nominal and real GDP, respectively; Panels C and D illustrate the results of 
models with MKT to forecast future growth rate of nominal and real GDP, 
respectively. Similarly, as shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7, the coefficients of CBI 
business confidence, MKT, SMB and HML are all positively correlated with 
future GDP change. Explanatory ability is better for future nominal GDP than for 
real GDP. The coefficients of HML are all positively significant at 5% significance 
level. The coefficients of SMB to future nominal GDP do not show any 
significance; however, SMB’s coefficients to future real GDP do. Except in 
models with MKT and SMB, the coefficients of MKT are all positively significant 
to future nominal GDP in Panel C, but do not show any significance in Panel D. 
The coefficients of CBI business confidence to future nominal GDP are all 
positively significant. However, the significance is different: in Panel A, it is 
significant at 5% significance level, while in Panel C, it is significant at 10% 
significance level. The decreasing significance is probably caused by the 
introduction of MKT into the model. 
Generally speaking, Tables 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 indicate that aggregate director 
trading (measured by NPR) and CBI business confidence are leading indicators 
of future economic change, and they significantly improve the explanatory 
performance of Fama-French 3 factors model in forecasting future GDP growth. 
                                                             
24  
The results of multicollinearity are not shown. It tests multicollinearity with and without 
constant. In STATA, the output shows the variance inflation factors together with their 
reciprocals. Some analysts compare the reciprocals with a predetermined tolerance;. If the 
reciprocal of the VIF is smaller than the tolerance, the associated predictor variable is removed 
from the regression model. However, most analysts rely on informal rules of thumb applied to 
the VIF (Chatterjee and Hadi, 2006). According to these rules, there is evidence of 
multicollinearity if the largest VIF is greater than 10 (some choose a more conservative 
threshold value of 30), and the mean of all the VIFs is considerably larger than 1. 
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5.4.3.3 Multiple regressions that include business cycle variables, Fama-French 3 factors 
and aggregate director trading/CBI business confidence 
It will now examine how much of the information on future economic growth 
contained in MKT, HML, SMB and aggregate director trading is also presents in 
popular business cycle variables (dividend yield of FTSE All Share, growth of 
industrial production and Term spread25). The reason these business cycle 
variables applied into model is what paper of Seyhun (1992) and Liew and 
Vassalou (2000) recommended.  
The multiple regressions estimated are of the form: 
)4,()(),4()(),4(),4()4,( ***/**   tttttttttttt TERMfIPGrwotheDYdCBIDTcFFbaGDPGrowth 
 
(42)
 
where           stands for the past 1-year Fama-French 3 factors (MKT, SMB 
and HML);                                   represents aggregate director 
trading (NPR) or CBI business confidence Industrial Trends Survey data (CBI 
business confidence);       is the dividend yield of FTSE All Share; 
                is the past 1-year growth of UK industrial production;         is 
the 10-year UK government bond yield minus the 90-day UK Treasury Bill yield; 
and          is the residual of the regression. GDP growth rates are observed at 
quarterly frequencies, meaning that consecutive annual growth rates have three 
overlapping quarters. This induces serial correlation in the residuals of the 
regressions. To correct for this, it uses the Newey and West (1987) estimator 
and set the lag parameter to three. Tables 5.9 and 5.10 present the 
performance of aggregate director trading and of CBI business confidence. 
In Table 5.9, Panels A and B indicate the future growth of nominal and real GDP. 
Models 1, 4, 7and 10 present results of real NPR, while Models 2, 5, 8 and 11 
(shadowed light grey) present results of NPR with seasonality adjustment one. 
Models 3, 6, 9 and 12 (shadowed dark grey) present results of NPR with 
seasonality adjustment two. 
                                                             
25 
Term Spread in the UK is calculated by long-run rate (the yield to maturity of a 10-year 
government bond) minus short term rate (90-day UK Treasury Bill rate) (Hardouvelis, 1994). 
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Even when business cycle variables are introduced into the model, NPR 
maintains positive correlation with future economic growth. The coefficients of 
NPR under different seasonality adjustment measurements are all positive 
correlated with future GDP growth. NPR is significant at 1% significance level (5% 
significance level in Model 1) to future nominal GDP in Panel A, and at 10% 
significance level (except in Models 7, 8 and 10, where NPR does not show 
significance) to future real GDP in Panel B. 
Compared with the results in Tables 5.6 and 5.7, the significance of NPR 
decreases very little, by introduced business cycle variables. By different NPR 
measurements for nominal GDP growth (Panel A), seasonality adjustment two 
has the best explanatory power in models without MKT (Models 1-3), while 
Seasonality Adjustment One has the best explanatory ability in models with 
MKT (Models 4-6). For real GDP growth (Panel B), the best results are 
achieved by seasonality adjustment two in models with or without MKT. 
Adjusted R-square differs only slightly between Panels where the same model 
is applied, which suggests different aggregate director trading measurements 
do not cause a big difference in performance in forecasting future economic 
activities. 
HML is all positively correlated to future nominal and real GDP growth. The 
coefficients of HML are positively significant at 1% significance level to future 
nominal GDP, and are positively significant at 5% significance level to future 
real GDP. SMB is positively correlated to future economic change, but does not 
show any significance; this is consistent with Tables 5.5-5.7. MKTs are also 
positively correlated with future GDP change. The coefficients of MKT are 
significant at 5%significance level to future growth of nominal GDP (Panel A). 
Meanwhile, MKT is all positively significant at 10% significance level to future 
growth of real GDP, except in Model 12 (Panel B). 
For business cycle variables, the coefficients of IPGrowth are all positively 
significant at 1% significance level, while coefficients of TERM are all negative 
but insignificant. Coefficients of DY are positively significant at 5% significance 
level (except Models 1 and 3, where it is significant at 10% significance level). 
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Compared the results in Tables 5.6 and 5.7, the coefficients of NPR are still 
positively significant to future aggregate economic growth, even when business 
cycle variables are introduced into the model. The explanatory power presented 
in Table 5.9 is much better than that in Tables 5.6 and 5.7. This implies that 
future economic activities are indeed dependent on business cycle change. 
Table 5.10 shows the performance of CBI business confidence variable. Models 
1 and 2 display the results of future growth of nominal GDP, while Models 3 and 
4 show the results of real GDP. The introduction of business cycle variables into 
the model leads CBI business confidence to lose its power predict to future 
economic growth. None of models present significance. Meanwhile, HML is 
positively significant at 1% significance level to future nominal GDP, and at 5% 
significance level to future real GDP. SMB and MKT are positively correlated to 
future economic change, but only significant at 10% significance level to future 
nominal GDP. For business cycle variables, the coefficients of IPGrowth and DY 
are all positively significant at 5% significance level (DY is significant at 1% 
significance level in Model 4), while the coefficients of TERM are all negative 
and most of them are insignificant. Overall, the results of Table 5.10 show that 
performance of CBI business confidence to predict future GDP change is 
replaced by MKT (shown in Table 5.8) and business cycle variables. 
Generally speaking, aggregate director trading and CBI Industrial Trends 
Survey (CBI business confidence) could be used to make economic forecasts 
for the future. Sensitivity tests present a significant positive relationship between 
aggregate director trading/CBI business confidence and future economic 
change. The results of Tables 5.5-5.10 show that aggregate net number of 
director trading ratio (NPR) and CBI business confidence are strongly and 
significantly correlated with future economic change; they also confirm the 
earlier results that Fama-French 3 factors (MKT, SMB and HML) are positively 
correlated with future GDP change. By introducing Fama-French 3 factors and 
business cycle variables (dividend yield of FTSE All Share, growth of industrial 
production and term spread) into the model, NPR maintains its significant level 
and explanatory ability. This implies that other time series variations predicting 
future economic change, such as Fama-French 3 factors and business cycle 
variables, do not attenuate the predictive power of aggregate director trading. 
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However, on the same is not true of CBI business confidence. CBI business 
confidence does good job at forecasting future GDP change in models with 
Fama-French 3 factors, but when business cycle variables are introduced into 
the model, the significant and explanatory ability disappears. This means that 
CBI business confidence does not as robust as NPR, but is still a leading 
indicator of future aggregate economic activities.  
5.5 Conclusion 
The empirical work of this chapter documents a strong relationship between 
past aggregate director trading, CBI Industrial Trends Survey data (CBI 
business confidence) and future economic activity. Different methods, such as 
sensitivity tests, models of Fama-French 2-factor or 3-factor and with business 
cycle variables, are applied. The findings show that aggregate director trading 
activities and CBI business confidence are positively significant and have good 
explanatory power in forecasting future movements in the economy. The 
predictability of future real activities increases with the length of forecasting 
horizon, the number of quarters of past director trading. 
Evidence also indicates that director trading retains marginal explanatory power 
when Fama-French factors and other business cycle variables are included as 
additional explanatory variables. CBI business confidence maintains good 
forecasting power in models with Fama-French factors, but not with other 
business cycle variables. This suggests that aggregate director trading and CBI 
business confidence capture a component of market factors (SMB, HML and 
MKT) and business cycle variables (DY, IPGrowth and TERM) not related to 
movements in future real activity. Aggregate director trading is therefore more 
robust than CBI business confidence. Moreover, by applied different measures 
of forecasting accuracy (mean square error, mean absolute error, mean 
absolute percentage error) proposed by Diebold and Mariano (1995), the 
summary statistics of models within Table 5.6 to 5.10 indicate predictive 
accuracy of aggregate director trading is better than CBI business confidence.26 
                                                             
26 
Summary statistics of forecasting accuracy is presented in Appendix Q.  
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Overall, the evidence suggests that aggregate director trading and CBI 
business confidence are leading indicators with good ability to forecast the UK’s 
macroeconomy. 
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Table 5.1  Time Series Regression of Future 1-Quarter, 2-Quarter, 3-Quarter and 4-Quarter Nominal GDP Growth on Past 1-
Quarter, 2-Quarter, 3-Quarter and 4-Quarter Aggregate Net Number of Director Purchases Trading Ratio 
),(
1
10_ tjt
it
tk
NPRNGDPGrowth 


    
 Panel A i=1   i=1   i=1   i=1 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
0.0144 0.004885 0.0392  0.0144 0.002834 0.0097  0.0141 0.003836 0.0434  0.0140 0.003536 0.0359 
(17.87)*** (2.60)**   (15.87)*** (1.74)*   (13.98)*** (2.95)***   (15.23)*** (1.53)  
Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.0146 0.001535 -0.0054  0.0144 0.002799 0.0092  0.0141 0.003631 0.0440  0.0140 0.0036347 0.0396 
(17.74)*** (0.73)   (15.90)*** (1.72)*   (14.59)*** (2.71)***   (15.01)*** (1.63)  
Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.0144 0.005310 0.0350  0.0144 0.003635 0.0174  0.0141 0.004478 0.0498  0.0139 0.004282 0.0494 
(17.90)*** (2.34)**     (15.78)*** (2.18)**     (14.06)*** (3.36)***     (15.25)*** (1.93)*   
 Panel B i=2   i=2   i=2   i=2 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
 α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
0.0291 0.008815 0.0501  0.0287 0.009593 0.0781  0.0281 0.009457 0.1141  0.0277 0.009439 0.1163 
(21.00)*** (3.00)***   (17.11)*** (4.06)***   (15.99)*** (3.62)***   (16.97)*** (2.12)**  
Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.0292 0.005755 0.0196  0.0286 0.009833 0.0825  0.0285 0.006507 0.0556  0.0277 0.009592 0.1233 
(21.29)*** (1.84)*   (17.13)*** (4.18)***   (16.44)*** (2.30)**   (16.72)*** (2.23)**  
Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.0291 0.010216 0.0524  0.0286 0.011120 0.0886  0.0281 0.010415 0.1135  0.0275 0.010816 0.1356 
(21.05)*** (2.98)***     (17.09)*** (4.57)***     (16.21)*** (3.56)***     (17.20)*** (2.50)**   
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Table 5.1 (Continued) 
 
 Panel C i=3   i=3   i=3   i=3 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
0.0440 0.010725 0.0407  0.0434 0.012746 0.0792  0.0426 0.012699 0.1189  0.0415 0.015891 0.1994 
(24.43)*** (1.83)*   (19.30)*** (3.05)***   (17.95)*** (3.22)***   (17.96)*** (2.89)***  
Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.0445 0.003826 -0.0038  0.0434 0.012968 0.0822  0.0427 0.010761 0.0944  0.0415 0.015924 0.2052 
(25.11)*** (0.83)   (19.31)*** (3.10)***   (18.35)*** (2.49)**   (17.92)*** (2.98)***  
Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.0441 0.011673 0.0359  0.0433 0.015126 0.0947  0.0424 0.014916 0.1366  0.0412 0.018121 0.2284 
(24.63)*** (1.77)*     (19.34)*** (3.60)***     (18.18)*** (3.42)***     (18.14)*** (3.59)***   
 Panel D i=4   i=4   i=4   i=4 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
 α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
0.0591 0.011963 0.0314  0.0582 0.015195 0.0736  0.0567 0.018655 0.1773  0.0554 0.020811 0.2422 
(26.86)*** (1.51)   (21.65)*** (2.25)**   (19.59)*** (3.43)***   (19.06)*** (2.75)***  
Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.0593 0.0072713 0.0069  0.0582 0.0152449 0.0740  0.0573 0.012943 0.0909  0.0553 0.020728 0.2459 
(27.21)*** (1.21)   (21.62)*** (2.29)**   (20.22)*** (2.20)**   (19.11)*** (2.84)***  
Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.0590 0.014614 0.0378  0.0581 0.018048 0.0883  0.0565 0.020874 0.1831  0.0550 0.023513 0.2717 
(26.88)*** (1.69)*     (21.77)*** (2.54)**     (20.01)*** (3.52)***     (19.34)*** (3.31)***   
 
Sample periods are 92 quarters from 1986 to 2008, GDPGrowth_N denotes quarterly growth rate of nominal GDP which is seasonally adjusted. NPR 
denotes quarterly aggregate net number of purchases trading ratio, calculated by dividing the net number of purchases (number of purchases minus number 
of sales) by the total number of director transaction of all firms (P-S)/(P+S), Seasonal Adj_1 denotes seasonal adjusted director trading transactions based 
on December and March fiscal year end by assumption, Seasonal Adj_2 denotes seasonal adjusted director trading transactions based on December and 
March fiscal year end by Observations. Both methods of seasonal adjustment are fully described in Chapter 3. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Newey-West t-statistics present in parentheses.  
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Table 5.2  Time Series Regression of Future 1-Quarter, 2-Quarter, 3-Quarter and 4-Quarter Nominal GDP Growth on Past 1-
Quarter, 2-Quarter, 3-Quarter and 4-Quarter CBI Industrial Trends Survey Data 





t
jtk
it
tk
CBINGDPGrowth
1
10_   
Panel A i=1   i=1   i=1   i=1 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
  
  
α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
0.015 0.00017 0.1492  0.016 0.00010 0.1636  0.016 0.00007 0.1615  0.015 0.00005 0.1456 
 (18.45)*** (2.77)***   (16.49)*** (2.57)**   (14.38)*** (2.56)**   (12.82)*** (2.47)**  
Panel B i=2   i=2   i=2   i=2 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
  
  
α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2 
0.031 0.00034 0.1838  0.031 0.00019 0.1899  0.031 0.00013 0.1769  0.031 0.00010 0.1710 
 (21.91)*** (3.30)***   (16.79)*** (2.87)***   (14.05)*** (2.68)***   (12.39)*** (2.61)**  
Panel C i=3   i=3   i=3   i=3 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
  
  
α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2 
0.046 0.00048 0.1852  0.046 0.00026 0.1832  0.045 0.00019 0.1792  0.045 0.00015  0.1748 
 (22.75)*** (3.78)***   (16.52)*** (3.05)***   (13.56)*** (2.75)***   (11.94)*** (2.63)**  
Panel D i=4   i=4   i=4   i=4 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
  
α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2 
0.060 0.00056 0.1477  0.060 0.00032 0.1536  0.060 0.00023 0.1505  0.059 0.00018 0.1514 
  (22.29)*** (3.62)***     (16.06)*** (2.90)***     (13.12)*** (2.62)**     (11.52)*** (2.56)**   
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Table 5.2 (Continued) 
 
Sample periods are 92 quarters from 1986 to 2008, GDPGrowth_N denotes quarterly growth rate of nominal GDP which is seasonally adjusted. CBI denotes 
quarterly industrial trends survey data provided by Confederation of British Industry (CBI business confidence). The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Newey-West t-statistics present in parentheses.  
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Table 5.3  Time Series Regression of Future 1-Quarter, 2-Quarter, 3-Quarter and 4-Quarter Growth Rate of Nominal GDP on Past 
1-Quarter, 2-Quarter, 3-Quarter and 4-Quarter Aggregate Net Number of Director Purchases Trading Ratio Decomposed by 
Different Macro-Effect Variables 
 
 
Panel A i=1   i=1   i=1   i=1 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0151 0.00502 0.0603  0.0151 0.00397 0.0417  0.0149 0.00371 0.0549  0.0148 0.00323 0.0401 
(19.67)*** (2.76)***   (17.26)*** (2.84)***   (15.37)*** (2.97)***   (18.42)*** (1.40)  
Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0139 0.00304 0.0050  0.0144 0.00277 0.0153  0.0144 0.00211 0.0093  0.0136 0.00313 0.0617 
(10.59)*** (1.38)   (12.18)*** (1.68)   (12.84)*** (1.45)   (15.06)*** (1.65)  
Depression 
0.0154 0.00447 0.0499  0.0153 0.00388 0.0444  0.0152 0.00352 0.0524  0.0149 0.00422 0.0824 
(20.52)*** (2.45)**     (17.81)*** (2.86)***     (15.35)*** (2.71)***     (17.56)*** (2.00)*   
Panel B i=1   i=1   i=1   i=1 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
 α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0052 -0.02022 0.1052  0.0088 -0.01259 0.3222  0.0109 -0.01120 0.6736  0.0093 -0.00942 0.7102 
(1.50) (-2.16)*   (4.03)*** (-4.03)***   (6.54)*** (-6.20)***   (7.04)*** (-6.13)***  
Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0134 -0.00335 -0.0160  0.0139 0.00148 -0.0198  0.0134 0.00262 -0.0106  0.0133 -0.00048 -0.0232 
(9.65)*** (-0.48)   (9.98)*** (0.38)   (9.46)*** (0.72)   (10.51)*** (-0.20)  
Depression 
0.0063 -0.01035 0.0641  0.0095 -0.00982 0.4038  0.0106 -0.00848 0.5804  0.0096 -0.01049 0.6051 
(2.06)* (-2.36)**     (4.99)*** (-5.19)***     (9.24)*** (-6.21)***     (8.01)*** (-5.54)***   
 




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1
),(10_ 
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Table 5.3 (Continued) 
 
Panel C i=2   i=2   i=2   i=2 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0306 0.00688 0.0387  0.0300 0.00900 0.0938  0.0296 0.00829 0.1177  0.0289 0.00952 0.1656 
(22.99)*** (2.34)**   (18.56)*** (4.06)***   (18.10)*** (3.14)***   (19.78)*** (2.18)**  
Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0279 0.00406 -0.0048  0.0280 0.00658 0.0441  0.0269 0.00730 0.1050  0.0256 0.00810 0.1567 
(12.90)*** (0.90)   (11.66)*** (2.03)*   (12.03)*** (1.99)*   (11.18)*** (2.04)**  
Depression 
0.0313 0.00555 0.0230  0.0307 0.00795 0.0790  0.0301 0.00838 0.1315  0.0292 0.01067 0.2230 
(23.58)*** (1.79)*     (19.02)*** (3.55)***     (18.04)*** (3.19)***     (18.88)*** (2.57)**   
Panel D i=2   i=2   i=2   i=2 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
 α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0090 -0.04171 0.1384  0.0160 -0.03085 0.3846  0.0186 -0.02939 0.8584  0.0156 -0.02461 0.7943 
(1.35) (-2.54)**   (3.63)*** (-4.29)***   (5.85)*** (-8.04)***   (6.78)*** (-6.73)***  
Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0267 0.00252 -0.0213  0.0269 -0.00057 -0.0226  0.0261 -0.00090 -0.0228  0.0261 -0.00491 -0.0070 
(11.51)*** (0.24)   (9.94)*** (-0.06)   (9.07)*** (-0.14)   (9.17)*** (-1.16)  
Depression 
0.0112 -0.01710 0.0306  0.0171 -0.01933 0.3444  0.0186 -0.02078 0.7647  0.0169 -0.02603 0.7763 
(1.95)* (-2.45)**     (4.34)*** (-6.64)***     (9.09)*** (-20.04)***     (5.94)*** (-15.04)*** 
Panel E i=3   i=3   i=3   i=3 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0459 0.00844 0.0295  0.0454 0.01045 0.0659  0.0444 0.01178 0.1332  0.0432 0.01416 0.2091 
(26.58)*** (1.35)   (20.65)*** (2.39)**   (19.38)*** (2.89)***   (20.81)*** (2.47)**  
Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0413 0.00833 0.0252  0.0410 0.01118 0.0878  0.0396 0.01061 0.1326  0.0382 0.01018 0.1456 
(15.45)*** (1.20)   (12.72)*** (1.96)*   (12.15)*** (1.68)   (10.45)*** (1.86)*  
Depression 
0.0467 0.00946 0.0426  0.0462 0.01045 0.0710  0.0451 0.01229 0.1527  0.0437 0.01554 0.2573 
(26.32)*** (1.67)*     (20.57)*** (2.53)**     (19.04)*** (3.10)***     (19.87)*** (2.81)***   
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Table 5.3 (Continued) 
 
Panel F i=3   i=3   i=3   i=3 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0131 -0.07377 0.3403  0.0211 -0.05729 0.5823  0.0226 -0.04671 0.8996  0.0186 -0.03978 0.8438 
(1.55) (-5.10)***   (3.66)*** (-5.72)***   (8.07)*** (-17.94)***   (9.56)*** (-8.19)***  
Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0405 0.00187 -0.0227  0.0403 0.00373 -0.0201  0.0396 -0.00077 -0.0236  0.0400 -0.00774 0.0024 
(13.33)*** (0.16)   (10.60)*** (0.42)   (9.76)*** (-0.12)   (10.79)*** (-1.24)  
Depression 
0.0166 -0.03378 0.1727  0.0229 -0.03300 0.4519  0.0239 -0.03140 0.7571  0.0207 -0.03548 0.5897 
(2.28)** (-3.66)***     (4.11)*** (-6.20)***     (5.01)*** (-15.47)***     (3.41)*** (-12.91)*** 
Panel G i=4   i=4   i=4   i=4 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
 α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0610 0.01254 0.0470  0.0602 0.01523 0.0937  0.0587 0.01720 0.1875  0.0574 0.01810 0.2355 
(27.90)*** (1.61)   (22.68)*** (2.23)**   (21.39)*** (3.02)***   (22.20)*** (2.25)**  
Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0557 0.00817 0.0111  0.0538 0.01561 0.1263  0.0521 0.01355 0.1579  0.0509 0.01029 0.1177 
(17.92)*** (1.06)   (14.61)*** (1.88)*   (12.78)*** (1.66)   (11.30)*** (1.69)  
Depression 
0.0621 0.01290 0.0517  0.0611 0.01628 0.1142  0.0595 0.01832 0.2192  0.0579 0.02032 0.2972 
(27.38)*** (1.76)*     (22.20)*** (2.59)**     (20.67)*** (3.40)***     (20.63)*** (2.66)**   
Panel H i=4   i=4   i=4   i=4 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0156 -0.08868 0.3709  0.0251 -0.07919 0.7792  0.0238 -0.05433 0.8110  0.0179 -0.04728 0.8937 
(1.43) (-4.74)***   (4.64)*** (-9.86)***   (4.99)*** (-6.19)***   (4.16)*** (-11.77)*** 
Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0547 -0.00528 -0.0205  0.0546 -0.00119 -0.0235  0.0543 -0.00818 -0.0068  0.0543 -0.01328 0.0395 
(15.87)*** (-0.44)   (12.31)*** (-0.12)   (12.47)*** (-0.93)   (12.42)*** (-1.64)  
Depression 
0.0211 -0.04225 0.2094  0.0284 -0.04586 0.6006  0.0267 -0.03248 0.5081  0.0223 -0.03655 0.3999 
(2.34)** (-3.01)**     (3.92)*** (-6.85)***     (2.70)** (-6.70)***     (2.09)* (-7.22)***   
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Table 5.3 (Continued) 
 
Sample periods are 92 quarters from 1986 to 2008. GDPGrowth_N denotes quarterly growth rate of nominal GDP which is seasonally adjusted. NPR 
denotes quarterly aggregate net number of purchases trading ratio, calculated by dividing the net number of purchases (number of purchases minus number 
of sales) by the total number of director transaction of all firms (P-S)/(P+S), Business cycle denotes business cycle peak and trough provided by Economic 
Cycle Research Institute (ECRI), there are 81 quarters are good time, 15 quarters are bad time. Growth rate cycle denotes growth rate cycle peak and 
trough provided by Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI), there are 47 quarters are good time, 49 quarters are bad time. Depression denotes UK 
depression time periods got from report Mitchell et al (2009), there are 77 quarters are good time, 19 quarters are bad time. Panel A, C, E and G presents 
NPR performance on good time by different measurements of macroeconomic conditions. Panel B, D, F and H (the shadow panels) present NPR 
performance on bad time by different measurements of macroeconomic conditions. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. Newey-West t-statistics present in parentheses. 
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Table 5.4  Time Series Regression of Future 1-Quarter, 2-Quarter, 3-Quarter and 4-Quarter Growth Rate of Nominal GDP on Past 
1-Quarter, 2-Quarter, 3-Quarter and 4-Quarter CBI Industrial Trends Survey Data Decomposed by Different Macro-Effect 
Variables 





t
jtk
it
tk
CBINGDPGrowth
1
10_   
Panel A i=1   i=1   i=1   i=1 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0158 0.00007 0.0200  0.0159 0.00005 0.0467  0.0160 0.00005 0.0729  0.0159 0.00004 0.0731 
(18.86)*** (1.50)   (16.95)*** (1.99)*   (15.27)*** (2.11)**   (14.00)*** (1.91)*  
Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0142 0.00004 -0.0144  0.0142 0.00004 -0.0087  0.0142 0.00005 0.0088  0.0139 0.00004 0.0181 
(11.79)*** (0.59)   (10.18)*** (0.80)   (9.90)*** (1.53)   (10.27)*** (1.62)  
Depression 
0.0162 0.00009 0.0437  0.0162 0.00005 0.0472  0.0163 0.00004 0.0662  0.0162 0.00003 0.0708 
(19.76)*** (1.91)*     (16.98)*** (1.93)*     (14.93)*** (2.00)**     (13.63)*** (1.83)*   
Panel B i=1   i=1   i=1   i=1 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0160 0.00037 0.2275  0.0135 0.00016 0.0647  0.0087 0.00005 -0.0711  -0.0004 -0.00002 -0.1062 
(3.66)*** (2.11)*   (2.09)* (1.32)   (1.17) (0.73)   (-0.07) (-0.50)  
Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0156 0.00016 0.1003  0.0154 0.00008 0.0717  0.0151 0.00006 0.0589  0.0151 0.00005 0.0673 
(11.52)*** (1.80)*   (9.24)*** (1.43)   (10.21)*** (1.36)   (12.01)*** (1.51)  
Depression 
0.0110 0.00022 0.0939  0.0106 0.00011 0.0537  0.0088 0.00005 -0.0312  0.0048 0.00001 -0.0758 
(2.78)** (1.35)     (2.33)** (1.12)     (2.20)** (0.82)     (1.03) (0.19)   
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Table 5.4 (Continued) 
 
Panel C i=2   i=2   i=2   i=2 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0317 0.00017 0.0616  0.0319 0.00011 0.1001  0.0320 0.00009 0.1143  0.0318 0.00007 0.1255 
(23.65)*** (2.39)**   (18.33)*** (2.40)**   (15.77)*** (2.18)**   (14.34)*** (2.01)**  
Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0284 0.00009 -0.0094  0.0283 0.00009 0.0075  0.0280 0.00010 0.0257  0.0275 0.00009 0.0323 
(14.31)*** (0.81)   (11.21)*** (1.35)   (10.33)*** (1.66)   (10.54)*** (1.69)  
Depression 
0.0323 0.00016 0.0616  0.0324 0.00010 0.0814  0.0324 0.00008 0.0966  0.0324 0.00007 0.1154 
(23.85)*** (2.42)**     (17.96)*** (2.22)**     (15.30)*** (2.03)**     (13.86)*** (1.90)*   
Panel D i=2   i=2   i=2   i=2 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
 α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0211 0.00044 0.0485  0.0125 0.00010 -0.0786  -0.0008 -0.00005 -0.1013  -0.0190 -0.00016 -0.0085 
(2.50)** (1.44)   (0.98) (0.55)   (-0.06) (-0.57)   (-1.62) (-3.06)**  
Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0297 0.00018 0.0338  0.0293 0.00010 0.0261  0.0289 0.00008 0.0341  0.0288 0.00007 0.0379 
(12.51)*** (1.49)   (9.76)*** (1.27)   (10.54)*** (1.50)   (10.11)*** (1.62)  
Depression 
0.0180 0.00032 0.0455  0.0158 0.00012 -0.0215  0.0100 0.00002 -0.0753  0.0042 -0.00003 -0.0759 
(2.76)** (1.23)     (1.78)* (0.77)     (0.99) (0.18)     (0.33) (-0.39)   
Panel E i=3   i=3   i=3   i=3 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0477 0.00028 0.0971  0.0478 0.00017 0.1210  0.0478 0.00013 0.1399  0.0476 0.00011 0.1519 
(26.16)*** (2.99)***   (19.19)*** (2.53)**   (16.08)*** (2.25)**   (14.62)*** (2.06)**  
Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0426 0.00018 0.0014  0.0421 0.00015 0.0198  0.0416 0.00013 0.0345  0.0408 0.00010 0.0237 
(16.43)*** (1.28)   (12.22)*** (1.65)   (10.88)*** (1.76)*   (11.10)*** (1.76)*  
Depression 
0.0485 0.00026 0.0839  0.0486 0.00015 0.0986  0.0486 0.00012 0.1199  0.0484 0.00010 0.1393 
(25.77)*** (2.85)***     (18.66)*** (2.34)**     (15.57)*** (2.11)**     (14.13)*** (1.97)*   
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Table 5.4 (Continued) 
 
Panel F i=3   i=3   i=3   i=3 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0165 0.00025 -0.0748  0.0026 -0.00005 -0.1078  -0.0195 -0.00025 -0.0220  -0.0486 -0.00040 0.1787 
(1.19) (0.66)   (0.13) (-0.24)   (-0.96) (-1.32)   (-3.19)** (-2.57)**  
Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0439 0.00020 0.0170  0.0436 0.00012 0.0294  0.0431 0.00010 0.0346  0.0429 0.00008 0.0327 
(13.26)*** (1.61)   (10.97)*** (1.66)   (10.27)*** (1.80)*   (9.12)*** (1.65)  
Depression 
0.0208 0.00027 -0.0234  0.0153 0.00006 -0.0716  0.0077 -0.00005 -0.0757  0.0007 -0.00010 -0.0564 
(2.26)** (0.88)     (1.03) (0.24)     (0.41) (-0.29)     (0.03) (-0.64)   
Panel G i=4   i=4   i=4   i=4 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
 α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2  α0 α1 Adj R
2 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0636 0.00035 0.1007  0.0637 0.00022 0.1295  0.0635 0.00016 0.1455  0.0630 0.00014 0.1687 
(27.02)*** (3.10)***   (19.66)*** (2.56)**   (16.47)*** (2.25)**   (15.14)*** (2.08)**  
Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0572 0.00022 0.0046  0.0566 0.00020 0.0341  0.0558 0.00014 0.0228  0.0543 0.00011 0.0286 
(18.58)*** (1.39)   (13.95)*** (1.93)*   (12.58)*** (1.70)*   (13.64)*** (1.65)  
Depression 
0.0648 0.00034 0.0904  0.0648 0.00020 0.1113  0.0646 0.00016 0.1293  0.0641 0.00013 0.1565 
(26.59)*** (2.96)***     (19.10)*** (2.41)**     (15.94)*** (2.14)**     (14.61)*** (2.00)*   
Panel H i=4   i=4   i=4   i=4 
 j=1  j=2  j=3  j=4 
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
  α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0070 -0.00011 -0.1085  -0.0210 -0.00047 -0.0057  -0.0569 -0.00070 0.2513  -0.0957 -0.00083 0.5751 
(0.36) (-0.19)   (-0.76) (-1.05)   (-2.46)** (-2.45)**   (-6.57)*** (-4.15)***  
Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0590 0.00028 0.0406  0.0583 0.00016 0.0447  0.0577 0.00011 0.0427  0.0569 0.00009 0.0302 
(15.39)*** (2.35)**   (11.95)*** (1.98)*   (10.53)*** (1.78)*   (9.16)*** (1.44)  
Depression 
0.0184 0.000003 -0.0769  0.0092 -0.00017 -0.0591  -0.0010 -0.00025 -0.0002  -0.0125 -0.00031 0.0785 
(1.30) (0.01)     (0.41) (-0.42)     (-0.04) (-0.93)     (-0.45) (-1.61)   
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Table 5.4 (Continued) 
 
Sample periods are 92 quarters from 1986 to 2008. GDPGrowth_N denotes quarterly growth rate of nominal GDP which is seasonally adjusted. CBI denotes 
quarterly industrial trends survey data provided by Confederation of British Industry (CBI business confidence).  Business cycle denotes business cycle peak 
and trough provided by Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI), there are 81 quarters are good time, 15 quarters are bad time. Growth rate cycle 
denotes growth rate cycle peak and trough provided by Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI), there are 47 quarters are good time, 49 quarters are bad 
time. Depression denotes UK depression time periods got from report Mitchell et al (2009), there are 77 quarters are good time, 19 quarters are bad 
time. Panel A, C, E and G presents NPR performance on good time by different measurements of macroeconomic conditions. Panel B, D, F and H (the 
shadow panels) present NPR performance on bad time by different measurements of macroeconomic conditions. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Newey-West t-statistics present in parentheses. 
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Table 5.5  Regressions of 1-Year Lead of Quarterly Nominal and Real GDP 
Growth Rates on 1-Year lag of Market Excess Returns, SMB and HML on: 1986-
2008 
)4,(),4()4,( Re*   tttttt tFactorbaGDPGrowth   
Panel A   Constant   MKT   SMB   HML   R2 Adj R2 
 1 0.058  0.055  …  …  0.1149 0.1048 
  (11.56)*** (1.73)*        
 2 0.061  …  0.046  …  0.0556 0.0448 
  (13.49)***   (1.13)      
 3 0.059  …  …  0.036  0.0691 0.0584 
  (13.85)***     (1.30)    
 4 0.059  …  0.036  0.030  0.1023 0.0814 
  (14.44)***   (1.04)  (1.28)    
 5 0.059  0.049  0.031  …  0.1394 0.1194 
  (11.86)*** (1.63)  (0.87)      
 6 0.055  0.061  …  0.042  0.2074  0.1889 
  (12.41)*** (2.12)**    (1.91)*    
 7 0.056  0.057  0.017  0.039  0.2138 0.1860 
  (12.59)*** (1.99)*   (0.53)   (2.00)**     
Panel B   Constant   MKT   SMB   HML   R2 Adj R2 
 8 0.059  0.055  …  …  0.1159 0.1058 
  (13.98)*** (2.24)**        
 9 0.061  …  0.045  …  0.0541 0.0432 
  (14.66)***   (1.19)      
 10 0.059  …  …  0.034  0.0651 0.0543 
  (15.84)***     (1.43)    
 11 0.060  …  0.036  0.029  0.0977 0.0767 
  (15.73)***   (1.09)  (1.36)    
 12 0.059  0.049  0.030  …  0.1392 0.1192 
  (13.98)*** (2.16)**  (0.88)      
 13 0.056  0.061  …  0.040  0.2038 0.1853 
  (15.90)*** (2.77)***    (2.22)**    
 14 0.057  0.057  0.016  0.037  0.2100 0.1821 
    (15.53)*** (2.64)**   (0.55)   (2.33)**       
 
Sample periods are 92 quarters from 1986 to 2008, quarterly Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is 
seasonally adjusted. GDPGrowth denotes nominal and real GDP growth in Panel A and Panel 
B, respectively. ‘FactorRet’ stands for MKT, SMB and HML. MKT denotes excess returns 
between return on index of FTSE All Share and return on the 90-day Treasury Bills, SMB is the 
difference in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and big stocks, HML is the 
difference in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and low 
book-to-market stocks. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. Newey-West t-statistics with 3 lags present in parentheses.  
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Table 5.6  Regressions of 1-Year Leads of Quarterly Nominal and Real GDP 
Growth Rates on 1-Year Lag of SMB, HML and Aggregate Net Number of 
Director Purchases Trading Ratio on: 1986-2008 
)4,(),4(),4()4,( *Re*   tttttttt NPRctFactorbaGDPGrowth   
Panel A   Constant   SMB   HML   NPR   R2 Adjust R2 
  0.055  0.024  …  0.020   0.2719  0.2542 
  (18.88)*** (1.11)    (2.90)***    
   0.054   …   0.029   0.021   0.3138 0.2970 
   (19.72)***     (2.02)**   (3.05)***       
  0.054  0.018  0.027  0.020  0.3252 0.3002 
    (19.82)*** (1.01)   (2.04)**   (3.21)***     
Panel B   Constant   SMB   HML   NPR   R2 Adjust R2 
  0.021  0.051  …  0.010  0.1759 0.1558 
  (6.65)***  (1.44)    (1.40)    
  0.019   …   0.026   0.012   0.1378 0.1167 
  (4.88)***       (1.96)*   (1.66)       
   0.020  0.046  0.021  0.010  0.2097 0.1804 
    (5.62)***   (1.37)   (2.10)**   (1.49)       
Panel C   Constant   SMB   HML   NPR _ADJ_1   R2 Adjust R2 
  0.055  0.024  …  0.020  0.2754 0.2577 
  (18.95)*** (1.10)    (3.00)***    
   0.053   …   0.028   0.020   0.3160 0.2993 
   (19.84)***     (2.01)**   (3.15)***       
  0.054  0.0183  0.026  0.020  0.3273 0.3024 
    (19.94)*** (0.99)   (2.03)**   (3.31)***     
Panel D   Constant   SMB   HML   NPR _ADJ_1   R2 Adjust R2 
  0.021  0.050  …  0.010   0.1774 0.1573 
  (6.63)***  (1.45)    (1.45)    
  0.019   …   0.026   0.012   0.1389 0.1179 
  (4.86)***       (1.96)*   (1.70)*       
   0.020  0.046  0.021  0.010  0.2107 0.1814 
    (5.61)***   (1.38)   (2.09)**   (1.53)       
Panel E   Constant   SMB   HML   NPR _ADJ_2   R
2
 Adjust R
2
 
  0.055  0.022  …  0.022   0.2967 0.2796 
  (19.16)*** (1.01)    (3.52)***    
   0.053   …   0.029   0.023   0.3421 0.3260 
   (19.80)***     (2.10)**   (3.75)***       
  0.053  0.016  0.027  0.022  0.3503 0.3263 
    (20.02)*** (0.87)   (2.14)**   (3.98)***     
Panel F   Constant   SMB   HML   NPR _ ADJ_2   R
2
 Adjust R
2
 
  0.021  0.049  …  0.011   0.1816 0.1616 
  (6.62)***  (1.38)    (1.47)    
  0.019   …   0.026   0.013   0.1482 0.1274 
  (4.81)***       (1.96)*   (1.82)*       
   0.020  0.044  0.021  0.011  0.2155 0.1865 
    (5.59)***   (1.31)   (2.10)**   (1.57)       
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Table 5.6 (Continued) 
 
Sample periods are 92 quarters from 1986 to 2008, quarterly Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is 
seasonally adjusted. GDPGrowth denotes nominal and real GDP growth rate. It stands for 
nominal GDP growth in Panel A, C and E, while in Panel B, D and F (Panels covered by grey 
shadow) for real GDP growth.  ‘FactorRet’ stands for SMB and HML. SMB is the difference in 
the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and big stocks, HML is the difference in 
the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market 
stocks. NPR denotes quarterly aggregate net number of purchases trading ratio, calculated by 
dividing the net number of purchases (number of purchases minus number of sales) by the total 
number of director transaction of all firms (P-S)/(P+S), NPR_ ADJ_1 denotes seasonal adjusted 
NPR based on December and March fiscal year end by assumption, NPR_ ADJ_2 denotes 
seasonal adjusted NPR based on December and March fiscal year end by Observations. Both 
methods of seasonal adjustment are fully described in Chapter 3. The symbols *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Newey-West t-statistics with 
3 lags present in parentheses.  
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Table 5.7  Regressions of 1-Year Leads of Quarterly Nominal and Real GDP 
Growth Rate on 1-Year Lag of MKT, SMB, HML and Aggregate Net Number of 
Director Purchases Trading Ratios on: 1986-2008 
)4,(),4(),4(),4()4,( *Re**   tttttttttt NPRdtFactorcMKTbaGDPGrowth   
Panel A   Constant   MKT   SMB   HML   NPR   R2 Adjust R2 
  0.055  0.007  0.024  …  0.019   0.2742  0.2473 
  (18.34)*** (0.43)  (1.04)    (2.84)***    
   0.052   0.020   …   0.033   0.019    0.3312  0.3064 
   (18.14)*** (1.27)       (2.47)**   (3.11)***       
  0.053  0.018  0.015  0.031  0.019  0.3388 0.3057 
    (18.53)*** (1.08)   (0.81)   (2.52)**   (3.25)***     
Panel B   Constant   MKT   SMB   HML   NPR   R2 Adjust R2 
  0.021  -0.004  0.051  …  0.010  0.1767 0.1462 
  (7.17)***  (-0.26)  (1.43)    (1.46)    
  0.019   0.010   …   0.028   0.011    0.1422  0.1104 
  (4.49)***   (0.61)       (1.87)*   (1.70)*       
   0.020  0.004  0.045  0.022  0.010  0.2103 0.1708 
    (5.73)***   (0.24)   (1.32)   (1.93)*   (1.54)       
Panel C   Constant   MKT   SMB   HML   NPR _ADJ_1   R2 Adjust R2 
  0.055  0.007  0.023  …  0.019   0.2775 0.2507 
  (18.28)*** (0.42)  (1.03)    (2.94)***    
   0.052   0.020   …   0.032   0.019    0.3328  0.3081 
   (18.15)*** (1.27)       (2.47)**   (3.23)***       
  0.053  0.018  0.015  0.030  0.019  0.3404  0.3075 
    (18.50)*** (1.07)   (0.80)   (2.52)**   (3.37)***     
Panel D   Constant   MKT   SMB   HML   NPR _ADJ_1   R2 Adjust R2 
  0.021  -0.004  0.051  …  0.010   0.1782  0.1478 
  (7.17)***  (-0.27)  (1.43)    (1.50)    
  0.019   0.010   …   0.028   0.011   0.1431 0.1113 
  (4.50)***   (0.61)       (1.87)*   (1.75)*       
   0.020  0.0036  0.045  0.022  0.010  0.2112  0.1718 
    (5.75)***   (0.23)   (1.33)   (1.93)*   (1.59)       
Panel E   Constant   MKT   SMB   HML   NPR _ ADJ_2   R
2
 Adjust R
2
 
  0.055  0.004  0.021  …  0.022   0.2974  0.2714 
  (18.47)*** (0.23)  (0.96)    (3.37)***    
   0.052   0.017   …   0.032   0.022   0.3534 0.3295 
   (18.16)*** (1.05)       (2.50)**   (3.71)***       
  0.052  0.015  0.013  0.030  0.021  0.3592 0.3272 
    (18.53)*** (0.88)   (0.71)   (2.57)**   (3.91)***     
Panel F   Constant   MKT   SMB   HML   NPR _ ADJ_2   R
2
 Adjust R
2
 
  0.021  -0.006  0.050  …  0.012   0.1831 0.1529 
  (7.12)***  (-0.37)  (1.37)    (1.54)    
  0.019   0.008   …   0.027   0.013    0.1508 0.1193 
  (4.48)***   (0.49)       (1.85)*   (1.84)*       
   0.019  0.002  0.044  0.022  0.011  0.2157 0.1765 
    (5.71)***   (0.13)   (1.27)   (1.93)*   (1.62)       
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Table 5.7 (Continued) 
 
Sample periods are 92 quarters from 1986 to 2008, quarterly Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is 
seasonally adjusted. GDPGrowth denotes nominal and real GDP growth rate. It stands for 
nominal GDP growth in Panel A, C and E, while in Panel B, D and F (Panels covered by grey 
shadow) for real GDP growth. MKT denotes excess returns between return on index of FTSE All 
Share and return on the 90-day Treasury Bills. ‘FactorRet’ stands for SMB and HML. SMB is 
the difference in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and big stocks, HML is 
the difference in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and low 
book-to-market stocks. NPR denotes quarterly aggregate net number of purchases trading ratio, 
calculated by dividing the net number of purchases (number of purchases minus number of 
sales) by the total number of director transaction of all firms (P-S)/(P+S), NPR_ ADJ_1 denotes 
seasonal adjusted NPR based on December and March fiscal year end by assumption, NPR_ 
ADJ_2 denotes seasonal adjusted NPR based on December and March fiscal year end by 
Observations. Both methods of seasonal adjustment are fully described in Chapter 3. The 
symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Newey-West t-statistics with 3 lags present in parentheses.  
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Table 5.8  Regressions of 1-Year Leads of Quarterly Nominal and Real GDP 
Growth Rates on 1-Year Lag of MKT, SMB, HML and CBI Industrial Trends 
Survey Data on: 1986-2008 
)4,(),4(),4(),4()4,( *Re**   tttttttttt CBIdtFactorcMKTbaGDPGrowth   
Panel A   Constant   MKT   SMB   HML   CBI   R2 Adjust R2 
  0.059  …  0.061  …  0.00014  0.2276  0.2096 
  (11.18)***   (1.33)    (2.52)**    
   0.056   …   …   0.048   0.00016   0.2520  0.2347 
   (10.69)***         (1.99)**   (2.69)***       
  0.056  …  0.049  0.042  0.00013  0.2937  0.2688 
    (10.90)***    (1.27)   (2.08)**   (2.46)***     
Panel B   Constant   MKT   SMB   HML   CBI   R
2
 Adjust R
2
 
  0.023  …  0.070  …  0.00006  0.2217 0.2036 
  (5.85)***    (2.02)**    (1.44)    
  0.021   …   …   0.036   0.00009   0.1661 0.1467 
  (4.77)***           (2.26)**   (1.96)*       
   0.021  …  0.062  0.028  0.00006  0.2679  0.2421 
    (5.03)***       (2.02)**   (2.44)**   (1.28)       
Panel C   Constant   MKT   SMB   HML   CBI   R2 Adjust R2 
  0.056  0.043  0.052  …  0.00012  0.2748 0.2492 
  (9.39)***  (1.45)  (1.23)    (1.94)*    
   0.052   0.062   …   0.056   0.00012    0.3488 0.3258 
   (8.03)***   (1.93)*       (2.44)**   (1.98)*       
  0.052  0.056  0.035  0.051  0.00010  0.3687 0.3386 
    (8.65)***   (1.93)*   (1.05)   (2.65)**   (1.72)*     
Panel D   Constant   MKT   SMB   HML   CBI   R
2
 Adjust R
2
 
  0.022  0.015  0.067  …  0.00005   0.2305  0.2034 
  (5.66)***  (0.66)  (1.91)*    (1.22)    
  0.019   0.033   …   0.040   0.00007    0.2077 0.1798 
  (3.95)***   (1.42)       (2.33)**   (1.54)       
   0.019  0.0228  0.056  0.032  0.00004   0.2873 0.2534 
    (4.63)***   (1.06)   (1.81)*   (2.43)**   (0.94)       
 
Sample periods are 92 quarters from 1986 to 2008, quarterly Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is 
seasonally adjusted. GDPGrowth denotes nominal and real GDP growth rate. It stands for 
nominal GDP growth in Panel A and C, while in Panel B and D (Panels covered by grey 
shadow) for real GDP growth. MKT denotes excess returns between return on index of FTSE All 
Share and return on the 90-day Treasury Bills. ‘FactorRet’ stands for SMB and HML. SMB is 
the difference in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and big stocks, HML is 
the difference in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and low 
book-to-market stocks. CBI denotes quarterly industrial trends survey data provided by 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI business confidence). The symbols *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Newey-West t-statistics with 
3 lags present in parentheses.  
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Table 5.9  Regressions of 1-Year Leads of Quarterly Nominal and Real GDP Growth Rates on 1-Year Lag of Fama-French 3 Factors 
and Aggregate Net Number of Director Purchases Trading Ratio in the Presence of Business Cycle Variables 
)4,()(),4()(),4(),4(),4()4,( ****Re**   tttttttttttttt TERMgIPGrowthfDYeNPRdtFactorcMKTbaGDPGrowth   
Panel A Constant   MKT   SMB   HML   NPR   DY   IPGrowth   TERM   R2   Adj R2 
1 0.022  …  0.077  0.047  0.0132974  0.722  0.428  -2.810  0.4751  0.4362 
 (1.43)    (1.61)  (3.11)***  (2.57)**  (1.97)*  (4.04)***  (-1.09)     
2 0.021  …  0.077  0.047  0.0135398  0.729  0.424  -2.796  0.4777  0.4390 
 (1.42)    (1.62)  (3.09)***  (2.74)***  (2.00)**  (4.04)***  (-1.10)     
3 0.022  …  0.075  0.047  0.0150378  0.717  0.430  -2.746  0.4805  0.4420 
 (1.44)    (1.55)  (3.14)***  (2.77)***  (1.95)*  (4.07)***  (-1.06)     
4 0.019  0.055  0.071  0.053  0.0142586  0.781  0.311  -1.245  0.4979  0.4540 
 (1.28)  (2.35)**  (1.52)  (3.39)***  (2.97)***  (2.11)**  (3.25)***  (-0.49)     
5 0.019  0.058  0.071  0.053  0.0147566  0.790  0.301  -1.151  0.5024  0.4588 
 (1.26)  (2.44)**  (1.52)  (3.39)***  (3.26)***  (2.15)**  (3.22)***  (-0.45)     
6 0.019  0.051  0.070  0.052  0.0155446  0.775  0.323  -1.313  0.5004  0.4567 
  (1.28)   (2.21)**   (1.46)   (3.37)***   (2.97)***   (2.09)**   (3.44)***   (-0.51)         
Panel B Constant   MKT   SMB   HML   NPR   DY   IPGrowth   TERM   R2   Adj R2 
7 0.027  …  0.052  0.039  0.0095577  0.607  0.454  -3.876  0.3446  0.2961 
 (2.21)**    (1.23)  (2.48)**  (1.42)  (2.05)**  (4.00)***  (-1.55)     
8 0.027  …  0.052  0.039  0.0097808  0.612  0.451  -3.863  0.3462  0.2978 
 (2.21)**    (1.24)  (2.46)**  (1.56)  (2.09)**  (4.00)***  (-1.56)     
9 0.027  …  0.050  0.039  0.0117091  0.596  0.452  -3.780  0.3519  0.3039 
 (2.24)**    (1.16)  (2.48)**  (1.68)*  (2.01)**  (3.97)***  (-1.51)     
10 0.025  0.047  0.047  0.044  0.0103833  0.658  0.353  -2.531  0.3613  0.3054 
 (2.05)**  (1.69)*  (1.14)  (2.61)**  (1.62)  (2.22)**  (3.69)***  (-1.11)     
11 0.025  0.049  0.047  0.044  0.0108207  0.664  0.346  -2.457  0.3640  0.3084 
 (2.04)**  (1.75)*  (1.14)  (2.60)**  (1.83)*  (2.27)**  (3.69)***  (-1.09)     
12 0.026  0.045  0.046  0.044  0.0121518  0.647  0.359  -2.528  0.3669  0.3115 
  (2.06)**   (1.60)   (1.08)   (2.58)**   (1.77)*   (2.17)**   (3.79)***   (-1.10)         
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Table 5.9 (Continued) 
 
Sample periods are 92 quarters from 1986 to 2008, quarterly Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is seasonally adjusted. GDPGrowth denotes nominal and real 
GDP growth rate in Panel A and B, respectively. MKT denotes excess returns between return on index of FTSE All Share and return on the 90-day Treasury 
Bills. ‘FactorRet’ stands for SMB and HML. SMB is the difference in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and big stocks, HML is the 
difference in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks.  
NPR denotes quarterly aggregate net number of purchases trading ratio, calculated by dividing the net number of purchases (number of purchases minus 
number of sales) by the total number of director transaction of all firms (P-S)/(P+S), results of real NPR present in model 1, 4, 7 and 10; model 2, 5, 8 and 11 
present results of NPR with Seasonality Adjustment One which is seasonal adjusted NPR based on December and March fiscal year end by assumption; 
model 3, 6, 9 and 12 present results of NPR with Seasonality Adjustment Two which is seasonal adjusted NPR based on December and March fiscal year 
end by Observations. Both methods of seasonal adjustment are fully described in Chapter 3. 
DY denotes the dividend yield of FTSE All Share. IPGrowth denotes industrial production growth. TERM denotes long-run rate minus short term rate in UK, 
calculated by long-run rate (the yield to maturity of a 10-year government bond) minus short term rate (90-day UK Treasury Bill rate).  
The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Newey-West t-statistics with 3 lags present in parentheses.  
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Table 5.10  Regressions of 1-Year Leads of Quarterly Nominal and Real GDP Growth Rates on 1-Year Lag of Fama-French 3 
Factors and CBI Industrial Trends Survey Data in the Presence of Business Cycle Variables 
)4,()(),4()(),4(),4(),4()4,( ****Re**   tttttttttttttt TERMgIPGrowthfDYeCBIdtFactorcMKTbaGDPGrowth   
  Constant   MKT   SMB   HML   CBI   DY   IPGrowth   TERM   R2   Adj R2 
1 0.016  …  0.090  0.048  -0.0000738  0.859  0.628  -3.207  0.4394  0.3979 
 (0.90)    (1.83)*  (2.95)***  (-0.80)  (2.33)**  (2.63)**  (-1.32)     
2 0.012  0.054  0.086  0.054  -0.0000926  0.930  0.554  -1.630  0.4611  0.4140 
  (0.71)   (1.68)*   (1.80)*   (3.20)***   (-0.98)   (2.62)**   (2.46)**   (-0.65)         
3 0.023  …  0.061  0.040  -0.0000456  0.703  0.583  -4.198  0.3251  0.2751 
 (1.57)    (1.39)  (2.40)**  (-0.51)  (2.36)**  (2.41)**  (-1.80)*     
4 0.021  0.046  0.058  0.045  -0.0000616  0.764  0.520  -2.854  0.3407  0.2830 
  (1.37)   (1.31)   (1.35)   (2.51)**   (-0.67)   (2.67)***   (2.29)**   (-1.30)         
 
Sample periods are 92 quarters from 1986 to 2008, quarterly Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is seasonally adjusted. GDPGrowth denotes nominal and real 
GDP growth rate. Model 1 and 2 presents results of Nominal GDP growth, while model 3 and 4 present real GDP. MKT denotes excess returns between 
return on index of FTSE All Share and return on the 90-day Treasury Bills. ‘FactorRet’ stands for SMB and HML. SMB is the difference in the returns of a 
value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and big stocks, HML is the difference in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and 
low book-to-market stocks. CBI denotes quarterly industrial trends survey data provided by Confederation of British Industry (CBI business confidence).  
DY denotes the dividend yield of FTSE All Share. IPGrowth denotes industrial production growth. TERM denotes long-run rate minus short term rate in UK, 
calculated by long-run rate (the yield to maturity of a 10-year government bond) minus short term rate (90-day UK Treasury Bill rate).  
The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Newey-West t-statistics with 3 lags present in parentheses.  
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Chapter 6: Firm Characteristics, Director Role and Market 
Reaction 
6.1 Introduction  
Chapter 4 concludes that aggregate director trading is positively significant and 
can be used to forecast future UK market excess returns. This is consistent with 
previous studies from both the USA and the UK. Chapter 5 investigates the 
relationship between aggregate director trading and future aggregate economic 
activities in the UK. Having examined the macro-picture of aggregate director 
trading, it is going to examine a more micro-picture. Therefore, Chapter 6 is 
about long-run director trading study concentrated the micro-aspects. This 
Chapter will investigate the performance of market reaction to director trading 
by firm characteristics and type of directors. 
Section 6.2 is a literature review. It discusses and summarises the existing 
evidence for a relationship of abnormal returns and firm characteristics with 
aggregate director trading and information hierarchy hypothesis, taking 
evidence from both the USA and the UK. 
Section 6.3 presents data and sample characteristics. It mainly describes the 
classification of director roles (CEOs, CFOs, Executive Chairmen, Nonexecutive 
Chairmen, Other Executives and Other Nonexecutives). 
Section 6.4 discusses methodology, introducing mean monthly calendar-time 
abnormal returns and Calendar-Time portfolio regression with Fama-French 3-
factor and Carhart 4-factor models. 
Section 6.5 contains empirical results. It first presents results of firm 
characteristics and director trading, and then documents the performance of 
market reaction to director roles. 
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Finally, Section 6.6 summarises the results and concludes Chapter 6. 
6.2 Literature Review 
6.2.1 Abnormal Returns, Firm Characteristics and Director Trading 
Previous studies provide evidence indicating that abnormal returns depend on 
company characteristics (firm size and low- or high-B/M ratio). 
In the US, Chopra et al. (1992) documented an economically-important 
overreaction effect in the stock market, concentrated among small firms. Fama 
and French argue that size and B/M ratio ‘provide a simple and powerful 
characterisation of the cross-section of average returns for the 1963-1990 
period’ (1992). In their later paper (1993), they introduce the Fama-French 3 
factors (MKT, SMB and HML)27 and show that the slopes on SMB for stocks are 
related to size. ‘In every book-to-market quintile, the slopes on SMB decrease 
monotonically from smaller- to bigger-size quintiles.’ Similarly, the slopes on 
HML are systematically related to B/M. ‘In every size quintile of stocks, the HML 
slopes increase monotonically from strong negative values for the lowest-B/M 
quintile to strong positive value for the highest-B/M quintile.’ The results of 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) show lower average returns and cumulative returns 
over the past 5 years in their sample; they therefore conclude that a low B/M 
implies an overvalued glamour stock. Loughran (1997) examined average 
equally weighted annual returns for size and B/M quintiles from July 1963 to 
December 1995, and found that the smallest sized group achieved better 
annual returns than the largest size quintile within NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ 
firms. Lakonishok et al. (1994) reported a similar book-to-market effect after 
controlling for firm size in a sample of NYSE and Amex firms. 
                                                             
27 
Details are fully described in Chapter 5. 
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Lakonishok and Lee (2001) investigated insider trading from 1975 to 1995; their 
findings, consistently with previous US studies, suggested that there is a more 
efficient market for larger stocks, as they are under much greater scrutiny than 
smaller stocks. The performance of aggregate insider activities is related to firm 
size. Insiders have a greater advantage in timing an index of small stocks than 
an index of large stocks. Consistent with the results of other similar studies, the 
usefulness of insider activities is not uniform across all market-cap groups. 
Insider trading is a stronger indicator in small-cap stocks, which are often 
perceived to be less efficient. They observe that the largest spread in returns 
between stocks bought and sold by insiders occurs in small-growth stocks. 
Insiders in general are heavy sellers of such stocks; indeed, those stocks are 
associated with relatively low returns. However, when they buy such stocks, 
insiders know what they are doing. In addition, insiders generally invest in 
small-value stock, which is associated with high returns. 
In the UK, Gregory et al. (1994) examined director trading activities for 150 
listed non-financial companies for the period January 1984 to December 1986 
in LSE. They found that a large proportion of abnormal returns following director 
trades occurred in small and medium sized firms: these abnormal returns could 
be explained by the size effect. In another study, Gregory et al. (1997) 
examined director trading from January 1986 to December 1990; they found 
that controlling for the size effect can be of fundamental importance when 
studying CARs over long post-event windows, particularly where the sample 
includes a large number of smaller companies. Later, Gregory et al. (2013) 
examined the patterns of, and long-run returns to, director trading along the 
value-glamour continuum in all stocks listed on the main LSE. They found that 
abnormal returns are particularly concentrated in smaller value stocks; when 
size and B/M are controlled for, the abnormal returns to small-value stocks are 
similar and always significant for small firms. 
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6.2.2 Information Hierarchy and Director Trading 
The information hierarchy hypothesis and relative empirical works are fully 
discussed in Section 2.1.3.   
6.3 Data and Sample Characteristics 
This Chapter uses the same dataset as in Chapter 3: the Hemscott Company 
Guru Academic, which covers the period 1994-2008.It includes 488,671 original 
transaction records, listing company names, director’s names, director’s 
shareholdings, director’s positions on the board, transaction and announcement 
dates, number of shares traded, price, transaction types (13 different types)28 
and transaction descriptions (27 different types).29 The reason that it has not 
used Directus (which covers the period 1986-1993) is that this dataset does not 
classify director roles or job title among director transactions. 
From previous research (Seyhun, 1988; 1990; 1992; 1998), it seems that 
directors’ open market sales and purchases are more likely to represent actions 
taken as a result of special director information. Other empirical works (Seyhun, 
1990; Gregory, Matatko et al., 1994; Fidrmuc, Goergen et al., 2006) indicate 
that option-related trade by directors shows lower information and is 
insignificantly related to post-signal abnormal returns. Therefore, following these 
papers, this study will only analyse open market sales and purchases by 
directors for the period 1986-2008. This means that the sample data relates 
only to ordinary shares or common shares. All other types of directors’ 
                                                             
28 
Transaction types include: purchase, sale, exercise of option, sale of option shares, in lieu of 
dividend, rights taken up, Sale of rights, received on conversion, transfer in between holdings, 
transfer out, n/a, and B&B purchase and sale. 
29 
Transaction descriptions include any relevant additional information relating to the transaction, 
such as ADRs, ISA, trust, warrants, etc. 
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transactions are excluded (e.g. rights taken up, exercises of options, shares 
acquired through a plan, etc.).30  
Following the above adjustments, the sample contains 60,300 directors’ 
transaction records relating to 1,086 firms, from 1994 to 2008.  
It classifies the firms in the sample into the 3 groups (small, medium and big) 
described in Chapter 3. It then splits each firm capitalisation group into 3 book-
to-market groups (low, medium and high). After adding in these size and book-
to-market factors, it is left with 55,848 transactions out of the original 60,300. 
Meanwhile, it obtains the benchmark portfolio from website of University of 
Exeter,31 which was constructed and applied by Gregory et al. (2013). It will 
form the portfolios by independently sorts the sample firms by market 
capitalisation and B/M. Sorting by market capitalisation first, it forms two size 
groups – ‘S’-small and ‘B’-big – using the median market capitalisation of the 
largest 350 companies in UK (proxy for the Fama–French NYSE break point) in 
year t as the size break point. Then it sorts the data into three B/M groups – ‘H’-
High, ‘M’-medium and ‘L’-Low, using the 30th and 70th percentiles of B/M of the 
largest 350 firms as break points for the B/M. This process ultimately results in 
the following six intersecting portfolios: SH, SM, SL, BH, BM, and BL where ‘S’ 
and ‘B’ represent small and big firm sizes respectively, and ‘H’, ‘M’ and ‘L’ 
represent high, medium and low B/M.  
These six portfolios are then used to form the SMB and HML factors. The SMB 
factor is  
3/)(3/)( BHBMBLSHSMSL  , (43) 
and the HML factor is  
                                                             
30 
Numerous consistency checks on dates, prices, and shares were performed to eliminate 
approximately 10,400 transaction records containing apparent data errors. 
31 
 http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/areas/centres/xfi/research/famafrench/ 
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2/)(2/)( BLSLBHSH  , (44) 
Note that in this model, all the information of individual firm from which SMB and 
HML are formed receives equal weighting. However, as Cremers et al. (2012) 
and Gregory et al. (2013) point out, it may be preferable to construct the Fama-
French factors by value-weighting (rather than equally weighting) the individual 
component portfolios. Therefore, the factors are value-weighted in the data 
available. The UK Fama-French factors are available from Xfi Centre for 
Finance and Investment, University of Exeter Business School.  
The next step is to classify the director roles. In the dataset, there are 3 
columns giving information on the director’s role: these are Role, Director and 
Job title.32. In order to test the information hierarchy hypothesis, directors must 
be split into six categories: CEO (Executive), CFO (Executive), Chairman 
(Executive), Chairman (Non-executive), all other executives, and all other non-
executives.  
The general categories of role are: 
1. Any job with the title Chief Executive, CEO, or similar; managing directors 
with executive positions. (Managing director is often another name for CEO. 
For chief operation/retail/commercial officer, etc., these roles do not fall into 
this category, but are treated as ’Other executives’). Any individual 
combining the role of chief executive with any other role or title is also 
included here 
2. Any executive role containing the word ‘finance’: the finance officer or ’CFO’ 
with an executive position. 
                                                             
32 ‘
Role’ is short for ‘job role’, and includes such position as CEO (Chief Executive Officer), COO 
(Chief Operating Officer) and CFO (Chief Financial Officer). Director is director type where 
D=Executive, N=Non-Executive, E=Company Secretary. The Executive or Non-Executive status 
is as reported by the companies themselves via the regulatory news service and also in their 
Annual Reports and Accounts. The job title is a detailed description of a director’s current 
abbreviated job role, where applicable. 
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3. Any role like Chairman, President, etc. is classed as ‘Chairman’. If they hold 
an executive position, as recorded in the ‘Director’ column (where ’D’ 
denotes an executive and ‘N’ a non-executive), then they are placed in this 
class 
4. Other executives 
5. Other non-executives. 
If an individual holds a combination of roles, they are categorised by the higher-
hierarchy position (e.g. a Chairman & CEO is treated as a CEO; a CFO & 
Company Secretary as a CFO, etc.). A title including vice-, deputy and joint- is 
treated as it would be without this prefix (e.g. a vice-president/chairman is 
treated as a president/chairman). If there is no description in the columns Role 
and Job Title, these positions are classed as ‘Other executives’ or ‘Other non-
executives’ depending on the record in the Director column (’D’ or ’N’).  
Furthermore, it deletes 27,603 transactions which had no description for ‘Role’, 
‘Director’ or ‘Job Title’. A further 49 traders with only E (described as company 
secretary) in the Director column are also deleted. This left with a sample of 
32,648 transactions from 1,037 companies. 
Table 6.1 summarises the statistics of the relationship between director trading, 
firm characteristics and director roles. Panels A and B describe the sample 
characteristics based on firm size and book-to-market ratio. Panel A presents 
director purchases, and Panel B shows director sales. It can be seen that, 
regardless of director purchases or sales, small firms always have a much lower 
number of total transactions than big firms (3,472 vs. 25,889 purchases; 821 vs. 
14,360 sales). But average shares per transaction in director purchases and 
sales in small firms are twice as high as those in big firms (508,669 vs. 156,023 
in purchases; 453,495 vs. 215,413 in sales). 
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For B/M ratio, there are a similar number of purchases transactions in low and 
high B/M firms, while the number of purchases transactions in medium B/M 
firms is more than those in low and high B/M firms combined: the frequency of 
purchases trading in medium B/Ms is more double that in the others. Medium 
B/M firms also trade the largest total number of shares. Meanwhile, high B/M 
firms achieve the lowest number of shares traded on a monthly basis and low 
B/M firms obtain the biggest number of shares per transaction, on average. For 
director sales, the total number of transactions in medium B/M firms is again 
more than that of low and high B/M firms combined. Low B/M firms trade the 
largest total number of shares, and have the highest average of shares per 
trade. Meanwhile, high B/M firms have the smallest total number of shares and 
transactions. 
Panels C and D describe the sample characteristics of director trading by 
director roles, with Panel C showing purchases and Panel D showing sales. 
From Panel C, it can be seen that CEOs trade very frequently. They record 
much higher figures than CFOs in their number of shares traded on monthly 
basis (3,098,464 vs. 913,550), total number of shares (557,723,573 vs. 
164,438,960), total number of transactions (6,728 vs. 3,612) and average 
shares per transaction (82,896 vs. 45,526). 
The sales activities in Panel D are more obvious. CEOs record the highest 
figures among all director roles for number of shares traded on monthly basis 
(2,612,037), total number of shares (470,166,684) and total number of 
transactions (1,454). The Higgs (2003) report shows that the average board 
size of all UK-listed firms is 6.7 consisting of 1 chairman, 3 executive directors, 
and 2.7 non-executive directors on average (p. 18). It is therefore logical that 
CEOs trade most frequently. CEOs may achieve valuable information to 
stimulate them to trade. 
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6.4 Methodology 
This Chapter uses the buy-and-hold abnormal returns and the calendar-time 
approach. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns measure the average multimonth or 
multiyear return from the investment strategy of all firms that complete an event 
and sell at the end of a pre-specified holding period; this is compared to an 
equivalent strategy using otherwise similar non-event firms. In the calendar-time 
approach, an event portfolio is formed for each calendar month: this includes all 
the firms that experienced the event over the months prior to the given month, 
where   refers to the specific investment holding period of event firms. So, if 
one is looking at a 24-month return, one would include all the firms which 
experienced an event in that particular month, y , of the past 24 months. The 
portfolio can be equally-weighted or value-weighted, and the abnormal returns 
can be specified by running a regression of the excess returns on a factor 
model (the calendar-time portfolio regression method, CTPR). 
6.4.1 Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR)  
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns have become the standard method of 
measuring long-run abnormal returns (Barber and Lyon, 1997; Lyon et al., 
1999). 
Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999) argue that BHARs are important 
because they ‘precisely measure investor experience.’ While it is true that 
BHARs capture the investor’s experience from buying and holding securities for 
3–5 years, this is not a particularly compelling reason to restrict attention to this 
methodology, if the objective is a reliable assessment of long-run stock price 
performance. First, the buy-and-hold experience is only one type of investor 
experience. Second, because of compounding, the buy-and-hold abnormal 
performance measure increases over the holding period, giving abnormal 
performance during any portion of the return series. For instance, if abnormal 
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performance exists for only the first 6 months following an event and if one 
calculates 3- and 5-year BHARs, both can be significant, and the 5-year BHAR 
will be larger in magnitude than the 3-year BHAR. This is important to consider, 
since the length of the holding period is arbitrary and various holding period 
intervals are often analysed to determine how long the abnormal performance 
continues after the event. Finally, and most important, this shows that there is 
serious statistical problem with BHARs that cannot be easily corrected. Since 
the objective is to reliably measure abnormal returns, it is imperative that the 
methodology allow for reliable statistical inference. 
It calculates 6-, 12-, 18- and 24-month BHARs for each sample firm’s 
purchasing activities by size-B/M portfolio, using 6 value-weighted, non-
rebalanced, size-B/M portfolios as expected return benchmarks:33  
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where ktiR , is return of firm i in size-B/M portfolio group k on month t. The main 
difference between returns of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and BHARs 
is that CARs ignore compounding, while raw returns and BHARs account for 
it.34 
The mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns is the equal-weighted average of the 
individual BHARs: 
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33 
Returns of 6 equal-weighted benchmark UK portfolios were obtained from the University of 
Exeter Business School website: http://business-
school.exeter.ac.uk/research/areas/centres/xfi/research/famafrench/. 
34 
Barber & Lyon (1997) provide a detailed description of the consequences of such differences 
in event study. 
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The size-B/M portfolio benchmarks are designed to control for the empirical 
relation between expected returns and these two firm characteristics (see Fama 
and French, 1992, 1993 for discussion and evidence). 
6.4.2 The statistical tests 
Since the BHAR is the difference between a sample firm’s 6, 12, 18-, and 24-
month returns and the 6, 12, 18-, and 24-month return on a benchmark portfolio, 
the distribution of individual firm BHARs is strongly positively skewed (Barber 
and Lyon, 1997) and generally does not have a zero mean. Therefore, the 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic is introduced. 
For each portfolio holding time t, it calculates the conventional t-statistic as: 
NBHAR
BHAR
t
ti
t
t
/)( ,

, (47)
 
where tBHAR is the cross sectional sample mean, )( tBHAR  is the cross 
sectional standard deviation, and n  is the number of firms that have director 
purchase activities. Because the data is likely to be skewed, it then corrects 
using Johnson’s (1978) correction: 
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where 

is the coefficient of skewness, and )(/ tt BHARBHARS  . This 
adjustment was advocated by Barber and Lyon (1997), Lyon et al. (1999) and 
Gregory et al. (2010) because of the suspected skewness of BHAR returns. 
As recommended by Sutton (1993) and Lyon et al. (1999), it finds well-specified 
test statistics through a bootstrapped application of this skewness-adjusted test 
statistic. Bootstrapping the test statistic involves drawing b resamples of size nb 
from the original sample. In general, the skewness-adjusted test statistic is 
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calculated in each of these b bootstrapped resamples, and the critical values for 
the transformed test statistics are calculated from the b values of the 
transformed statistics. 
The bootstrapping is carried out as follows: draw 1,000 bootstrapped resamples 
from the original sample of size 4/nnb  .
35  In each resample, calculate the 
statistic: 
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where 
b

is the coefficient of skewness, and )(/ t
bb
t
b BHARBHARS  . Thus, 
btadjSkewness _ , bS , and 
bˆ  are the bootstrapped resample analogues of 
tadjSkewness _ , S , and ˆ from the original sample for the 000,1,,1 b
resamples. The null hypothesis that the mean long-run abnormal return is zero 
is rejected if: 
*_ lxtadjSkewness   or 
*_ uxtadjSkewness  . From the 1,000 
resamples, it calculates the two critical values ( *x s) for the transformed test 
statistic ( tadjSkewness _ ). It can then reject the null hypothesis that the mean 
long-run abnormal returns is zero at the   significance level by solving: 
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6.4.3 Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions (CTPR)  
An alternative approach to measuring long-run stock price performance is to 
track the performance of an event portfolio in calendar time, relative either to an 
explicit asset-pricing model or to some other benchmark. The calendar-time 
                                                             
35
 The choice of 4/nnb  is based on empirical analysis. It is suggested by Lyon et al. (1999). 
An analysis of resampling fewer than n observations can be found in Shao (1996) and Bickel et 
al. (2012).  
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portfolio approach was first used by Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974), and is 
strongly advocated by Fama (1998). Mitchell and Stafford (2000) have a strong 
preference for calendar time methods to allow for cross-sectional correlation. 
The event portfolio is formed each period and includes all companies that have 
completed the event within the prior n  period. By forming event portfolios, the 
cross-sectional correlations of the individual event firm returns are automatically 
accounted for in the portfolio variance at each point in calendar time. Calendar-
time portfolios represent an important improvement over the traditional BHAR 
methodology, which assumes independence of the abnormal returns of each 
individual firm. 
In calendar-time approach methodology an event portfolio is formed for each 
calendar month, and includes all the firms that experienced the event within the 
past n months prior to the given month, where the n refers to the specific 
investment holding period of event firms. So, if one is looking at a 24-month 
return, one would include all the firms which experienced an event in that 
particular month or in y of the past 24 months. The abnormal returns can be 
specified by running a regression of the excess returns on a factor model (e.g. 
the calendar-time portfolio regression method, CTPR). In the CTPR method, the 
excess monthly return of the event portfolio is calculated and regressed against 
the excess market returns, the monthly return on the zero investment portfolio 
for the common size factor in stock returns, and the monthly return on the zero 
investment portfolio for the common book-to-market equity factor in stock 
returns. Fama (1993) shows that size and book-to-market characteristics 
appear to capture a large proportion of the variation in stock returns. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Brav and Gompers (1997) employ the Fama-
French 3-factor model to analyse returns on calendar-time portfolios of firms 
that issue equity. Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974) also use variations of this 
calendar-time portfolio method, and the approach is strongly advocated by 
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Fama (1998). The event portfolio is formed each period to include all companies 
that have completed the event within the prior n periods. By forming event 
portfolios, the cross-sectional correlations of the individual event firm returns are 
automatically accounted for in the portfolio variance at each point in calendar 
time. In light of our strong evidence that the individual event firm abnormal 
returns are cross-sectionally correlated, calendar-time portfolios represent an 
important improvement over the traditional BHAR methodology, which assumes 
independence the abnormal returns of individual firms. 
Many studies have used calendar-time portfolio methods to detect the 
performance of aggregate insider trading and abnormal market returns in the 
US market (Jaffe, 1974; Finnerty, 1976; Seyhun, 1988; Seyhun, 1990; Seyhun, 
1992; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). For the UK, Gregory et al. (2012; 2013) have 
used calendar-time portfolio methods to examine the long-run returns from 
director trading in the UK market, and the effect of gender on both short-run and 
long-run returns. 
The calendar-time portfolio methods offer some advantages over tests using 
either cumulative or buy-and-hold abnormal returns. First, this approach 
eliminates the problem of cross-sectional dependence between sample firms, 
because the returns of sample firms are aggregated into a single portfolio. 
Second, the calendar-time portfolio methods yield more robust test statistics in 
non-random samples. Nonetheless, in non-random samples, calendar-time 
portfolio methods can yield mis-specified test statistics. 
6.4.4 The Fama-French 3-factor Model and Calculating Calendar-Time 
Abnormal Returns (CTARs)  
The excess returns are then regressed against the Fama-French three factors 
(FF3F) as shown below: 
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where Rpt represents event portfolios return in month t, Rft is the risk free rate 
(the 90 day T bill rate), and Rmt is the monthly market return (these three factors 
are zero-investment portfolios representing the excess return of the market). 
The size factor SMB is the difference in returns between a portfolio of small-
capitalisation firms and a portfolio of big-capitalisation firms, and SMB is the 
monthly return on the zero investment portfolio for size factor in stock returns. 
The HML factor is the difference in returns between a portfolio of firms with high 
B/M ratios and a portfolio of firms with low B/M ratios, and HML is the monthly 
return on the zero investment portfolio for common book-to-market equity factor 
in stock returns.    shows the average monthly abnormal return on the portfolio 
of event firms, which is zero under the null of no abnormal performance, given 
the model. 
6.4.5 The Carhart 4-factor Model and Calculating Calendar-Time 
Abnormal Returns (CTARs)  
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993; 2001) show that returns on portfolios formed on 
past returns cannot be explained by differences in size and book-to-market 
characteristics alone. The past returns or momentum is an important factor, and 
is explored by Carhart (1997). Therefore, to account for the momentum effect, it 
will employ the Fama-French 3 factors plus Carhart’s momentum factor, as 
shown below. 
                                                     
where MOMt (the momentum factor) is the difference in the returns of equal-
weighted portfolios of best stocks and worst stocks. The rest of the symbols are 
the same as those used in the Fama-French 3-factor model. The regression 
yields parameter estimates of   ,   ,   ,    and   . The error term in the 
regression is denoted by    . If the Carhart 4-factor model provides a complete 
description of expected returns, then the estimate of the intercept term (  ), 
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which measures mispricing, provides a test of the null hypothesis that the mean 
monthly excess return on the calendar-time portfolio is zero. 
One problem is that the error term (   ) in both of the above regressions may be 
heteroscedastic, since the number of securities in the calendar-time portfolio 
varies from one month to the next. However, this heteroscedasticity does not 
significantly affect the specification of the intercept test in random samples. 
However, a correction for heteroscedasticity can be performed using weighted 
least squares (WLS) estimation, where the weighting factor is based on the 
number of securities in the portfolio in each calendar month. 
Another issue is that, if the model provides only an imperfect description of 
expected returns, the intercept represents the combined effects of mispricing 
and model misspecification. This is what Fama (1970) refers to as the ‘joint-test 
problem’: tests of market efficiency are necessarily joint tests of market 
efficiency and the assumed model of expected returns. 
In the next section, it will present the results of the BHAR and CTPR methods, 
examining the relationship of aggregate director trading with firm characteristics 
and director role. 
6.5 Empirical Results 
6.5.1 Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
6.5.1.1 Monthly Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns with Firm Characteristics 
As discussed in Section 6.4.1, it applies the BHAR methodology to analyse the 
performance of firm characteristics (size and B/M). Table 6.2 presents the 
results. It shows the performance of 6-, 12-, 18- and 24-month holding periods 
of director trading, in Panels A-D respectively.  
Generally, the results of Table 6.2 show that firm characteristics (size and B/M) 
have significant effects on the performance of abnormal returns. For a 6-month 
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holding time (Panel A), all portfolios except small/low and small/high achieve 
significant positive none-zero abnormal returns. The abnormal returns of 
small/medium are 2.19% which is significant at 5% significance level. The 
abnormal returns of big/low, big/medium and big/high are 4.04%, 1.26% and 
2.22%, respectively: they are therefore all significant at 1% significance level. 
Contrastingly, small/low and small/high receive negative insignificant abnormal 
returns (-10.56% and -1.49%). 
In Panel B, the abnormal returns of small/low and small/high are negative but 
insignificant, while small/medium, big/low, big/medium and big/high are 
positively significant. Among these positives, small/medium is 10% significance 
with 1.70% abnormal returns; big/high has 1.80% abnormal returns which are 
significant at 5% significance level; and both big/low and big/medium are 
significant at 1% significance level, with abnormal returns of 7.15% and 1.00%, 
respectively.  
In Panel C, the results once again show that the abnormal returns of small/low 
and small/high are negative, and those of small/medium, big/low, big/medium 
and big/high are positive. However, this time, small/high is negatively significant 
at 10% with -7.62% abnormal returns. Only small/medium and big/low show 
significantly positive abnormal returns at 1% significance level, with 2.84% and 
9.56% each. The abnormal returns of big/medium and big/high do not show 
significance. 
Panel D is consistent with previous panels in that the abnormal returns of 
small/low and small/high are negative, and those of small/medium, big/low, 
big/medium and big/high are positive. Small/high is negatively significant at 1% 
significance level, with -9.15% abnormal returns. Small/medium is positively 
significant at 10% significance level, with 1.69% abnormal returns, and big/low 
receives 9.94% abnormal returns, which is significant at a 1% significance level. 
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A vertical comparison across every portfolio shows that the performance of 
portfolios with different size-B/M is totally different. The BHAR of small/low is 
always negatively insignificant. The abnormal returns of small/medium are 
always positively significant, with a maximum abnormal return of 2.84% in 18-
month holding time. Small/high always receives negative abnormal returns: the 
longer the holding time, the more negative the abnormal returns. The negative 
abnormal returns become significant after 12-month holding time. By contrast, 
big/low always shows positively significant abnormal returns. The longer the 
holding time, the better the abnormal returns and the more significant the t-
value gets. The abnormal returns could reach a maximum of 9.94% in 24-month 
holding time. The performance of big/medium and big/high is similar. Both of 
them get positive abnormal returns in different holding times, and their abnormal 
returns are only significant at 6- and 12-month holding time. Beyond that, 
abnormal returns drop sharply. 
The results of Table 6.2 indicate that the performance of stock movements is 
strongly affected by firm characteristics after director purchasing. Compared to 
the benchmark portfolio, big firms always receive positive abnormal returns. 
Among small firms, only small/medium beats the performance of the benchmark. 
6.5.1.2 Monthly Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns with Firm Characteristics and Director 
Role 
As shown in Table 6.2, firm characteristics affect the performance of portfolios’ 
abnormal returns. Next it splits every size-B/M portfolio into two groups 
according to whether the director trading was executives or non-executives. 
Executives include directors such as CEOs, CFOs, executive chairmen and 
other executives. Non-Executives include non-executive chairmen and other 
non-executives. 36  The results of firm characteristics and director role are 
                                                             
36 
Details of director classification are described in Section 6.3. They can also be seen from 
Table 6.1. 
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presented in Table 6.3. Panels A-D show the performance of 6-, 12-, 18- and 
24-month holding periods, respectively. 
Generally, the abnormal returns of directors are totally different in different size-
B/M firms in post-purchasing time. For a 6-month holding time, the abnormal 
returns of Executives and Non-Executives are all negative in small/low firms, 
while small/medium, big/low, big/medium and big/high are all positive (Panel A). 
This is consistent with the results presented in Panel A, Table 6.2. Moreover, 
most of these positives are significant at least 5% significance level. In 
small/high firms, Executives received positive insignificant abnormal returns of 
1.75%, while the abnormal returns of Non-Executives are -4.92%, which are 
negatively significant at 1% significance level. 
The results of Panel B are also similar to those of Panel B, Table 6.2. For 12-
month holding periods, the abnormal returns of Executives and Non-Executives 
in big/low, big/medium and big/high are all positive, and most of them are 
positively significant at 1% significance level. The abnormal returns of 
Executives and Non-Executives in small/low and small/high are all negative: of 
these, the results for Executives of small/low and Non-Executives of small/high 
are negatively significant (abnormal returns of -9.25% and -5.30%). In 
small/medium firms, abnormal returns of Executives are negatively insignificant, 
while Non-Executives are 5.84%, which is positively significant at 5% 
significance level. 
Panels C and D show the results for 18- and 24-month holding times. The 
abnormal returns of Executives and Non-Executives in big/low and big/high are 
all positively significant at least 5% significance level, while the abnormal 
returns of Executives and Non-Executives in small/low and small/high are all 
negative. The abnormal returns of Executives in small/medium and big/medium 
are negative. Meanwhile, Non-Executives of small/medium and big/medium all 
have positive abnormal returns. However, there are some differences between 
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Panels C and D: the abnormal returns of both Executives and Non-Executives 
in big/low are better in Panel D than in Panel C. The rest of the positive 
abnormal returns decrease. and most of the negative abnormal returns become 
more negative. 
By vertically comparing every portfolio, it can be seen that the abnormal returns 
of both Executives and Non-Executives in small/low firms are all negative. The 
longer the holding time, the more negative the value and the more significant 
the t-value of the abnormal returns. This implies that compared to the 
benchmark, both Executives and Non-Executives in small/low firms do not 
achieve positive abnormal returns after their purchasing trading. 
For small/medium, except for a 6-month holding time, the abnormal returns of 
Executives are all negative: the longer the holding time, the more negative the 
returns. Non-Executives always obtain positively significant abnormal returns. 
Abnormal returns reach peak in 18-month holding time (18.22%) and maintain a 
high level (14.30%) in 24-month holding time. 
For small/high, except for 6-month holding time, abnormal returns of Executives 
are all negative. The abnormal returns of Non-Executives are also negative, and 
reach a trough (-5.30%) at 12-month holding time. The performance of directors 
in small/high firms shows that neither Executives nor Non-Executives could 
make positively significant abnormal returns in different holding time after their 
purchases. 
For big/low, the abnormal returns of both Executives and Non-Executives are 
positively significant at least 5% significance level; and the longer the holding 
time, the better the abnormal returns. 
For big/medium firms, abnormal returns of Executives are positive in 6- and 12-
month holding times, although it is only significant in 6-month (1.37%). In 18-, 
and 24-month holding, Executives’ returns are negatively insignificant; abnormal 
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returns of Non-Executives are all positively significant at 1% significance level, 
but the value decreases with increasing the holding time. The best abnormal 
returns are 3.43% on 6-month holding time. 
For big/high firms, the abnormal returns of Executives and Non-Executives are 
all positively significant at least 5% significance level. The abnormal returns 
reach a peak in the 18-month holding time (4.21% for Executives and 13.00% 
for Non-Executives) and then drop. 
The results of Table 6.3 indicate similar findings to those of Table 6.2: compared 
with the benchmark, the performance of directors in big firms is better than that 
of directors in small firms. Furthermore, among portfolios with positive abnormal 
returns, the performance of Non-Executives seems better than that of 
Executives. There is just one exception: in big/low firms, Executives are much 
better than Non-Executives in different holding times. Where there are points of 
inconsistency between the findings of Tables 6.2 and 6.3, these are probably 
caused by the sample data described in Section 6.3: there are some 
transactions which for which it has information on firm characteristics but not on 
director trading (some director trading data have no executives/non-executives 
information). In other words, the sample of Table 6.3 is not exactly the same as 
that of Table 6.2. 
6.5.2 Calendar-Time Abnormal Returns 
As discussed in Section 6.4, the methodology of calendar-time abnormal 
returns is better for presenting cross-sectional data. Therefore, it applies Fama-
French 3-factor models, to examine the relationship between abnormal returns, 
firm characteristics and director role.37 
                                                             
37 
It uses the same UK Fama-French 3 factors data as Gregory et al. (2013). Data taken from: 
http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/areas/centres/xfi/research/famafrench/ 
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6.5.2.1 Calendar-Time Abnormal Returns with Firm Characteristics 
Table 6.4 presents the results of Fama-French 3-factor calendar time portfolio 
regressions of firm characteristics (size and B/M). Panels A-D display the 
performance of director purchasing trading in 6-, 12-, 18- and 24-month holding 
periods respectively. 
For 6-month holding time, all firms except small/low achieve positively 
significant abnormal returns (Panel A). Among these positive returns, those of 
small/medium, small/high, big/low and big/high are all significant at 1% 
significance level, while big/medium is significant at 10% significance level. 
Small/high firms get the best abnormal returns (2.76% per month). 
The results for 12-month holding periods (Panel B) are similar. The abnormal 
returns of small/low are negatively insignificant, and the rest are all positive. 
However, the monthly abnormal returns and the magnitude of significant levels 
are lower than those shown in Panel A. The abnormal returns of small/medium 
are 2.57% with 1% significance on 6-month holding, but falls to 1.04% with 10% 
significance on 12-month holding time. On 6-month holding, small/high firms 
receive 2.76% abnormal returns per month with significance at 1% significance 
level, but on 12-month holding periods, the firms get 1.56% abnormal returns 
with 5% significance. The abnormal returns of big/low firms drop sharply from 
1.90% with 1% significance in Panel A, to only 0.03% in Panel B. Big/medium 
firms maintain their abnormal returns and significance: the firms obtain 1.56% 
abnormal returns per month on 6-month holding, and 1.53% on 12-month 
holding. Both of these returns are significant at a 10% significance level. The 
abnormal returns of big/high decrease from 2.10% per month with 1% 
significance in Panel A, to 1.22% with 10% significance in Panel B. 
Panels C and D show the results for 18- and 24-month holding periods. 
Consistently with Panels A and B, the abnormal returns of small/low firms are 
negative, while the rest are positive. However, none of firms shows any 
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significance. This means that after a 12-month holding time, by controlled 
excess returns of market index, size and B/M effects (Fama-French 3 factors), 
no firm group could not make any significant none-zero abnormal returns. 
The findings of Table 6.4 are that small/low firms make negative abnormal 
returns, none of which were significant. The rest of the firm groups achieved 
positive abnormal returns, but none of them made any significant, none-zero 
abnormal returns beyond 12-month holding time. The firm groups small/medium, 
small/high, big/medium and big/high could achieve positively significant 
abnormal returns on 6- and 12-month holding times; however, the value of 
these abnormal returns decreases. Big/low firms could only make positively 
significant abnormal returns on 6-month holding time. After that, the value and 
significance magnitude of the abnormal returns dropped sharply to almost zero. 
Generally, these results indicate that both small and big firms could make 
positive significant abnormal returns, as could medium and high B/M firms. 
6.5.2.2 Calendar-Time Abnormal Returns with Firm Characteristics and Director Role 
Like Table 6.3, Table 6.5 splits every size-B/M portfolio into two director groups: 
Executives and Non-Executives. Panels A-D present the performance of 
directors’ abnormal returns on 6-, 12-, 18- and 24-month holding periods 
respectively. 
For 6-month holding time (Panel A), both Executives and Non-Executives of 
big/medium and big/high firms make positively significant abnormal returns. 
Meanwhile, Executives of small/medium and small/high and Non-Executives of 
big/low firms also obtain positively significant abnormal returns. Directors in 
small/low firms do not achieve significant abnormal returns. 
Panel B shows the results for 12-month holding periods, where only Executives 
of small/high and big/high and Non-Executives of big/medium had positive 
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significant abnormal returns. Of these, only Executives of small/high make 1% 
significant abnormal returns (1.87% per month). 
For 18-month holding time (Panel C), only Executives of small/high firms 
achieved positively significant abnormal returns of 1.76% per month, which are 
significant at 1% significance level. The abnormal returns of directors in the rest 
of the firm groups are insignificant. 
In Panel D (24-month holding periods), no Executives or Non-Executives in any 
firm groups show significant abnormal returns. Only Executives of small/high 
firms come close to the 10% significant level (1.36% abnormal returns per 
month with WLS t-value 1.57). 
The findings of Table 6.5 are consistent with those of Table 6.4 that almost 
abnormal returns occur on 6- and 12-month holding times. Both Executives and 
Non-Executives in big firms obtain positively significant abnormal returns; 
meanwhile, in small firms (small/medium and small/high), only Executives could 
receive positively significant abnormal returns. However, the results here differ 
from those of Table 6.4, as on 18-month holding time, Executives of small/high 
firms could still get 1% significant abnormal returns (1.76% per month). 
All these findings indicate that, regardless of the firm’s B/M, directors in all big 
firms (except Executives of big/low firms) could get significant abnormal returns 
on 6-month holding time. Some of them even continued to receive abnormal 
returns until 12-month holding time. Furthermore, Executives of small/high firms 
could make very positively significant none-zero abnormal returns up until the 
18-month holding time: this implies that they have access to some superior 
information about the companies, which helps them to make a better profit than 
other investors, including Non-Executives in their companies. Another 
interesting result is that, in big/low and big/medium firms, the performance of 
Non-Executives is better than that of Executives. This is probably because Non-
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Executives in these firm groups are more independent to make sensitive 
judgements, based not only on company information but also on competitors of 
the company, movements in the industry, market and macroeconomy. 
6.5.3 Calendar-Time Abnormal Returns with Director Roles 
Sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 discussed firm characteristics and director roles; this 
Section, however, will focus only on directors’ trading activities by role, using the 
methodology of calendar-time abnormal returns. 
6.5.3.1 Calendar-Time Abnormal Returns (Fama-French 3-factor model) 
Table 6.6 presents the results of the calendar-time abnormal returns using 
Fama-French 3-factor model. It applies 1-, 3-, 6-, 12-, 18- and 24-month holding 
periods of director purchase transactions. As described in Section 6.3, directors 
are classified into 6 groups: CEOs, CFOs, Executive Chairmen, Non-Executive 
Chairmen, other Executives and other Non-Executives. 
For 1-month holding time, the abnormal returns of all groups of director are 
positively significant at 1% significant level. CFOs obtain 3.62% abnormal 
returns per month, which is the best performance among all directors. Executive 
Chairmen and Non-Executive Chairmen achieve the second- and third-best 
abnormal returns respectively (2.97% and 2.96%). Other Non-Executives 
receive 2.66% monthly abnormal returns; CEOs obtain 2.24% per month, which 
is just higher than the Other Executives (2.21%). 
For 3-month holding period, the abnormal returns of all director groups are 
positive. All of them are significant at least 10% significance level, except 
Executive and Non-Executive Chairmen. As with 1-month holdings, CFOs 
received the best abnormal returns (2.04% per month). Other Non-Executives 
get the second-best result with 1.83% abnormal returns per month. Executive 
Chairmen come third (but the value is not significant), followed by Other 
Executives and Non-Executive Chairmen. Surprisingly, although the abnormal 
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returns of CEOs are significant at 10% significance level, the value is the lowest 
among director groups: CEOs achieved only 0.79% monthly abnormal returns. 
For 6-month holding periods, the abnormal returns of CFOs, Other Executives 
and Other Non-Executives are all positively significant at 5%. The other results 
do not show any significance. Executive Chairmen get the best abnormal 
returns, followed by CFOs. Other Non-Executives and Other Executives obtain 
1.14% and 0.85% abnormal returns per month respectively. CEOs receive only 
0.35% monthly abnormal returns. The abnormal returns of Non-Executive 
Chairmen are just 0.11% per month, which is insignificant and close to zero. 
Beyond the 6-month holding time, none of the director groups makes positively 
significant abnormal returns. Moreover, Executive Chairmen and Other Non-
Executives obtain negative insignificant abnormal returns for the 24-month 
holding period. 
Table 6.6 finds that directors could make positively significant abnormal returns 
within 6-month holding time. All kinds of directors could achieve positively 
significant abnormal returns at 1% significance level one month after purchasing 
activities. The abnormal returns of CFOs get the highest value on 1- and 3-
month holding time; this partially support the information hypothesis, that 
directors like CEOs and CFOs who are familiar with the day-to-day operations 
of the company trade on more valuable information. However, CEOs, who 
should also have more valuable information than other directors, do not perform 
well. 
One interesting phenomenon is the performance of Executive Chairmen. During 
1-, 3- and 6-month holding time, Executive Chairmen get very high abnormal 
returns; however, the magnitude of t-statistics is much smaller than for other 
director groups. This is probably due to the fact that there are fewer 
observations. As it can see from Table 6.1, it only has records of 1,351 
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purchase transactions by Executive Chairmen over 180 calendar months, which 
means that there are less than 10 transactions per month on average. 
Insufficient trading frequency could damage the reliability or credibility of the 
results of calendar-time abnormal returns. If it does not consider the 
performance of Executive Chairmen, the abnormal returns of CFOs are the best 
in 6-month holding time, which better fits with the information hypothesis. 
6.5.3.2 Calendar-Time Abnormal Returns (Carhart 4-factor model) 
It also applies calendar-time abnormal returns using Carhart 4-factor model 
(Appendix R). The Carhart 4-factor model leads to similar results to those of the 
Fama-French 3-factor model. Most differences are in the magnitude of the 
abnormal returns. Furthermore, the WLS t-value of the Carhart 4-factor model is 
smaller and weaker than that of Fama-French 3-factor model, which implies that 
the momentum factor somehow replaces and smoothes abnormal returns of 
directors. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the market reaction to director trading, and its 
relationship with firm characteristics, director role and the information hierarchy 
hypothesis. The performance of both firm characteristics and director roles 
shows that directors do successfully make significant abnormal return after their 
purchases. It has also found some evidence for the information hypothesis, in 
the form of CFOs’ performance on 1-, 3-, and 6-month holding periods as 
shown through calendar-time abnormal returns (CTAR) methodology with 
Fama-French 3 factor and Carhart 4 factor models. However, results on the 
abnormal returns of CEOs do not have sufficient evidence to support the 
hypothesis. 
To examine the performance of firm characteristics and director roles, it used 
the methodology of BHAR and CTAR. Empirical evidence indicates that the 
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performance of stock movements is affected by firm characteristics and director 
roles. Generally, the results show that both small and big firms can make 
positive significant abnormal returns, as can medium and high B/M firms. 
Executives and Non-Executives in big firms always get positively significant 
abnormal returns. 
The results of the information hypothesis test indicate that all directors make 
positively significant abnormal returns one month after their purchases. The 
performance of CFOs supports the hypothesis within 6-month holding time. 
Although CEOs are assumed to have the same superior knowledge about their 
company’s prospects as CFOs, the results of CEO trading do not support the 
hypothesis. One possible explanation is that CFOs’ purchases may be pursuing 
longer-term post-trade return, while other directors try to make a quick profit 
when they trade. Another plausible explanation for this result is proposed by 
Fidrmuc et al. (2006), who state that the FSA, the regulators and market may 
follow the transactions of CEOs more closely, which causes these directors to 
trade more cautiously and at less informed moments. Also, trades of CFOs are 
more informative than other directors. This might suggest that aggregate 
director trading of CFOs might be more informative of market Movements and 
future changes in GDP. Therefore, future work would investigate this.  
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Table 6.1  Sample Characteristics of Directors' Trading From January 1994 to December 2008 
 
 Panel A: Purchases Small Firms Big Firms Low B/M Medium B/M High B/M 
No. of Shares Traded on 
Monthly Basis 
                
9,810,433  
              
22,440,895  
                                  
13,474,002  
                                     
18,157,419  
                          
7,004,301  
Total No. of Shares 
        
1,765,877,850  
        
4,039,361,120  
                            
2,425,320,308  
                               
3,268,335,347  
                   
1,260,774,165  
Total No. of Transactions 
                         
3,472  
                      
25,889  
                                             
8,476  
                                    
20,553  
                           
8,673  
Average shares* 
                    
508,669  
                    
156,023  
                                        
286,155  
                                       
159,021  
                        
145,373  
Total No. of Month 
                            
180  
                            
180  
                                                 
180  
                                      
180  
                     
180  
 Panel B: Sales  Small Firms   Big Firms   Low B/M  Medium B/M  High B/M  
No. of Shares Traded on 
Monthly Basis 
                
2,067,313  
              
17,184,781  
                                  
10,980,959  
                                       
9,188,858  
                        
2,673,448  
Total No. of Shares 
            
372,116,316  
        
3,093,260,625  
                            
1,976,572,658  
                               
1,653,994,509  
                       
481,220,717  
Total No. of Transactions 
                            
821  
                      
14,360  
                                             
5,789  
                                      
9,716  
                         
2,642  
Average shares* 
                    
453,495  
                    
215,413  
                                        
341,428  
                                       
170,231  
                       
182,212  
Total No. of Month 
                            
180  
                            
180  
                                                 
180  
                                      
180  
                         
180  
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Table 6.1 (Continued) 
 
 Panel C: Purchases CEO  CFO Chairman (Exe) Chairman(Non) Other Exe Other Non 
No. of Shares Traded on 
Monthly Basis 
           
3,098,464               913,550           3,352,591           2,269,536            1,094,222           5,225,615  
Total No. of Shares 
      
557,723,573       164,438,960       603,466,436       408,516,440      196,959,940       940,610,760  
Total No. of Transactions 
                 
6,728                   3,612                   1,351                   3,737                   4,628                   6,787  
Average shares* 
             
 82,896                 45,526               446,681               109,317                 42,558               138,590  
Total No. of Month 
                   
 180                     180                     180                     180                     180                     180  
 Panel D: Sales CEO  CFO Chairman (Exe) Chairman(Non) Other Exe Other Non 
No. of Shares Traded on 
Monthly Basis 
          
2,612,037               196,146            1,645,712            1,055,475               977,053            2,370,610  
Total No. of Shares 
       
470,166,684          35,306,279        296,228,163        189,985,555        175,869,594        426,709,771  
Total No. of Transactions 
                  
1,454                     783                      524                      511                  1,333                   1,200  
Average shares* 
             
323,361                45,091              565,321              371,792               131,935               355,591  
Total No. of Month 
                   
 180                    180                   180                    180                    180                    180 
* The average shares in Panels A to D are per transaction.         
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Table 6.2  Monthly Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) of Director 
Purchases for Firm Characteristics defined by size and B/M from January 
1994 to December 2008 
 
 
 

T
t
T
t
k
tbenchmark
k
tii RRBHAR
1 1
,, )1()1(  Where 
k
tiR ,  presents return of firm i in size-B/M 
portfolio group k on month t. 
k
benchmarkR  presents return of control portfolio k based on size-B/M, it 
is from http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/areas/centres/xfi/research/famafrench/ . 
Small low denotes small firms with low B/M, small medium denotes small firms with medium 
B/M, small high denotes small firms with high B/M, big low denotes big firms with low B/M, big 
medium denotes big firms with medium B/M, and big high denotes big firms with high B/M 
formed on the basis of their size and the B/M ratios. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for the two-tailed hypothesis test that 
the null hypothesis of no monthly excess return when post trading period is 6, 12, 18 and 24 
months. Skewness-adjusted t-value presents in the table.  
 
 Purchases   Purchases 
Panel A 6-month t-value    Panel C 18-month t-value   
Small Low -10.56% -1.02  Small Low -16.39% -1.44  
Small Medium 2.19% 2.24 **  Small Medium 2.84% 2.71 *** 
Small High -1.49% -0.70   Small High -7.62% -1.66 * 
Big Low 4.04% 5.16 *** Big Low 9.56% 11.54 *** 
Big Medium 1.26% 4.79 ***  Big Medium 0.32% 0.79  
Big High 2.22% 3.61 ***  Big High 0.67% 0.75  
Panel B 12-month t-value    Panel D 24-month t-value   
Small Low -14.09% -1.18  Small Low -16.93% -1.37  
Small Medium 1.70% 1.90 *  Small Medium 1.69% 1.90 * 
Small High -6.32% -0.68  Small High -9.15% -7.00 *** 
Big Low 7.15% 8.14 *** Big Low 9.94% 16.17 *** 
Big Medium 1.00% 3.26 ***  Big Medium 0.09% 0.33  
Big High 1.80% 2.33 **  Big High 0.13% 0.46  
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Table 6.3  Monthly Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) of Director 
Purchases with Firm Characteristics and Director Role from January 1994 to 
December 2008 



T
t
tbenchmark
T
t
tii RRBHAR
1
,
1
, )1()1( where tiR , presents portfolio returns of sample 
based on size-B/M. benchmarkR presents return of control portfolios based on size-B/M, it is from 
http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/areas/centres/xfi/research/famafrench/ (University of 
Exeter). Small low denotes small firms with low B/M, small medium denotes small firms with 
medium B/M, small high denotes small firms with high B/M, big low denotes big firms with low 
B/M, big medium denotes big firms with medium B/M, and big high denotes big firms with high 
B/M formed on the basis of their size and the B/M ratios. Exe denotes Executives which include 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Executive Chairman, and other 
Executives exclude CEO, CFO and Executive Chairman. Non denotes Non-Executives which 
include Non-Executive Chairman and other Non-Executives exclude Non-Executive Chairman. 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively, for the two-tailed hypothesis test that the null hypothesis of no monthly excess 
return when post trading period is 6, 12, 18 and 24 months. Skewness-adjusted t-value 
presents in the table.  
 
  Purchases    Purchases 
Panel A   6-month t-value    Panel C   18-month t-value   
Small Low 
Exe -7.53% -1.23  
Small Low 
Exe -12.96% -6.32 *** 
Non -5.17% -0.90   Non -6.55% -1.49  
Small 
Medium 
Exe 1.71% 1.24   Small 
Medium 
Exe -3.92% -1.43  
Non 4.99% 3.59 *** Non 18.22% 3.31 *** 
Small High 
Exe 1.75% 1.47   
Small High 
Exe -3.29% -0.79  
Non -4.92% -5.72 *** Non -3.92% -1.88 * 
Big Low 
Exe 4.21% 4.03 *** 
Big Low 
Exe 11.06% 9.49 *** 
Non 3.10% 2.26 **  Non 5.65% 4.02 *** 
Big 
Medium 
Exe 1.37% 2.69 ***  Big 
Medium 
Exe -1.25% -0.66  
Non 3.43% 5.14 *** Non 3.16% 3.36 *** 
Big High 
Exe 1.22% 3.12 ***  
Big High 
Exe 4.21% 2.43 ** 
Non 1.88% 2.81 ***  Non 13.00% 6.91 *** 
Panel B   12-month t-value    Panel D   24-month t-value   
Small Low 
Exe -9.25% -3.68 *** 
Small Low 
Exe -12.48% -9.05 *** 
Non -6.00% -1.48   Non -15.90% -3.04 *** 
Small 
Medium 
Exe -2.21% -1.07   Small 
Medium 
Exe -4.96% -0.67  
Non 5.84% 2.16 **  Non 14.30% 5.66 *** 
Small High 
Exe -0.93% -0.19   
Small High 
Exe -14.43% -1.25  
Non -5.30% -1.99 **  Non -3.24% -1.53  
Big Low 
Exe 8.07% 6.94 *** 
Big Low 
Exe 11.46% 12.74 *** 
Non 4.80% 3.37 *** Non 6.08% 5.27 *** 
Big 
Medium 
Exe 0.42% 0.87   Big 
Medium 
Exe -1.52% -0.12  
Non 3.22% 3.86 *** Non 2.26% 2.72 *** 
Big High 
Exe 3.72% 2.67 *** 
Big High 
Exe 1.95% 1.99 ** 
Non 8.24% 4.82 ***  Non 6.92% 4.62 *** 
 
 
 Page 177 of 224 
 
Table 6.4  Alphas from the Fama-French 3 Factor Calendar Time Portfolio 
Regressions for Firm Characteristics defined by Size and B/M from January 
1994 to December 2008 
 
This table reports the calendar-time abnormal returns using WLS regression for 6 months, 12 
months, 18 months and 24 months holding periods. AR is monthly abnormal returns. The 
abnormal returns are the αs from the regression Rpt − Rft = αi + βi (Rmt − Rft ) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + 
εit. Rpt is the simple return on the calendar-time portfolio. Rft is the return on the 90-day Treasury 
Bills. Rmt is the return on index of FTSE All Share. SMB is the return to a small minus big factor 
mimicking portfolio, and HML is the return to high B/M minus low B/M factor mimicking portfolio. 
Small low denotes small firms with low B/M, small medium denotes small firms with medium 
B/M, small high denotes small firms with high B/M, big low denotes big firms with low B/M, big 
medium denotes big firms with medium B/M, and big high denotes big firms with high B/M 
formed on the basis of their size and the B/M ratios. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for the two-tailed hypothesis test that 
the coefficient equals zero. T-value presents in the table.  
 
Panel A 
Purchases  
Panel C 
Purchases 
6-month AR   WLS-t    18-month AR   WLS-t   
Small Low -0.74%  -1.62    Small Low -0.31%  -0.82   
Small Medium 2.57%  3.13  *** Small Medium 0.71%  1.56   
Small High 2.76%  3.29  *** Small High 0.97%  1.52   
Big Low 1.90%  2.99  *** Big Low 0.01%  0.06   
Big Medium 1.56%  1.94  *  Big Medium 0.62%  1.28   
Big High 2.10%   3.76  ***  Big High 0.90%   1.54    
 Purchases   Purchases 
 Panel B 12-month AR   WLS-t     Panel D 24-month AR   WLS-t   
Small Low -0.33%  -0.92    Small Low -0.30%  -0.71   
Small Medium 1.04%  1.68  *  Small Medium 0.19%  0.49   
Small High 1.56%  2.14  **  Small High 0.81%  1.27   
Big Low 0.03%  0.25    Big Low 0.03%  0.05   
Big Medium 1.53%  1.85  *  Big Medium 0.57%  0.87   
Big High 1.22%   1.73  *  Big High 0.30%   0.83    
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Table 6.5  Post-trade long-run CTAR of Director Purchases by Firm 
Characteristics and Director Role Using the Fama-French 3 Factor Model for 
Holding Periods of 6-, 12-, 18- and 24-Month from January 1994 to December 
2008 
 
Panel A  Purchase  Panel C  Purchase 
    6-month AR WLS-t        18-month AR WLS-t   
Small Low 
Exe 0.52% 1.02    
Small Low 
Exe -0.59% -1.36   
Non -0.10% -0.35    Non -0.86% -1.54   
Small 
Medium 
Exe 1.78% 2.85  *** Small 
Medium 
Exe 0.42% 1.20   
Non 1.03% 1.56    Non 0.57% 1.04   
Small High 
Exe 2.53% 3.11  *** 
Small High 
Exe 1.76% 2.73  *** 
Non -0.86% -1.43    Non -0.76% -1.04   
Big Low 
Exe -0.68% -1.54    
Big Low 
Exe -0.55% -1.23   
Non 1.90% 3.16  *** Non 0.12% 0.37   
Big Medium 
Exe 1.08% 2.25  **  
Big Medium 
Exe 0.36% 0.94   
Non 1.65% 2.67  *** Non 0.77% 1.01   
Big High 
Exe 3.99% 4.45  *** 
Big High 
Exe 0.87% 1.52   
Non 0.77% 1.66  *  Non 0.61% 1.40    
  Purchase    Purchase 
Panel B   12-month AR WLS-t    Panel D   24-month AR WLS-t   
Small Low 
Exe 0.06% 0.27    
Small Low 
Exe -0.44% -0.90   
Non -0.72% -1.62    Non -0.82% -1.44   
Small 
Medium 
Exe 0.97% 1.51    Small 
Medium 
Exe 0.63% 1.29   
Non 0.67% 1.55    Non 0.14% 0.26   
Small High 
Exe 1.87% 3.09  *** 
Small High 
Exe 1.36% 1.57   
Non -0.67% -1.41    Non -0.11% -0.24   
Big Low 
Exe -0.98% -1.37    
Big Low 
Exe -0.45% -0.94   
Non 0.67% 1.49    Non 0.11% 0.21   
Big Medium 
Exe 0.51% 1.05    
Big Medium 
Exe 0.14% 0.30   
Non 1.45% 1.82  *  Non 0.79% 1.05   
Big High 
Exe 0.76% 1.66  *  
Big High 
Exe 0.82% 1.25   
Non 0.76% 1.03     Non 0.07% 0.18    
 
ARs are intercepts from Fama-French regression of the calendar time portfolio on a market 
factor, a size factor and a book-to-market factor. Weighted Least Squares estimation, 
where the weighting factor is based o the number of securities in the portfolio in each 
calendar month, is applied.  
Small low denotes small firms with low B/M, small medium denotes small firms with 
medium B/M, small high denotes small firms with high B/M, big low denotes big firms with 
low B/M, big medium denotes big firms with medium B/M, and big high denotes big firms 
with high B/M formed on the basis of their size and the B/M ratios. Exe denotes Executives 
which include Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Executive 
Chairman, and other Executives exclude CEO, CFO and Executive Chairman. Non 
denotes Non-Executives which include Non-Executive Chairman and other Non-Executives 
exclude Non-Executive Chairman.  
ittitiftmtiiftpt HMLhSMBsRRRR   )(
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Table 6.5 (Continued) 
 
Rpt is the simple return on the calendar-time portfolio, Rft is the return on the 90-day 
Treasury Bills, Rmt is the return on index of FTSE All Share, SMBt is the difference in the 
returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and big stocks, HMLt is the difference 
in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-
market stocks. The estimate of the intercept term (αi), provides a test of the null hypothesis 
that the mean monthly excess return on the calendar -time portfolio is zero.  
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, with t-statistics in 
parentheses.  
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Table 6.6  Post-trade long-run CTAR of Director Purchases by Director Role 
Using the Fama-French 3 Factor Model for Holding Periods of 1-, 3-, 6-, 12-, 
18- and 24-Month from January 1994 to December 2008 
 
Director 
Group 
1-month 
AR 
3-month 
AR 
6-month 
AR 
12-month 
AR 
18-month 
AR 
24-month 
AR 
       
CEO 
2.24% 0.79% 0.35% 0.46% 0.34% 0.18% 
(4.31)*** (1.81)* (0.83) (1.20) (0.91) (0.48) 
CFO 
3.62% 2.04% 1.31% 0.41% 0.27% 0.40% 
(4.40)*** (3.65)*** (2.58)** (0.87) (0.62) (0.92) 
Chair Exe 
2.97% 1.39% 1.51% 0.80% 0.39% -0.08% 
(2.74)*** (1.59) (1.64) (1.25) (0.68) (-0.18) 
Chair Non 
2.96% 0.93% 0.11% 0.60% 0.63% 0.55% 
(3.47)*** (1.52) (0.21) (1.30) (1.29) (1.21) 
Other Exe 
2.21% 1.31% 0.85% 0.42% 0.26% 0.08% 
(3.84)*** (3.04)*** (2.05)** (1.15) (0.70) (0.21) 
Other Non 
2.66% 1.83% 1.14% 0.35% 0.25% -0.16% 
(3.37)*** (3.09)*** (2.39)** (0.80) (0.60) (-0.39) 
 
ARs are intercepts from Fama-French regression of the calendar time portfolio on a market 
factor, a size factor and a book-to-market factor. Weighted Least Squares estimation, 
where the weighting factor is based o the number of securities in the portfolio in each 
calendar month, is applied.  
CEO: Chief Executive Officer; CFO: Chief Financial Officer; Chair Exe: Executive 
Chairman; Chair Non: Non-Executive Chairman; Other Exe: Other Executives exclude 
CEO, CFO and Executive Chairman; Other Non: Other Non-Executives exclude Non-
Executive Chairman.  
Rpt is the simple return on the calendar-time portfolio, Rft is the return on the 90-day 
Treasury Bills, Rmt is the return on index of FTSE All Share, SMBt is the difference in the 
returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and big stocks, HMLt is the difference 
in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-
market stocks. The estimate of the intercept term (αi), provides a test of the null hypothesis 
that the mean monthly excess return on the calendar-time portfolio is zero.  
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, with t-value in 
parentheses. 
ittitiftmtiiftpt HMLhSMBsRRRR   )(
 Page 181 of 224 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.1 Conclusion 
The majority of the work in this thesis focuses on long-run director trading 
(director trading accumulated over long periods) in the UK market. Chapter 4 
tests the relationship between aggregate director trading and future market 
excess returns, and Chapter 5 goes further to investigate the link between 
aggregate director trading and future UK economic change. Chapter 4 and 5 
are long-run director trading studies focused on macro-aspects. In Chapter 6, it 
investigates long-run director trading focused on more micro-aspects. It checks 
whether director trading with firm characteristics affects the performance of 
abnormal returns and whether the information hierarchy hypothesis is supported 
by UK data. 
The main aim of the thesis is to examine long-run trading patterns and returns 
based on characteristics of the trades and trader themselves, rather than those 
of the firms in which they trade. Chapter 4 researches aggregate director 
trading to discover whether directors are contrarian and whether aggregate 
director trading could forecast future market excess returns. The advanced 
study in Chapter 5 aims to detect whether aggregate director trading is a 
leading indicator of future economic activities. Chapter 6 concentrates on the 
long-run relationship between director trading, firm characteristics and director 
role (CEO, CFO, executive chairman, non-executive chairman, other executives 
and other non-executives). It aims to discover whether director trading with firm 
characteristics affect the performance of stock abnormal returns, and whether 
the performance of director trading by different types of director supports the 
information hierarchy hypothesis in long-run study. 
Chapter 4 documents a strong, significant positive relationship between past 
aggregate director trading and future market excess returns, by following 
methodology of Seyhun (1988; 1992) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001). The 
results find evidence that directors are contrarian. They increase their stock 
purchases prior to an increase in the stock market, and decrease their stock 
purchases following increases in the stock market. By applying long-run CER 
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and BHER time series models (Seyhun, 1992; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001), it 
finds that aggregate director trading has a ability to forecast future excess 
market returns. Evidence here shows that aggregate director trading of both 
large and small firms is positively significant, with predictive power of future 
excess returns of large and small firm portfolios.  
Due to various the fiscal year-ends of companies listed on LSE and to UK 
regulation requirements, this thesis introduced several seasonal adjustment 
measurements, to more accurately describe director trading. Furthermore, it 
employs a variety of measurements of director trading (net number of purchase 
transactions, the net purchase ratio, the difference of net purchase ratio, the 
difference of net purchase transaction, and the growth rate of net purchases). 
Evidence in Chapter 4 suggests that director trading has the power to forecast 
future market excess returns: the predictability of market excess returns 
increases with the length of forecasting horizon and the number of months of 
past director trading. 
One major contribution of this study to the UK literature is that it finds evidence 
linking aggregate director trading to future economic growth. After confirming 
the relationship between aggregate director trading and future market excess 
return in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 finds that aggregate director trading is positively 
significant and has good explanatory power to forecast future movements of the 
economy. In other words, aggregate director trading is one reliable leading 
indicator of the UK economy. Aggregate director trading retains marginal 
explanatory power when business cycle variables are introduced as 
independent variables. This suggests that aggregate director trading captures 
some element of market factors (SMB, HML and MKT) and business cycle 
variables (dividend yield of FTSE All share, growth rate of industrial production 
and term spread) which is unrelated to movement in future real activity. 
Finally, this thesis introduces into the UK literature the theme of the market’s 
reaction to director trading, based on firm characteristics and the information 
hierarchy hypothesis. In Chapter 6, it considers the effects of long-run director 
trading with firm characteristics and director trading patterns on the market 
timing and the subsequent market reaction to director’s trades. Using long-run 
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BHAR and calendar time portfolio regression with Fama-French 3-factor and 
Carhart 4-factor models, it finds that directors can make significant abnormal 
returns after they purchase the stocks of their own companies. Empirical work 
shows that firm characteristics (size and B/M ratio) of director trading do have 
significant impact on the performance of abnormal returns. Firms with small 
capitalisation and high B/M ratio achieve significant abnormal returns. It also 
finds some evidence to support the information hierarchy hypothesis, as CFOs 
do better than other members of the board of directors in the short-run after 
their purchase activities. However, CEOs, who also have the best knowledge 
about their company’s prospects and are able to achieve more valuable 
information, do not perform better than other directors. 
7.2 Limitations of the Research 
There are some specific limitations on the work of Chapters 4 to 6, which will be 
discussed below. 
Chapter 4 only applies the director trading with firm size control as robustness 
test. It does not use B/M ratio data because the Dataset LSPD does not have 
B/M information, and Datastream could output very little B/M information of 
sample companies for the period 1986-1993. The time period of director trading 
covers in this thesis is 1986-2008: if it deletes the data from 1986 to 1993, it 
sacrifices more than one third of data time. This may lead to biased results, as it 
would not have director trading data from a long enough period to run a long-
run time series model. Furthermore, as mentioned by Gregory et al. (2011), for 
UK-list companies, it has an issue that there are small illiquid firms in the 
sample. This may lead to potential problem that it fails to output sufficient data 
about these small illiquid firms when forming the portfolios. 
Chapter 5 uses nominal and real GDP to denote economic activity, and applies 
dividend yield of FTSE All Share, growth rate of industrial production and term 
spread to proxy business cycle movement. However, it is also valuable to check 
other business cycle macroeconomic variables (unemployment claims, real 
value of manufacture’s new orders for consumer goods and materials, monetary 
growth rate, etc) to check the performance of aggregate director trading. 
Another potential problem is that GDP is measured quarterly, so in sample 
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period of 23 years (1986-2008) there are only 92 observations. Even using 
overlapping measurement with Newey-West t-test methodology, it still does not 
have sufficient data on GDP, which may lead to biased results. 
In Chapter 6, it forms 6 groups of firms (small/low, small/medium, small/high, 
big/low, big/medium and big/high) to compare director trading with firm 
characteristics. It may therefore be valuable to check the results using with 
other firm classifications: for example, by looking at small and big firms or low 
B/M and high B/M firms separately. Another limitation related to the finding is 
that abnormal returns of 1-month to 6-month post-purchase are significantly 
higher for CFOs than for other director: it only runs a long-run calendar time 
portfolio regression model, and does not apply short-run event study 
methodology to further test this finding. One limitation is that, while the long-run 
calendar time methodology has the statistical power to detect abnormal returns, 
these estimates do not allow for analysis of long-run abnormal returns within a 
fixed-effects regression framework. Another limitation is that, if the model 
provides only an imperfect description of expected returns, then the intercept 
represents the combined effects of mispricing and model misspecification. This 
is what Fama (1970) refers to as the ‘joint-test problem’. 
7.3 Suggestions for Future Research 
There are several ways in which the work of these chapters could be extended. 
Chapter 4 examines director trading within a time series framework. The 
findings show that aggregate director trading indicate future market excess 
returns, and that the longer the future market excess returns and past director 
trading, the better explanatory power aggregate director trading gets. If the time 
length of data is long enough, it could build on this result by splitting the sample 
into different time periods based on economic change or regulation of director 
trading changes, to examine the performance of aggregate director trading. If 
data on recent director trading is available, it could examine the performance of 
director trading during the financial crisis of 2008. Finally, it could test the 
performance of director trading based on firm characteristics, by testing 
aggregate director trading on value stock (high B/M ratio) and growth stock (low 
B/M ratio), if the B/M data is available. 
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Chapter 5 could be extended by using different macroeconomic indicators as 
the dependent variables, and other business cycle variables (unemployment 
claims, real value of manufacture’s new orders for consumer goods and 
materials, monetary growth rate, etc.) to test robustness of aggregate director 
trading. Also, it can apply dummy variable to evaluate macro-conditions.  
Chapter 6 finds that the abnormal returns of 1- to 6-month post-purchase are 
significantly higher for CFOs than for other directors. However, it only uses long-
run calendar time portfolio regression model. Gregory et al. (2012) find that the 
returns of female executive trades are significantly greater than returns of male 
executive trades when returns of 10 days or more post-trade are considered. 
This hints that it may be valuable to apply short-run event study methodology to 
further test the performance of director trading patterns. Also, as documented in 
Chapter 6, trades of CFOs are more informative than other directors. This might 
suggest that aggregate director trading of CFOs might be more informative of 
market movements and future changes in GDP. Therefore, further work could 
investigate this.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Unit root test of Aggregate net Number of Purchases (ANT), aggregate ANP and 
ANS 
Unit Root Test of ANT 
 
Unit Root Test of ANP 
 
 
Unit Root Test of ANS 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     30.33916   5.383533     5.64   0.000     19.74065    40.93768
              
         L1.    -.3311309   .0456535    -7.25   0.000    -.4210085   -.2412533
          NT  
                                                                              
        D.NT        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -7.253            -3.458            -2.879            -2.570
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =       275
                                                                              
       _cons     39.79773     8.0832     4.92   0.000      23.8844    55.71106
              
         L1.     -.190062   .0357433    -5.32   0.000    -.2604294   -.1196945
         ANP  
                                                                              
       D.ANP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -5.317            -3.458            -2.879            -2.570
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =       275
                                                                              
       _cons      33.7419   5.814523     5.80   0.000      22.2949     45.1889
              
         L1.     -.293224   .0426714    -6.87   0.000    -.3772308   -.2092172
         ANS  
                                                                              
       D.ANS        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -6.872            -3.458            -2.879            -2.570
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =       275
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Appendix B 
Correlation of Aggregate Director Trading Variables 
  ANPt+1 ANPt ANPt-1 
 
  APt+1 APt APt-1 
 
  ASt+1 ASt ASt-1 
ANPt 0.66***     
 
APt 0.81***     
 
ASt 0.71***     
ANPt-1 0.48*** 0.66***   
 
APt-1 0.68*** 0.81***   
 
ASt-1 0.51*** 0.71***   
ANPt-2 0.35*** 0.48*** 0.66*** 
 
APt-2 0.67*** 0.68*** 0.81*** 
 
ASt-2 0.41*** 0.51*** 0.71*** 
  SANPt+1 SANPt SANPt-1 
 
  SAPt+1 SAPt SAPt-1 
 
  SASt+1 SASt SASt-1 
SANPt 0.66***     
 
SAPt 0.81***     
 
SASt 0.71***     
SANPt-1 0.48*** 0.66***   
 
SAPt-1 0.68*** 0.81***   
 
SASt-1 0.51*** 0.71***   
SANPt-2 0.35*** 0.48*** 0.66*** 
 
SAPt-2 0.67*** 0.68*** 0.81*** 
 
SASt-2 0.41*** 0.51*** 0.71*** 
  NPRt+1 NPRt NPRt-1 
 
  PRt+1 PRt PRt-1 
 
  SRt+1 SRt SRt-1 
NPRt+1  0.67***     
 
PRt+1  0.67***     
 
SRt+1  0.67***     
NPRt  0.50*** 0.67***    
 
PRt  0.50*** 0.67***    
 
SRt  0.50*** 0.67***    
NPRt-1  0.34*** 0.50***  0.67*** 
 
PRt-1  0.34*** 0.50***  0.67*** 
 
SRt-1  0.34*** 0.50***  0.67*** 
  ∆NPRt+1 ∆NPRt ∆NPRt-1 
 
  ∆PRt+1 ∆PRt ∆PRt-1 
 
  ∆SRt+1 ∆SRt ∆SRt-1 
∆NPRt+1 -0.24***     
 
∆PRt+1 -0.24***     
 
∆SRt+1 -0.24***     
∆NPRt -0.03 -0.24***   
 
∆PRt -0.03 -0.24***   
 
∆SRt -0.03 -0.24***   
∆NPRt-1 -0.13* -0.03 -0.24*** 
 
∆PRt-1 -0.13* -0.03 -0.24 
 
∆SRt-1 -0.13* -0.03 -0.24 
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Appendix B (Continued) 
 
  ∆ANPt+1 ∆ANPt ∆ANPt-1 
 
  ∆APt+1 ∆APt ∆APt-1 
 
  ∆ASt+1 ∆ASt ∆ASt-1 
∆ANPt+1 -0.24***     
 
∆APt+1 -0.18***     
 
∆ASt+1 -0.16***     
∆ANPt -0.08 -0.24***   
 
∆APt  -0.31*** -0.18***   
 
∆ASt -0.16*** -0.16***   
∆ANPt-1 -0.10 -0.08 -0.24*** 
 
∆APt-1  0.06  -0.31*** -0.19*** 
 
∆ASt-1 -0.03  -0.16*** -0.17*** 
  NPGRt+1 NPGRt NPGRt-1 
 
  APGRt+1 APGRt APGRt-1 
 
  ASGRt+1 ASGRt ASGRt-1 
NPGRt+1 -0.03     
 
APGRt+1 -0.20***     
 
ASGRt+1 -0.27***     
NPGRt -0.12* -0.03   
 
APGRt -0.27*** -0.20***   
 
ASGRt -0.07 -0.27***   
NPGRt-1  0.13** -0.12* -0.03 
 
APGRt-1 0.13** -0.27*** -0.21*** 
 
ASGRt-1  0.04 -0.07 -0.27*** 
 
ANP denotes aggregate net number of purchases. AP denotes aggregate number of purchases transactions. AS denotes aggregate number of sales 
transactions. SANP denotes standardized aggregate net number of purchase. SAP denotes standardized aggregate number purchases transactions. SAS 
denotes aggregate number of sales transactions. NPR denotes Net number of director purchase ratio. PR denotes purchase ratio. SR denotes sales ratio. 
∆NPR denotes differences of aggregate net purchase ratio. ∆PR denotes differences of aggregate purchase ratio. ∆SR denotes differences of aggregate sale 
ratio. ∆ANP denotes differences of aggregate net number of purchase. ∆AP denotes differences of aggregate number of purchases. ∆AS denotes differences 
of aggregate number of sales. NPGR denotes change of aggregate net number of purchase. APGR denotes change of aggregate number of purchases. 
ASGR denotes change of aggregate number of sales.  
Symbol *, ** and *** denote significant level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively  
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Appendix C 
Summary Statistics of Aggregate Director Trading Variables 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
ANP 89.38 78.48 -203 331 
AP 203.49 100.75 26 659 
AS 114.11 74.52 13 435 
     NPR 0.30 0.24 -0.48 0.80 
PR 0.65 0.12 0.26 0.90 
SR 0.35 0.12 0.10 0.74 
     ∆NPR 0.0016 0.19 -0.62 0.64 
∆PR 0.0008 0.10 -0.31 0.32 
∆SR -0.0008 0.10 -0.32 0.31 
     ∆ANP 0.96 64.12 -217 317 
∆AP 1.25 62.21 -255 266 
∆AS 0.29 57.01 -291 201 
     NPGR -0.20 5.97 -54 48 
APGR 0.06 0.36 -0.77 2.27 
ASGR 0.11 0.52 -0.78 2.39 
 
Appendix D 
Data Description by applied methodology of Pesaran and Timmermann (2000) 
 
YALL: Dividend yield on the FTSE All Share Index.  
I3: 90-day T-bill rate.  
PI: Rate of change of retail prices, computed as ln[RPI12/RPI12(-12)] where 
RPI12 is a twelve-month moving average of the Retail Price Index.  
GILT: Yield on a 2.5% government consol measured at the end of the month.  
DM0: Year-on-year rate of change in the narrow money stock M0. 
DIP: Year-on-year rate of change in industrial production of the manufacturing 
sector.  
DPSPOT: Year-on-year change in the spot price of oil (in logs). Both spot oil 
price of WTI and Brent are applied.  
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Appendix E 
Regression of the Excess Monthly Stock Returns against the leading, 
Contemporaneous, and Lagged Values of the Monthly Standardized Aggregate Net 
Number of Director Purchases Transactions (SANP) by All Firms 
 
 Constant   SANPt+1   SANPt   SANPt-1   SANPt-2 
1 -0.00045 
 
… 
 
… 
 
0.004127 
 
-0.000567 
 (-0.16) 
     
(1.01) 
 
(-0.14) 
2 -0.00016 
 
… 
 
-0.021566 
 
0.017335 
 
0.001193 
 (-0.06) 
   
(-4.04)*** 
 
(3.68)*** 
 
(0.35) 
3 0.000004 
 
-0.022706 
 
-0.007975 
 
0.019001 
 
0.001205 
 (0.00) 
 
(-5.55)*** 
 
(-1.49) 
 
(4.05)*** 
 
(0.35) 
 Constant 
 
SANP_ADJ_1t+1 SANP_ADJ_1t SANP_ADJ_1t-1 SANP_ADJ_1t-2 
4 -0.00046 
 
… 
 
… 
 
0.001628 
 
-0.000055 
 (-0.16) 
     
(0.50) 
 
(-0.02) 
5 -0.00032 
 
… 
 
-0.014253 
 
0.008698 
 
0.001075 
 (-0.12) 
   
(-3.26)*** 
 
(2.39)** 
 
(0.30) 
6 -0.000187 
 
-0.018069 
 
-0.005591 
 
0.008518 
 
0.003992 
 (-0.08) 
 
(-4.75)*** 
 
(-1.26) 
 
(2.26)** 
 
(1.13) 
 Constant 
 
SANP_ADJ_2t+1 SANP_ADJ_2t SANP_ADJ_2t-1 SANP_ADJ_2t-2 
7 -0.00047 
 
… 
 
… 
 
0.003791 
 
-0.001642 
 (-0.17) 
     
(0.92) 
 
(-0.38) 
8 -0.00022 
 
… 
 
-0.019709 
 
0.015734 
 
0.000785 
 (-0.09) 
   
(-3.57)*** 
 
(3.24)*** 
 
(0.20) 
9 -0.000003 
 
-0.023405 
 
-0.005969 
 
0.017263 
 
0.002770 
 (-0.00) 
 
(-5.34)*** 
 
(-1.06) 
 
(3.50)*** 
 
(0.72) 
 
Sample periods are 276 months from 1986 to 2008. SANP is standardized aggregate net 
number of director purchases transactions. SANP_ADJ_1 denotes seasonal adjusted ANP 
based on December and March fiscal year end by assumption, SANP_ADJ_2 denotes 
seasonal adjusted ANP based on December and March fiscal year end by Observations. Both 
methods of seasonal adjustment are fully described in Chapter 3. Excess market returns is 
defined as the actual return to the FTSE All Share index minus the return on the monthly 90-day 
Treasury Bills. The Newey-West t-statistics of estimated coefficients are shown in parentheses. 
The symbol *, **, *** presents significant level at the 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.  
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Appendix F 
Summary Statistics of Excess Monthly Stock Returns  
 
 
m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
α0 
 
α0 
 
α0 
 
α0 
-0.00133   -0.00090   0.00048  0.00216 
 
Excess market returns is defined as buy-and-hold excess returns between the actual return to 
the FTSE All Share index and the return on the monthly 90-day Treasury Bills. 
 
 
 
m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
α0 
 
α0 
 
α0 
 
α0 
-0.0010063   0.0064833  0.0007564  0.002736 
 
Excess market returns is defined as cumulative excess returns between the actual return to the 
FTSE All Share index and the return on the monthly 90-day Treasury Bills. 
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Appendix G 
 Correlation Between Monthly Return of FTSE All Share/Excess Market Return/Aggregate Net Number of Director 
Purchases/Aggregate Number of Director Purchases/Aggregate Number of Director Sales and Performance of Industries 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
R_FTSE All 
  
NPR_All 
R_BM 0.6498*** 
 
NPR_BM 0.3747*** 
R_CG  0.5327*** 
 
NPR _CG 0.2532*** 
R_CS 0.7515*** 
 
NPR _CS 0.4604*** 
R_F 0.7821*** 
 
NPR _F 0.5694*** 
R_HC 0.3877*** 
 
NPR _HC 0.1479** 
R_I  0.7135*** 
 
NPR _I 0.4258*** 
R_OS 0.5618*** 
 
NPR _OG 0.2693*** 
R_T 0.5511*** 
 
NPR _T 0.1394* 
R_TC 0.5569*** 
 
NPR _TC 0.2384*** 
R_U 0.3572*** 
 
NPR _U -0.0639 
 
Panel A represents Correlation between monthly returns of FTSE All Share and return of industries. Panel B represents correlation between aggregate net number of 
director purchases of all firms and aggregate net number of director purchases of industries. BM- Basic Material, CG-Consumer Goods, CS-Consumer Services, F-Financials, 
HC-Health Care, I-Industrial, OS-Oil & Gas, T-Technology, TC-Telecommunication, U-Utilities. Symbol *, **,*** denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
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Appendix H 
Time Series Regression of Future 1-Quarter, 2-Quarter, 3-Quarter and 4-Quarter Real GDP Growth on Past 1-Quarter, 2-Quarter, 3-
Quarter and 4-Quarter Aggregate Net Number of Director Purchases Trading Ratio 
),(
1
10_ tjt
it
tk
NPRRGDPGrowth 


    
 
 Panel A i=1   i=1   i=1   i=1 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
0.0053 0.008036 0.0710 
 
0.0054 0.004387 0.0190 
 
0.0056 0.001000 -0.0092 
 
0.0055 0.001419 -0.0071 
(4.93)*** (3.61)*** 
  
(4.91)*** (2.31)** 
  
(5.00)*** (0.61) 
  
(5.42)*** (0.53) 
 Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.0062 -0.003068 0.0031 
 
0.0054 0.004324 0.0182 
 
0.0047 0.006571 0.0987 
 
0.0054 0.001564 -0.0060 
(5.73)*** (-1.06) 
  
(4.90)*** (2.29)** 
  
(4.21)*** (4.84)*** 
  
(5.32)*** (0.60) 
 Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.0055 0.005416 0.0177 
 
0.0054 0.005025 0.0218 
 
0.0053 0.003055 0.0058 
 
0.0054 0.001953 -0.0041 
(5.05)*** (1.64)     (4.88)*** (2.35)**     (4.82)*** (1.93)*     (5.39)*** (0.73)   
 Panel B i=2   i=2   i=2   i=2 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
0.0114 0.004675 0.0031 
 
0.0108 0.008292 0.0449 
 
0.0107 0.005370 0.0227 
 
0.0105 0.005179 0.0203 
(7.65)*** (1.24) 
  
(5.84)*** (2.78)*** 
  
(5.81)*** (1.62) 
  
(5.57)*** (0.92) 
 Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.0114 0.004372 0.0036 
 
0.0108 0.008619 0.0494 
 
0.0109 0.003771 0.0075 
 
0.0104 0.005485 0.0250 
(7.74)*** (1.36) 
  
(5.81)*** (2.90)*** 
  
(5.82)*** (1.31) 
  
(5.45)*** (0.99) 
 Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.0115 0.004665 -0.0003 
 
0.0108 0.008918 0.0428 
 
0.0107 0.005777 0.0210 
 
0.0103 0.006464 0.0320 
(7.72)*** (1.16)     (5.86)*** (2.68)***     (5.85)*** (1.57)     (5.52)*** (1.14)   
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Appendix H (Continued) 
 
 Panel C i=3   i=3   i=3   i=3 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
0.0172 0.006929 0.0076 
 
0.0170 0.006328 0.0080 
 
0.0169 0.003707 -0.0020 
 
0.0157 0.009504 0.0527 
(9.03)*** (1.14) 
  
(7.19)*** (1.45) 
  
(0.72) (0.74) 
  
(5.66)*** (1.51) 
 Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.0182 -0.004626 -0.0016 
 
0.0170 0.006814 0.0111 
 
0.0158 0.009883 0.0670 
 
0.0156 0.009629 0.0559 
(9.64)*** (-1.03) 
  
(7.15)*** (1.54) 
  
(6.26)*** (2.47)** 
  
(5.61)*** (1.54) 
 Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.0175 0.003701 -0.0074 
 
0.0170 0.006912 0.0079 
 
0.0165 0.007070 0.0175 
 
0.0155 0.010956 0.0631 
(9.16)*** (0.52)     (7.26)*** (1.38)     (6.64)*** (1.32)     (5.63)*** (1.72)*   
 Panel D i=4   i=4   i=4   i=4 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
0.0235 0.005374 -0.0027 
 
0.0231 0.007703 0.0111 
 
0.0219 0.011080 0.0573 
 
0.0210 0.012060 0.0748 
(11.03)*** (0.68) 
  
(8.50)*** (1.05) 
  
(7.12)*** (1.74)* 
  
(6.11)*** (1.54) 
 Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.0234 0.005679 0.0001 
 
0.0230 0.007955 0.0126 
 
0.0221 0.008828 0.0376 
 
0.0210 0.012055 0.0767 
(10.90)*** (1.08) 
  
(8.46)*** (1.09) 
  
(7.19)*** (1.56) 
  
(6.07)*** (1.58) 
 Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.0235 0.007620 0.0023 
 
0.0230 0.009204 0.0154 
 
0.0218 0.012687 0.0627 
 
0.0208 0.013690 0.0858 
(11.01)*** (0.87)     (8.54)*** (1.11)     (7.15)*** (1.80)*     (6.06)*** (1.68)*   
 
Sample periods are 92 quarters from 1986 to 2008, GDPGrowth_R denotes quarterly growth rate of real GDP which is seasonally adjusted. 
NPR denotes quarterly aggregate net number of purchases trading ratio, calculated by dividing the net number of purchases (number of 
purchases minus number of sales) by the total number of director transaction of all firms (P-S)/(P+S), Seasonal Adj_1 denotes seasonal 
adjusted director trading transactions based on December and March fiscal year end by assumption, Seasonal Adj_2 denotes seasonal 
adjusted director trading transactions based on December and March fiscal year end by Observations. Both methods of seasonal adjustment 
are fully described in Chapter 3. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Newey-West 
t-statistics present in parentheses.  
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Appendix I 
Time Series Regression of Future 1-Quarter, 2-Quarter, 3-Quarter and 4-Quarter Real GDP Growth on Past 1-Quarter, 2-
Quarter, 3-Quarter and 4-Quarter CBI Industrial Trends Survey Data 





t
jtk
it
tk
CBIRGDPGrowth
1
10_   
Panel A i=1   i=1   i=1   i=1 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
  α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
  0.006 0.00013 0.0549 
 
0.007 0.00007 0.0669 
 
0.007 0.00005 0.0685 
 
0.006 0.00004 0.0423 
 
(6.07)*** (2.01)** 
  
(6.78)*** (2.40)** 
  
(6.45)*** (2.42)** 
  
(6.15)*** (2.06)** 
 Panel B i=2   i=2   i=2   i=2 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
  α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
  
0.013 0.00025 
 
0.1206 
 
0.013 0.00014 0.1317 
 
0.013 0.00009 0.1002 
 
0.012 0.00007 0.0847 
 
(9.15)*** (3.15)*** 
  
(7.53)*** (2.75)*** 
  
(6.72)*** (2.33)** 
  
(6.09)*** (2.18)** 
 Panel C i=3   i=3   i=3   i=3 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
  α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
  
0.019 0.00036 0.1409 
 
0.019 0.00018 0.1148 
 
0.018 0.00013 0.1032 
 
0.018 0.00010 
 
0.0930 
 
(10.58)*** (3.37)*** 
  
(8.03)*** (2.56)** 
  
(6.67)*** (2.25)** 
  
(5.99)*** (2.18)** 
 Panel D i=4   i=4   i=4   i=4 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
  α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
  0.024 0.00035 0.0820 
 
0.024 0.00020 0.0866 
 
0.024 0.00014 0.0829 
 
0.023 0.00011 0.0766 
  (11.16)*** (2.77)***    (8.06)*** (2.25)**    (6.64)*** (2.10)**    (5.87)*** (2.08)**   
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Appendix I (Continued) 
 
Sample periods are 92 quarters from 1986 to 2008, GDPGrowth_R denotes quarterly growth rate of real GDP which is seasonally adjusted. 
CBI denotes quarterly industrial trends survey data provided by Confederation of British Industry (CBI business confidence). The symbols *, **, 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Newey-West t-statistics present in parentheses.  
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Appendix J 
Time Series Regression of Future 1-Quarter, 2-Quarter, 3-Quarter and 4-Quarter Growth Rate of Real GDP on Past One-Quarter, Two-
Quarter, Three-Quarter and Four-Quarter Aggregate Net Number of Director Purchases Trading Ratio Decomposed by Different 
Macro-Effect Variables 
 
 
Panel A i=1   i=1   i=1   i=1 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0067 0.00677 0.0671 
 
0.0068 0.00372 0.0158 
 
0.0071 0.00084 -0.0110 
 
0.0069 0.00141 -0.0074 
(6.52)*** (2.99)*** 
  
(6.92)*** (1.92)* 
  
(7.12)*** (0.57) 
  
(8.80)*** (0.58) 
 Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0064 0.00174 -0.0185 
 
0.0071 0.00126 -0.0206 
 
0.0071 0.00029 -0.0253 
 
0.0068 0.00042 -0.0255 
(3.71)*** (0.40) 
  
(4.47)*** (0.60) 
  
(4.84)*** (0.18) 
  
(6.09)*** (0.21) 
 
Depression 
0.0068 0.00657 0.0740 
 
0.0069 0.00397 0.0251 
 
0.0072 0.00073 -0.0120 
 
0.0067 0.00247 0.0067 
(7.04)*** (3.08)***     (7.73)*** (2.52)**     (7.32)*** (0.49)     (9.26)*** (1.10)   
Panel B i=1   i=1   i=1   i=1 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
Business 
Cycle 
-0.0024 -0.00666 -0.0861 
 
-0.0011 -0.00941 0.0302 
 
0.0005 -0.00524 -0.0255 
 
-0.0007 -0.00626 0.1238 
(-0.61) (-0.69) 
  
(-0.34) (-1.65) 
  
(0.19) (-1.27) 
  
(-0.26) (-1.45) 
 Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0044 -0.00582 -0.0034 
 
0.0043 0.00006 -0.0227 
 
0.0043 -0.00243 -0.0163 
 
0.0044 -0.00385 -0.0016 
(2.86)*** (-1.15) 
  
(2.55)** (0.01) 
  
(2.80)*** (-0.55) 
  
(3.39)*** (-1.02) 
 
Depression 
0.0003 -0.00791 -0.0063 
 
0.0019 -0.01099 0.1872 
 
0.0021 -0.00371 -0.0379 
 
0.0013 -0.00609 -0.0026 
(0.08) (-1.16)     (0.52) (-2.19)*     (0.67) (-1.10)     (0.44) (-1.05)   
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Appendix J (Continued) 
 
Panel C i=2   i=2   i=2   i=2 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0143 0.00351 -0.0001 
 
0.0137 0.00677 0.0452 
 
0.0136 0.00481 0.0294 
 
0.0132 0.00535 0.0400 
(10.87)*** (1.03) 
  
(8.87)*** (2.43)** 
  
(9.29)*** (1.63) 
  
(9.29)*** (1.06) 
 Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0126 0.00256 -0.0178 
 
0.0131 0.00351 -0.0085 
 
0.0126 0.00284 -0.0091 
 
0.0113 0.00537 0.0375 
(5.43)*** (0.47) 
  
(4.81)*** (0.85) 
  
(4.90)*** (0.71) 
  
(4.08)*** (1.35) 
 
Depression 
0.0145 0.00210 -0.0084 
 
0.0139 0.00622 0.0455 
 
0.0137 0.00505 0.0415 
 
0.0131 0.00670 0.0817 
(11.29)*** (0.66)     (9.53)*** (2.35)**     (9.84)*** (1.76)*     (10.10)*** (1.37)   
Panel D i=2   i=2   i=2   i=2 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
Business 
Cycle 
-0.0056 -0.01090 -0.0668 
 
-0.0021 -0.01186 0.0624 
 
-0.0015 -0.00930 0.0985 
 
-0.0012 -0.01130 0.2868 
(-1.14) (-0.96) 
  
(-0.61) (-1.81) 
  
(-0.44) (-1.55) 
  
(-0.57) (-2.18)* 
 Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0087 -0.01281 0.0211 
 
0.0088 -0.00736 0.0010 
 
0.0088 -0.01009 0.0346 
 
0.0093 -0.01199 0.0803 
(3.95)*** (-1.71)* 
  
(3.11)*** (-1.07) 
  
(3.43)*** (-1.55) 
  
(4.07)*** (-1.72) 
 
Depression 
-0.0014 -0.00154 -0.0818 
 
0.0027 -0.01167 0.1086 
 
0.0022 -0.00512 -0.0339 
 
0.0027 -0.01009 0.0436 
(-0.29) (-0.16)     (0.55) (-2.19)*     (0.45) (-1.67)     (0.64) (-1.48)   
Panel E i=3   i=3   i=3   i=3 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0213 0.00581 0.0098 
 
0.0212 0.00480 0.0057 
 
0.0210 0.00350 0.0013 
 
0.0197 0.00846 0.0737 
(13.20)*** (1.08) 
  
(11.22)*** (1.25) 
  
(10.61) (0.83) 
  
(9.75)*** (1.55) 
 Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0183 0.00509 -0.0063 
 
0.0188 0.00575 0.0049 
 
0.0176 0.00640 0.0316 
 
0.0173 0.00495 0.0109 
(6.62)*** (0.67) 
  
(5.60)*** (1.00) 
  
(4.84)*** (1.04) 
  
(4.06)*** (0.86) 
 
Depression 
0.0214 0.00718 0.0268 
 
0.0214 0.00525 0.0128 
 
0.0210 0.00452 0.0142 
 
0.0196 0.00981 0.1170 
(13.41)*** (1.62)     (11.41)*** (1.61)     (10.99)*** (1.13)     (10.83)*** (1.85)*   
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Panel F i=3   i=3   i=3   i=3 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
Business 
Cycle 
-0.0090 -0.02483 0.1206 
 
-0.0058 -0.02105 0.2902 
 
-0.0031 -0.01960 0.6246 
 
-0.0057 -0.01585 0.5228 
(-1.68) (-1.61) 
  
(-1.27) (-4.53)*** 
  
(-1.01) (-4.67)*** 
  
(-1.50) (-4.72)*** 
 Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0128 -0.01736 0.0276 
 
0.0131 -0.01354 0.0255 
 
0.0135 -0.01766 0.0850 
 
0.0140 -0.01552 0.0846 
(4.60)*** (-1.72)* 
  
(3.87)*** (-1.41) 
  
(4.29)*** (-1.67) 
  
(4.48)*** (-1.70)* 
 
Depression 
-0.0025 -0.00801 -0.0471 
 
0.0007 -0.01185 0.0736 
 
0.0024 -0.01133 0.1645 
 
0.0015 -0.01370 0.1255 
(-0.46) (-1.14)     (0.14) (-3.47)***     (0.46) (-13.95)***     (0.32) (-3.38)***   
Panel G i=4   i=4   i=4   i=4 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0285 0.00586 0.0064 
 
0.0280 0.00787 0.0296 
 
0.0270 0.00984 0.0848 
 
0.0262 0.00964 0.0917 
(15.95)*** (1.03) 
  
(13.02)*** (1.28) 
  
(11.69)*** (1.78)* 
  
(10.51)*** (1.37) 
 Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0249 0.00722 0.0063 
 
0.0236 0.01151 0.0663 
 
0.0233 0.00683 0.0245 
 
0.0229 0.00343 -0.0106 
(8.50)*** (0.87) 
  
(6.05)*** (1.36) 
  
(4.91)*** (0.86) 
  
(4.21)*** (0.56) 
 
Depression 
0.0287 0.00712 0.0194 
 
0.0280 0.01025 0.0711 
 
0.0270 0.01150 0.1390 
 
0.0260 0.01182 0.1640 
(16.40)*** (1.50)     (13.31)*** (1.99)*     (12.51)*** (2.18)**     (11.54)*** (1.76)*   
Panel H i=4   i=4   i=4   i=4 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
Business 
Cycle 
-0.0110 -0.04232 0.4542 
 
-0.0070 -0.03654 0.8482 
 
-0.0078 -0.02138 0.5535 
 
-0.0121 -0.01685 0.5774 
(-2.25)* (-4.58)*** 
  
(-2.69)** (-11.29)*** 
 
(-1.48) (-2.98)** 
  
(-2.59)** (-4.27)*** 
 Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0175 -0.02327 0.0547 
 
0.0180 -0.02044 0.0723 
 
0.0187 -0.02132 0.1080 
 
0.0189 -0.01837 0.1015 
(5.95)*** (-1.60) 
  
(5.07)*** (-1.76)* 
  
(5.21)*** (-1.85)* 
  
(4.54)*** (-1.99)* 
 
Depression 
-0.0020 -0.02185 0.1801 
 
0.0017 -0.02299 0.4987 
 
0.0014 -0.01378 0.2655 
 
-0.0008 -0.01346 0.1104 
(-0.40) (-2.91)**     (0.39) (-6.85)***     (0.23) (-5.48)***     (-0.12) (-3.63)***   
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Appendix J (Continued) 
 
Sample periods are 92 quarters from 1986 to 2008. GDPGrowth_R denotes quarterly growth rate of real GDP which is seasonally adjusted. NPR denotes 
quarterly aggregate net number of purchases trading ratio, calculated by dividing the net number of purchases (number of purchases minus number of sales) 
by the total number of director transaction of all firms (P-S)/(P+S), Business cycle denotes business cycle peak and trough provided by Economic Cycle 
Research Institute (ECRI), there are 81 quarters are good time, 15 quarters are bad time. Growth rate cycle denotes growth rate cycle peak and trough 
provided by Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI), there are 47 quarters are good time, 49 quarters are bad time. Depression denotes UK depression 
time periods got from report Mitchell et al. (2009), there are 77 quarters are good time, 19 quarters are bad time. Panel A, C, E and G presents NPR 
performance on good time by different measurements of macroeconomic conditions. Panel B, D, F and H (the shadow panels) present NPR performance on 
bad time by different measurements of macroeconomic conditions. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Newey-West t-statistics present in parentheses. 
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Appendix K  
Time Series Regression of Future 1-Quarter, 2-Quarter, 3-Quarter and 4-Quarter Growth Rate of Real GDP on Past 1-Quarter, 2-
Quarter, 3-Quarter and 4-Quarter CBI Industrial Trends Survey Data Decomposed by Different Macro-Effect Variables 





t
jtk
it
tk
CBIRGDPGrowth
1
10_   
 
Panel A i=1   i=1   i=1   i=1 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0073 0.00001 -0.0124 
 
0.0074 0.00002 -0.0086 
 
0.0074 0.00002 -0.0064 
 
0.0072 0.000005 -0.0125 
(6.84)*** (0.16) 
  
(7.75)*** (0.54) 
  
(7.46)*** (0.66) 
  
(7.47)*** (0.27) 
 Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0063 0.00002 -0.0216 
 
0.0064 0.00004 -0.0135 
 
0.0063 0.00005 0.0024 
 
0.0061 0.00003 -0.0151 
(4.15)*** (0.17) 
  
(4.22)*** (0.59) 
  
(4.32)*** (1.08) 
  
(4.33)*** (0.68) 
 
Depression 
0.0075 0.00003 -0.0078 
 
0.0075 0.000015 -0.0103 
 
0.0074 0.000010 -0.0108 
 
0.0073 0.000002 -0.0139 
(7.16)*** (0.52)     (7.81)*** (0.46)     (7.35)*** (0.44)     (7.32)*** (0.12)   
Panel B i=1   i=1   i=1   i=1 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0019 0.00017 0.0164 
 
0.0000 0.00006 -0.0612 
 
-0.0007 0.00002 -0.0929 
 
-0.0071 -0.00002 -0.0990 
(0.40) (1.19) 
  
(-0.00) (0.54) 
  
(-0.07) (0.24) 
  
(-1.05) (-0.41) 
 Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0039 -0.00001 -0.0216 
 
0.0041 -0.000002 -0.0222 
 
0.0037 -0.000003 -0.0225 
 
0.0040 0.000005 -0.0226 
(2.51)** (-0.08) 
  
(2.70)** (-0.04) 
  
(2.78)*** (-0.10) 
  
(2.57)** (0.17) 
 
Depression 
0.0009 0.00010 -0.0341 
 
0.0016 0.00006 -0.0346 
 
0.0036 0.00005 -0.0195 
 
0.0008 0.00002 -0.0625 
(0.18) (0.67)     (0.25) (0.71)     (0.63) (1.03)     (0.17) (0.62)   
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Appendix K (Continued) 
 
Panel C i=2   i=2   i=2   i=2 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0148 0.00006 -0.0042 
 
0.0148 0.00005 0.0045 
 
0.0146 0.00002 -0.0058 
 
0.0144 0.00001 -0.0101 
(10.89)*** (0.73) 
  
(8.98)*** (0.85) 
  
(8.37)*** (0.58) 
  
(7.92)*** (0.42) 
 Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0129 0.00009 -0.0117 
 
0.0127 0.00011 0.0130 
 
0.0123 0.00008 0.0067 
 
0.0121 0.00006 -0.0053 
(5.95)*** (0.66) 
  
(4.90)*** (1.18) 
  
(4.63)*** (1.00) 
  
(4.50)*** (0.91) 
 
Depression 
0.0149 0.00005 -0.0068 
 
0.0149 0.00002 -0.0082 
 
0.0146 0.000008 -0.0129 
 
0.0145 0.000006 -0.0133 
(11.06)*** (0.64)     (8.89)*** (0.49)     (8.18)*** (0.23)     (7.79)*** (0.22)   
Panel D i=2   i=2   i=2   i=2 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
Business 
Cycle 
-0.0029 0.00015 -0.0460 
 
-0.0060 0.00002 -0.0984 
 
-0.0130 -0.00006 -0.0785 
 
-0.0199 -0.00009 -0.0295 
(-0.38) (0.81) 
  
(-0.47) (0.10) 
  
(-1.38) (-0.59) 
  
(-2.16)* (-0.97) 
 Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0079 -0.00003 -0.0198 
 
0.0079 -0.00001 -0.0220 
 
0.0078 0.000002 -0.0232 
 
0.0077 0.000002 -0.0237 
(3.82)*** (-0.34) 
  
(3.20)*** (-0.15) 
  
(3.18)*** (0.04) 
  
(2.63)** (0.05) 
 
Depression 
0.0011 0.00017 -0.0166 
 
0.0041 0.00013 0.0126 
 
0.0026 0.00007 -0.0368 
 
-0.0001 0.00003 -0.0739 
(0.12) (0.73)     (0.37) (0.87)     (0.27) (0.72)     (-0.01) (0.36)   
Panel E i=3   i=3   i=3   i=3 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0222 0.00010 0.0045 
 
0.0221 0.00005 -0.0024 
 
0.0218 0.00003 -0.0064 
 
0.0216 0.00002 -0.0085 
(13.10)*** (0.98) 
  
(10.39)*** (0.71) 
  
(8.90)*** (0.57) 
  
(8.37)*** (0.53) 
 Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0192 0.00019 0.0034 
 
0.0188 0.00012 0.0034 
 
0.0184 0.00010 0.0050 
 
0.0180 0.00005 -0.0138 
(7.33)*** (1.16) 
  
(5.63)*** (1.03) 
  
(4.90)*** (1.00) 
  
(4.65)*** (0.72) 
 
Depression 
0.0224 0.00007 -0.0055 
 
0.0222 0.00002 -0.0119 
 
0.0220 0.000013 -0.0123 
 
0.0218 0.000012 -0.0118 
(13.05)*** (0.68)     (10.25)*** (0.33)     (8.81)*** (0.30)     (8.34)*** (0.36)   
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Panel F i=3   i=3   i=3   i=3 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
Business 
Cycle 
-0.0103 0.00004 -0.0971 
 
-0.0179 -0.00009 -0.0705 
 
-0.0242 -0.00013 -0.0048 
 
-0.0335 -0.00016 0.0841 
(-1.09) (0.17) 
  
(-1.83) (-0.58) 
  
(-2.44)** (-0.91) 
  
(-2.85)** (-1.14) 
 Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0122 -0.000019 -0.0223 
 
0.0125 0.000015 -0.0223 
 
0.0120 0.000009 -0.0233 
 
0.0122 0.000005 -0.0241 
(5.08)*** (-0.16) 
  
(4.31)*** (0.19) 
  
(3.44)*** (0.15) 
  
(2.98)*** (0.11) 
 
Depression 
0.0030 0.00029 0.0644 
 
0.0024 0.00014 0.0038 
 
0.0017 0.00008 -0.0422 
 
-0.0009 0.00004 -0.0750 
(0.29) (1.08)     (0.21) (0.90)     (0.12) (0.57)     (-0.06) (0.37)   
Panel G i=4   i=4   i=4   i=4 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
Business 
Cycle 
0.0294 0.00006 -0.0088 
 
0.0293 0.00004 -0.0060 
 
0.0290 0.00003 -0.0064 
 
0.0285 0.00002 -0.0079 
(15.52)*** (0.59) 
  
(11.33)*** (0.64) 
  
(9.61)*** (0.61) 
  
(9.05)*** (0.54) 
 Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0261 0.00010 -0.0174 
 
0.0257 0.00013 0.0019 
 
0.0252 0.00007 -0.0105 
 
0.0241 0.00004 -0.0181 
(8.90)*** (0.60) 
  
(6.62)*** (1.03) 
  
(5.75)*** (0.70) 
  
(5.54)*** (0.43) 
 
Depression 
0.0297 0.00003 -0.0124 
 
0.0295 0.000024 -0.0113 
 
0.0293 0.000020 -0.0106 
 
0.0287 0.000017 -0.0101 
(15.53)*** (0.36)     (11.33)*** (0.39)     (9.66)*** (0.43)     (9.24)*** (0.44)   
Panel H i=4   i=4   i=4   i=4 
 
j=1 
 
j=2 
 
j=3 
 
j=4 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
Business 
Cycle 
-0.0241 -0.00030 -0.0008 
 
-0.0354 -0.00034 0.1994 
 
-0.0472 -0.00037 0.3721 
 
-0.0570 -0.00034 0.5230 
(-2.84)** (-1.03) 
  
(-3.51)*** (-1.69) 
  
(-5.78)*** (-2.85)** 
  
(-7.11)*** (-3.32)** 
 Growth 
Rate Cycle 
0.0173 0.00004 -0.0214 
 
0.0170 0.000018 -0.0227 
 
0.0166 0.000004 -0.0243 
 
0.0154 -0.00002 -0.0217 
(6.94)*** (0.36) 
  
(4.93)*** (0.25) 
  
(3.67)*** (0.07) 
  
(2.59)** (-0.45) 
 
Depression 
-0.0034 0.00007 -0.0699 
 
-0.0041 0.00001 -0.0832 
 
-0.0056 -0.00002 -0.0880 
 
-0.0110 -0.00007 -0.0702 
(-0.37) (0.26)     (-0.29) (0.03)     (-0.34) (-0.15)     (-0.61) (-0.58)   
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Sample periods are 92 quarters from 1986 to 2008. GDPGrowth_R denotes quarterly growth rate of real GDP which is seasonally adjusted. CBI denotes 
quarterly industrial trends survey data provided by Confederation of British Industry (CBI business confidence).  Business cycle denotes business cycle peak 
and trough provided by Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI), there are 81 quarters are good time, 15 quarters are bad time. Growth rate cycle 
denotes growth rate cycle peak and trough provided by Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI), there are 47 quarters are good time, 49 quarters are bad 
time. Depression denotes UK depression time periods got from report Mitchell et al. (2009), there are 77 quarters are good time, 19 quarters are bad 
time. Panel A, C, E and G presents NPR performance on good time by different measurements of macroeconomic conditions. Panel B, D, F and H (the 
shadow panels) present NPR performance on bad time by different measurements of macroeconomic conditions. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Newey-West t-statistics present in parentheses. 
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Appendix L 
Time Series Regression of Future 1-, 3-, 6-, 9- and 12-Month SMB on Past 1-, 3-, 6-, 9- and 12-month Aggregate Net Number of Director 
Purchases Ratio by All Firms 
 
Panel n=1 n=1 n=1 n=1 n=1 
A m=1 m=3 m=6 m=9 m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
0.0038 -0.016 0.0103 0.0042 -0.021 0.0033 0.0039 -0.024 0.0006 0.00083 -0.016 -0.0025 0.0071 -0.038 0.0016 
 
(1.22) (-2.07)**   (0.71) (-1.38)   (0.51) (-1.16)   (0.08) (-0.63)   (0.62) (-1.28)   
Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.0038 -0.016 0.0103 0.0042 -0.021 0.0033 0.0039 -0.024 0.0006 0.00083 -0.016 -0.0025 0.0071 -0.038 0.0016 
(1.22) (-2.07)**   (0.71) (-1.38)   (0.51) (-1.16)   (0.08) (-0.63)   (0.62) (-1.28)   
Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.0039 -0.017 0.0101 0.0054 -0.026 0.0056 0.0049 -0.028 0.0015 0.00350 -0.026 -0.0009 0.0101 -0.050 0.0044 
(1.24) (-2.07)**   (0.89) (-1.60)   (0.63) (-1.28)   (0.36) (-0.96)   (0.89) (-1.59)   
Panel n=3 n=3 n=3 n=3 n=3 
B m=1 m=3 m=6 m=9 m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
0.0023 -0.011 0.0013 0.0023 -0.016 -0.0006 -0.00105 -0.0082 -0.0033 0.0018 -0.021 -0.0022 0.0077 -0.043 0.0014 
 
(0.64) (-1.09)   (0.26) (-0.65)   (-0.09) (-0.25)   (0.12) (-0.50)   (0.40) (-0.80)   
Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.0025 -0.011 0.0020 0.0032 -0.019 0.0007 -0.00024 -0.0109 -0.0030 0.0027 -0.024 -0.0016 0.0088 -0.046 0.0024 
(0.70) (-1.17)   (0.36) (-0.79)   (-0.02) (-0.33)   (0.18) (-0.58)   (0.46) (-0.87)   
Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.0028 -0.013 0.0025 0.0034 -0.021 0.0008 0.00041 -0.0136 -0.0027 0.0046 -0.031 -0.0005 0.0116 -0.058 0.0048 
(0.75) (-1.22)   (0.38) (-0.79)   (0.03) (-0.38)   (0.31) (-0.71)   (0.61) (-1.04)   
Panel n=6 n=6 n=6 n=6 n=6 
C m=1 m=3 m=6 m=9 m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
0.00052 -0.0056 -0.0027 -0.00176 -0.0038 -0.0036 -0.00139 -0.0083 -0.0035 0.0044 -0.032 -0.0010 0.0059 -0.040 -0.0004 
 
(0.13) (-0.50)   (-0.19) (-0.14)   (-0.11) (-0.22)   (0.26) (-0.62)   (0.26) (-0.59)   
Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.00112 -0.0076 -0.0018 -0.00031 -0.0086 -0.0031 -0.00020 -0.0122 -0.0031 0.0049 -0.033 -0.0006 0.0074 -0.045 0.0006 
(0.29) (-0.69)   (-0.03) (-0.32)   (-0.02) (-0.33)   (0.29) (-0.65)   (0.33) (-0.67)   
Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.00087 -0.0070 -0.0023 0.00039 -0.0087 -0.0031 0.00083 -0.0162 -0.0027 0.0075 -0.043 0.0011 0.0097 -0.054 0.0020 
(0.22) (-0.59)   (-0.04) (-0.30)   (0.07) (-0.42)   (0.46) (-0.84)   (0.44) (-0.79)   



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1
)1,(10
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tk
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Appendix L (Continued) 
 
Panel n=9 n=9 n=9 n=9 n=9 
D m=1 m=3 m=6 m=9 m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
0.00008 -0.0041 -0.0033 0.00068 -0.012 -0.0028 0.0037 -0.026 -0.0014 0.0050 -0.036 -0.0010 -0.0110 0.0117 -0.0037 
 
(0.02) (-0.33)   (0.07) (-0.40)   (0.26) (-0.59)   (0.25) (-0.58)   (-0.42) (0.15)   
Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.00037 -0.0050 -0.0031 0.00136 -0.014  -0.0023 0.0039 -0.027 -0.0011 0.0054 -0.037 -0.0006 -0.0091 0.0050 -0.0039 
(0.09) (-0.43)   (0.14) (-0.49)   (0.27) (-0.62)   (0.28) (-0.62)   (-0.36) (0.07)   
Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.00073 -0.0064 -0.0028 0.00235 -0.018 -0.0017 0.0063 -0.036 0.0005 0.0087 -0.049 0.0012 -0.0051 -0.0088 -0.0038 
(0.18) (-0.51)   (0.24) (-0.58)   (0.45) (-0.80)   (0.44) (-0.79)   (-0.20) (-0.11)   
Panel n=12 n=12 n=12 n=12 n=12 
E m=1 m=3 m=6 m=9 m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
0.0013 -0.0085 -0.0022 0.0029 -0.020 -0.0014 0.0019 -0.023 -0.0023 -0.0126 0.0180 -0.0033 -0.026 0.057 0.0009 
 
(0.30) (-0.64)   (0.26) (-0.60)   (0.12) (-0.43)   (-0.57) (0.26)   (-0.94) (0.66)   
Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.0016 -0.0095 -0.0016 0.0033 -0.022 -0.0008 0.0031 -0.026 -0.0016 -0.0107 0.0114 -0.0037 -0.024 0.048 -0.0002 
(0.39) (-0.76)   (0.32) (-0.67)   (0.19) (-0.53)   (-0.51) (0.18)   (-0.89) (0.59)   
Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.0019 -0.0108 -0.0014 0.0046 -0.027 0.0002 0.0048 -0.033 -0.0007 -0.0072 -0.0007 -0.0039 -0.019 0.032 -0.0026 
(0.45) (-0.80)   (0.43) (-0.78)   (0.30) (-0.63)   (-0.34) (-0.01)   (-0.70) (0.37)   
 
Sample periods are 92 quarters from 1986 to 2008. SMB denotes small minus big, is the difference in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks 
and big stocks. NPR denotes quarterly aggregate net number of purchases trading ratio, calculated by dividing the net number of purchases (number of 
purchases minus number of sales) by the total number of director transaction of all firms (P-S)/(P+S), Seasonal Adj_1 denotes seasonal adjusted director 
trading transactions based on December and March fiscal year end by assumption, Seasonal Adj_2 denotes seasonal adjusted director trading transactions 
based on December and March fiscal year end by Observations. Both methods of seasonal adjustment are fully described in Chapter 3. The symbols *, **, *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Newey-West t-statistics present in parentheses.  
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Appendix M 
Time Series Regression of Future 1-, 3-, 6-, 9- and 12-Month HML on Past 1-, 3-, 6-, 9- and 12-month Aggregate Net Number of Director 
Purchases Ratio by All Firms 
 
Panel n=1 n=1 n=1 n=1 n=1 
A m=1 m=3 m=6 m=9 m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
0.0073 -0.0098 0.0017 0.026 -0.043 0.0187 0.051 -0.080 0.0265 0.074 -0.106 0.0280 0.104 -0.160 0.0477 
 
(2.24)** (-1.29)   (4.11)*** (-3.09)***   (5.35)*** (-3.80)***   (5.24)*** (-3.33)***   (6.35)*** (-4.10)***   
Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.0073 -0.0098 0.0017 0.026 -0.043 0.0187 0.051 -0.080 0.0265 0.074 -0.106 0.0280 0.104 -0.160 0.0477 
(2.24)** (-1.29)   (4.11)*** (-3.09)***   (5.35)*** (-3.80)***   (5.24)*** (-3.33)***   (6.35)*** (-4.10)***   
Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.0087 -0.0150 0.0073 0.028 -0.050 0.0227 0.055 -0.097 0.0350 0.081 -0.135 0.0415 0.114 -0.200 0.0666 
(2.56)** (-1.84)*   (4.27)*** (-3.34)***   (5.59)*** (-4.23)***   (5.49)*** (-3.88)***   (6.52)*** (-4.63)***   
Panel n=3 n=3 n=3 n=3 n=3 
B m=1 m=3 m=6 m=9 m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
0.011 -0.020 0.0141 0.032 -0.062 0.0321 0.057 -0.103 0.0349 0.083 -0.143 0.0411 0.124 -0.233 0.0809 
 
(2.71)*** (-2.39)**   (3.56)*** (-3.30)***   (3.59)*** (-3.01)***   (3.66)*** (-2.78)***   (4.66)*** (-3.67)***   
Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.011 -0.020 0.0142 0.033 -0.065 0.0366 0.059 -0.107 0.0385 0.086 -0.149 0.0461 0.127 -0.240 0.0877 
(2.74)*** (-2.46)**   (3.76)*** (-3.61)***   (3.79)*** (-3.25)***   (3.86)*** (-3.03)***   (4.92)*** (-3.93)***   
Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.011 -0.022 0.0144 0.033 -0.068 0.0350 0.061 -0.119 0.0429 0.091 -0.175 0.0564 0.133 -0.272 0.0998 
(2.71)*** (-2.38)**   (3.57)*** (-3.30)***   (3.66)*** (-3.09)***   (3.71)*** (-2.98)***   (4.62)*** (-3.75)***   
Panel n=6 n=6 n=6 n=6 n=6 
C m=1 m=3 m=6 m=9 m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
0.011 -0.023 0.0124 0.033 -0.068 0.0282 0.061 -0.120 0.0355 0.101 -0.210 0.0686 0.149 -0.327 0.1207 
 
(2.70)*** (-2.40)**   (3.19)*** (-2.82)***   (3.45)*** (-2.88)***   (4.19)*** (-3.58)***   (4.95)*** (-4.21)***   
Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.011 -0.024 0.0156 0.035 -0.073 0.0355 0.065 -0.130 0.0449 0.106 -0.222 0.0814 0.154 -0.339 0.1365 
(2.89)*** (-2.68)***   (3.52)*** (-3.27)***   (3.90)*** (-3.44)***   (4.63)*** (-4.07)***   (5.38)*** (-4.68)***   
Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.012 -0.025 0.0154 0.035 -0.077 0.0350 0.067 -0.143 0.0484 0.109 -0.243 0.0867 0.158 -0.365 0.1401 
(2.76)*** (-2.52)**   (3.26)*** (-2.95)***   (3.54)*** (-3.08)***   (4.20)*** (-3.69)***   (4.88)*** (-4.24)***   
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Appendix M (Continued) 
 
Panel n=9 n=9 n=9 n=9 n=9 
D m=1 m=3 m=6 m=9 m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
0.012 -0.026 0.0138 0.035 -0.077 0.0284 0.075 -0.171 0.0589 0.124 -0.293 0.1071 0.173 -0.417 0.1554 
 
(2.50)** (-2.20)**   (2.97)*** (-2.58)**   (3.96)*** (-3.53)***   (4.72)*** (-4.22)***   (5.05)*** (-4.47)***   
Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.012 -0.028 0.0172 0.036 -0.082 0.0355 0.077 -0.177 0.0686 0.126 -0.297 0.1195 0.176 -0.420 0.1704 
(2.71)*** (-2.50)**   (3.30)*** (-3.01)***   (4.34)*** (-3.99)***   (5.07)*** (-4.61)***   (5.38)*** (-4.83)***   
Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.013 -0.030 0.0180 0.038 -0.091 0.0382 0.081 -0.197 0.0741 0.132 -0.328 0.1264 0.182 -0.457 0.1745 
(2.64)*** (-2.40)**   (3.13)*** (-2.85)***   (4.05)*** (-3.70)***   (4.72)*** (-4.30)***   (5.09)*** (-4.57)***   
Panel n=12 n=12 n=12 n=12 n=12 
E m=1 m=3 m=6 m=9 m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
0.013 -0.032 0.0189 0.044 -0.110 0.0533 0.092 -0.232 0.0949 0.142 -0.360 0.1395 0.187 -0.471 0.1709 
 
(2.75)*** (-2.56)**   (3.88)*** (-3.64)***   (4.89)*** (-4.34)***   (5.07)*** (-4.50)***   (5.39)*** (-4.84)***   
Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.014 -0.033 0.0217 0.045 -0.111 0.0606 0.092 -0.230 0.1042 0.143 -0.356 0.1521 0.187 -0.464 0.1837 
(2.94)*** (-2.81)***   (4.10)*** (-3.95)***   (5.10)*** (-4.63)***   (5.27)*** (-4.75)***   (5.53)*** (-5.02)***   
Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.014 -0.036 0.0233 0.047 -0.122 0.0626 0.097 -0.255 0.1089 0.149 -0.390 0.1553 0.195 -0.508 0.1876 
(2.87)*** (-2.73)***   (3.96)*** (-3.77)***   (4.89)*** (-4.44)***   (5.12)*** (-4.63)***   (5.49)*** (-4.98)***   
 
Sample periods are 92 quarters from 1986 to 2008. HML denotes high minus low, is the difference in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-
market stocks and low book-to-market stocks. NPR denotes quarterly aggregate net number of purchases trading ratio, calculated by dividing the net number 
of purchases (number of purchases minus number of sales) by the total number of director transaction of all firms (P-S)/(P+S), Seasonal Adj_1 denotes 
seasonal adjusted director trading transactions based on December and March fiscal year end by assumption, Seasonal Adj_2 denotes seasonal adjusted 
director trading transactions based on December and March fiscal year end by Observations. Both methods of seasonal adjustment are fully described in 
Chapter 3. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Newey-West t-statistics present in parentheses.  
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Appendix N  
Time Series Regression of Future 1-, 3-, 6-, 9- and 12-Month HML on Past 1-, 3-, 6-, 9- and 12- Change of Aggregate Net Director 
Purchases Ratio by All Firms 
 
Panel n=1 n=1 n=1 n=1 n=1 
A m=1 m=3 m=6 m=9 m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
0.0044 0.017 0.0070 0.013 0.023 0.0005 0.027 0.013 -0.0032 0.042 0.017 -0.0032 0.057 0.044 -0.0013 
 
(2.26)** (1.86)* 
 
(3.18)*** (1.05) 
 
(4.03)*** (0.38) 
 
(4.77)*** (0.39) 
 
(5.35)*** (0.73) 
 Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.0044 0.017 0.0070 0.013 0.023 0.0005 0.027 0.013 -0.0032 0.042 0.017 -0.0032 0.057 0.044 -0.0013 
(2.26)** (1.86)* 
 
(3.18)*** (1.05) 
 
(4.03)*** (0.38) 
 
(4.77)*** (0.39) 
 
(5.35)*** (0.73) 
 Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.0044 0.018 0.0056 0.013 0.017 -0.0018 0.027 0.010 -0.0035 0.042 0.017 -0.0033 0.057 0.040 -0.0021 
(2.26)** (1.81)*   (3.18)*** (0.80)   (4.03)*** (0.32)   (4.77)*** (0.38)   (5.34)*** (0.72)   
Panel n=3 n=3 n=3 n=3 n=3 
B m=1 m=3 m=6 m=9 m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
0.004 0.011 0.0052 0.013 0.012 -0.0014 0.027 -0.0006 -0.0038 0.042 0.014 -0.0031 0.056 0.046 0.0017 
 
(1.85)* (1.48) 
 
(2.01)** (0.74) 
 
(2.39)** (-0.02) 
 
(2.76)*** (0.37) 
 
(3.08)*** (0.98) 
 Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.004 0.011 0.0052 0.013 0.012 -0.0014 0.027 -0.0006 -0.0038 0.042 0.014 -0.0031 0.056 0.046 0.0017 
(1.85)* (1.48) 
 
(2.01)** (0.74) 
 
(2.39)** (-0.02) 
 
(2.76)*** (0.37) 
 
(3.08)*** (0.98) 
 Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.005 0.008 0.0003 0.013 0.010 -0.0025 0.027 -0.0002 -0.0038 0.042 0.017 -0.0030 0.056 0.046 0.0007 
(1.85)* (1.04)   (2.01)** (0.51)   (2.39)** (-0.01)   (2.76)*** (0.40)   (3.08)*** (0.88)   
Panel n=6 n=6 n=6 n=6 n=6 
C m=1 m=3 m=6 m=9 m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
0.004 0.007 0.0002 0.013 0.002 -0.0037 0.026 0.004 -0.0037 0.040 0.047 0.0054 0.054 0.061 0.0073 
 
(1.73)* (0.92) 
 
(1.91)* (0.13) 
 
(2.27)** (0.14) 
 
(2.61)** (1.19) 
 
(2.92)*** (1.20) 
 Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.004 0.007 0.0002 0.013 0.002 -0.0037 0.026 0.004 -0.0037 0.040 0.047 0.0054 0.054 0.061 0.0073 
(1.73)* (0.92) 
 
(1.91)* (0.13) 
 
(2.27)** (0.14) 
 
(2.61)** (1.19) 
 
(2.92)*** (1.20) 
 Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.004 0.006 -0.0012 0.013 0.003 -0.0036 0.026 0.009 -0.0033 0.040 0.048 0.0050 0.054 0.058 0.0051 
(1.73)* (0.72)   (1.91)* (0.15)   (2.27)** (0.32)   (2.61)** (1.13)   (2.92)*** (1.06)   
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Appendix N (Continued) 
 
Panel n=9 n=9 n=9 n=9 n=9 
D m=1 m=3 m=6 m=9 m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
0.004 0.008 0.0010 0.012 0.011 -0.0016 0.024 0.043 0.0095 0.038 0.071 0.0176 0.051 0.065 0.0086 
 
(1.64) (1.00) 
 
(1.78)* (0.72) 
 
(2.11)** (1.61) 
 
(2.46)** (1.67)* 
 
(2.77)*** (1.32) 
 Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.004 0.008 0.0010 0.012 0.011 -0.0016 0.024 0.043 0.0095 0.038 0.071 0.0176 0.051 0.065 0.0086 
(1.64) (1.00) 
 
(1.78)* (0.72) 
 
(2.11)** (1.61) 
 
(2.46)** (1.67)* 
 
(2.77)*** (1.32) 
 Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.004 0.007 -0.0004 0.012 0.013 -0.0010 0.024 0.047 0.0097 0.038 0.072 0.0152 0.051 0.059 0.0051 
(1.65) (0.88)   (1.78)* (0.78)   (2.10)** (1.67)*   (2.45)** (1.61)   (2.76)*** (1.18)   
Panel n=12 n=12 n=12 n=12 n=12 
E m=1 m=3 m=6 m=9 m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
0.003 0.024 0.0391 0.011 0.047 0.0311 0.023 0.069 0.0251 0.036 0.077 0.0175 0.049 0.061 0.0057 
 
(1.42) (2.85)*** 
 
(1.62) (2.31)** 
 
(1.96)* (1.96)* 
 
(2.31)** (1.65) 
 
(2.64)*** (1.17) 
 Seasonal 
Adj_1 
0.003 0.024 0.0391 0.011 0.047 0.0311 0.023 0.069 0.0251 0.036 0.077 0.0175 0.049 0.061 0.0057 
(1.42) (2.85)*** 
 
(1.62) (2.31)** 
 
(1.96)* (1.96)* 
 
(2.31)** (1.65) 
 
(2.64)*** (1.17) 
 Seasonal 
Adj_2 
0.004 0.022 0.0255 0.011 0.044 0.0235 0.023 0.067 0.0199 0.036 0.068 0.0111 0.050 0.044 0.0005 
(1.43) (2.32)**   (1.62) (1.89)*   (1.96)* (1.73)*   (2.31)** (1.37)   (2.62)*** (0.75)   
 
Sample periods are 92 quarters from 1986 to 2008. HML denotes high minus low, is the difference in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-
market stocks and low book-to-market stocks. ∆NPR denotes NPR in month t minus NPR in month t-1, where NPR denotes quarterly aggregate net number 
of purchases trading ratio, calculated by dividing the net number of purchases (number of purchases minus number of sales) by the total number of director 
transaction of all firms (P-S)/(P+S), Seasonal Adj_1 denotes seasonal adjusted director trading transactions based on December and March fiscal year end 
by assumption, Seasonal Adj_2 denotes seasonal adjusted director trading transactions based on December and March fiscal year end by Observations. 
Both methods of seasonal adjustment are fully described in Chapter 3. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Newey-West t-statistics present in parentheses.  
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Appendix O 
Regressions of Future  3-, 6-, 9-, 12-Month SMB on Past 3-, 6-, 9-, 12-Month Market Excess Returns on: 1986-2008 
 
 
Panel n=3   n=3   n=3   n=3 
A m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
-0.0006 0.175 0.0476 
 
0.0022 0.017 -0.0034 
 
0.0031 -0.005 -0.0036 
 
0.0022 -0.055 -0.0024 
 
(-0.12) (1.73)* 
  
(0.20) (0.16) 
  
(0.19) (-0.03) 
  
(0.10) (-0.39) 
 Panel n=6   n=6   n=6   n=6 
B m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
0.0008 -0.004 -0.0036 
 
0.0034 -0.096 0.0105 
 
0.0048 -0.148 0.0187 
 
0.0033 -0.144 0.0119 
 
(0.13) (-0.06) 
  
(0.30) (-0.93) 
  
(0.29) (-1.18) 
  
(0.15) (-1.10) 
 Panel n=9   n=9   n=9   n=9 
C m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
   α0 α1 Adj R
2
   α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
0.0010 -0.011 -0.0031 
 
0.0042 -0.104 0.0205 
 
0.0053 -0.136 0.0232 
 
0.0040 -0.175 0.0290 
 
(0.16) (-0.20) 
  
(0.36) (-1.18) 
  
(0.32) (-1.28) 
  
(0.18) (-1.52) 
 Panel n=12   n=12   n=12   n=12 
D m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
   α0 α1 Adj R
2
   α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2
 
 
0.0015 -0.029 0.0011 
 
0.0045 -0.100 0.0251 
 
0.0060 -0.162 0.0459 
 
0.0046 -0.193 0.0497 
  (0.24) (-0.63)    (0.38) (-1.30)    (0.36) (-1.63)    (0.22) (-1.68)*   
 
Sample periods are 276 months from 1986 to 2008. SMB denotes the difference in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and big stocks. 
MKT denotes excess returns between return on index of FTSE All Share and return on the 90-day Treasury Bills. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Newey-West t-statistics present in parentheses.  
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Appendix P 
Regressions of Future  3-, 6-, 9-, 12-Month HML on Past 3-, 6-, 9-, 12-Month Market Excess Returns on: 1986-2008 
 
 
Panel n=3   n=3   n=3   n=3 
B m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
0.0114 -0.013 -0.0033 
 
0.0225 -0.009 -0.0036 
 
0.0333 -0.130 0.0012 
 
0.0428 -0.213 0.0053 
 
(1.62) (-0.23) 
  
(1.45) (-0.09) 
  
(1.39) (-0.91) 
  
(1.31) (-1.18) 
 Panel n=6   n=6   n=6   n=6 
C m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
0.0112 -0.011 -0.0033 
 
0.0226 -0.069 0.0008 
 
0.0336 -0.185 0.0151 
 
0.0422 -0.158 0.0053 
 
(1.56) (-0.25) 
  
(1.46) (-0.75) 
  
(1.41) (-1.31) 
  
(1.27) (-0.95) 
 Panel n=9   n=9   n=9   n=9 
D m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
0.0116 -0.050 0.0047 
 
0.0234 -0.129 0.0186 
 
0.0337 -0.166 0.0178 
 
0.0412 -0.127 0.0044 
 
(1.64) (-1.25) 
  
(1.54) (-1.41) 
  
(1.39) (-1.33) 
  
(1.20) (-0.83) 
 Panel n=12   n=12   n=12   n=12 
E m=3 
 
m=6 
 
m=9 
 
m=12 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2   α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
α0 α1 Adj R
2 
 
0.0120 -0.067 0.0154 
 
0.0229 -0.096 0.0126 
 
0.0324 -0.112 0.0088 
 
0.0399 -0.106 0.0036 
  (1.73)* (-1.68)*    (1.47) (-1.37)    (1.28) (-1.17)    (1.14) (-0.81)   
 
Sample periods are 276 months from 1986 to 2008. HML is the difference in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and low 
book-to-market stocks. MKT denotes excess returns between return on index of FTSE All Share and return on the 90-day Treasury Bills. The symbols *, **, 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Newey-West t-statistics present in parentheses.  
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Appendix Q 
Summary of Forecasting Accuracy to Regressions of 1-Year Leads of Quarterly Nominal GDP Growth Rates on 1-Year Lags of MKT, 
SMB, HML and NPR/CBI on 1986-2008 
)4,(),4(),4(),4()4,( /*Re**   tttttttttt CBINPRdtFactorcMKTbaGDPGrowth   
)4,()(),4()(),4(),4(),4()4,( ***/*Re**   tttttttttttttt TERMgIPGrowthfDYeCBINPRdtFactorcMKTbaGDPGrowth   
Con 
 
… 
 
SMB 
   
NPR/CBI 
 
… 
 
… 
 
… 
 
NPR is Better than CBI 
Con   …   …   HML   NPR/CBI   …   …   …   NPR is Better than CBI 
Con 
 
… 
 
SMB 
 
HML 
 
NPR/CBI 
 
… 
 
… 
 
… 
 
NPR is Better than CBI 
Con   MKT   SMB   …   NPR/CBI   …   …   …   NPR is Better than CBI 
Con 
 
MKT 
 
… 
 
HML 
 
NPR/CBI 
 
… 
 
… 
 
… 
 
NPR is Better than CBI 
Con   MKT   SMB   HML   NPR/CBI   …   …   …   NPR is Better than CBI 
Con 
 
… 
 
SMB 
 
HML 
 
NPR/CBI 
 
DY 
 
IPGrowth 
 
Term 
 
NPR is Better than CBI 
Con   MKT   SMB   HML   NPR/CBI   DY   IPGrowth   Term   NPR is Better than CBI 
 
Sample periods are 92 quarters from 1986 to 2008, quarterly Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is seasonally adjusted. GDPGrowth denotes nominal GDP 
growth rate. MKT denotes excess returns between return on index of FTSE All Share and return on the 90-day Treasury Bills. ‘FactorRet’ stands for SMB 
and HML. SMB is the difference in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and big stocks, HML is the difference in the returns of a value-
weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-market stocks. NPR denotes quarterly aggregate net number of purchases trading ratio, 
calculated by dividing the net number of purchases (number of purchases minus number of sales) by the total number of director transaction of all firms (P-
S)/(P+S). CBI denotes quarterly industrial trends survey data provided by Confederation of British Industry (CBI business confidence). DY denotes the 
dividend yield of FTSE All Share. IPGrowth denotes industrial production growth. TERM denotes long-run rate minus short term rate in UK, calculated by 
long-run rate (the yield to maturity of a 10-year government bond) minus short term rate (90-day UK Treasury Bill rate). The symbols *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Newey-West t-statistics with 3 lags present in parentheses.  
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Appendix R 
Post-trade long-run CTAR of Director Purchases by Director Role Using the 
Carhart 4 Factor Model for Holding Periods of 1-, 3-, 6-, 12-, 18- and 24-Month 
from January 1994 to December 2008 
 
Director 
Group  
1-month 
AR 
3-month 
AR 
6-month 
AR 
12-month 
AR 
18-month 
AR 
24-month 
AR   
        
CEO 
 
2.28% 0.76% 0.26% 0.36% 0.27% 0.10% 
 
(4.21)*** (1.66)* (0.61) (0.92) (0.71) (0.27) 
CFO 
 
3.35% 1.70% 1.30% 0.43% 0.23% 0.32% 
 
(3.78)*** (2.70)*** (2.45)** (0.89) (0.51) (0.71) 
Chair Exe 
 
2.49% 1.02% 1.27% 0.54% 0.21% -0.14% 
 
(2.25)** (1.13) (1.34) (0.81) (0.35) (-0.28) 
Chair Non 
 
2.82% 0.58% 0.46% 0.47% 0.53% 0.45% 
 
(2.92)*** (0.88) (0.79) (0.99) (1.04) (0.95) 
Other Exe 
 
1.91% 1.23% 0.66% 0.31% 0.19% -0.02% 
 
(3.17)*** (2.70)*** (1.54) (0.82) (0.49) (-0.05) 
Other Non 
 
2.54% 1.86% 1.07% 0.25% 0.17% -0.21% 
  (3.11)*** (3.09)*** (2.22)** (0.58) (0.38) (-0.50) 
 
ARs are intercepts from Fama-French regression of the calendar time portfolio on a market 
factor, a size factor and a book-to-market factor. Weighted Least Squares estimation, 
where the weighting factor is based o the number of securities in the portfolio in each 
calendar month, is applied.  
CEO: Chief Executive Officer; CFO: Chief Financial Officer; Chair Exe: Executive 
Chairman; Chair Non: Non-Executive Chairman; Other Exe: Other Executives exclude 
CEO, CFO and Executive Chairman; Other Non: Other Non-Executives exclude Non-
Executive Chairman.  
Rpt is the simple return on the calendar-time portfolio, Rft is the return on the 90-day 
Treasury Bills, Rmt is the return on index of FTSE All Share, SMBt is the difference in the 
returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and big stocks, HMLt is the difference 
in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and low book-to-
market stocks. MOMt is difference in average return on high prior return portfolios and low 
prior return portfolios. The estimate of the intercept term (αi), provides a test of the null 
hypothesis that the mean monthly excess return on the calendar-time portfolio is zero.  
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, with t-value in 
parentheses. 
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